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Introduction 
The rise of privately enforceable rights in national courts based on substantive 
international law is an undeniable global phenomenon. Private rights are one 
response to the necessity of legal institutions to cope with globalisation. More-
over, the existence of privately enforceable rights is one more piece of evi-
dence that the state-centred international system has undergone fundamental 
and irreversible change in the last 50 years. Privately enforceable rights and 
corresponding private duties based in substantive international law and enfor-
ceable in domestic courts are also evidence that monist theories of internatio-
nal law are empirically more correct than dualist theories. Finally, privately 
enforceable human rights undermine the claims of realism to primacy in inter-
national relations theory. Realism posits that international relations are funda-
mentally based on power politics and are zero sum. The rise of trading blocs, 
privatisation, and individual human rights all demonstrate the des-integration 
of the state due to globalisation and localisation and tend to invalidate the rea-
lists. For all these reasons, the issue of private law rights under international 
law is a timely topic. 
Our examination centres on one aspect of this complex of problems: the 
availability and limits of private law remedies to human rights violations – 
largely, torts. This thesis presents a comparative inquiry into those rights and 
duties based on international law recognized in national legal orders. Happily, 
and perhaps surprisingly, tort law can contribute to the defense of human 
rights. But that possibility is qualified by numerous serious limitations: proce-
durally, litigants usually invoke universal jurisdiction in cases of human rights 
violations heard in first world courts. Jurisdiction to adjudicate is usually 
accepted without problem. But precisely because certain violations of human 
rights are of universal concern there are numerous jurisdictional limitations on 
substantive rights while very real are not insurmountable. That is the principal 
contradiction of international tort law: the theoretical availability of universal 
rights, contradicted by the practical unavailability of relief, theoretically due to 
jurisdictional limitations, practically due to judgement proof defendants. The 
practical and procedural limitations are not however so great as to extinguish 
or obviate all human rights claims in private law. 
Limits of the Inquiry 
The thesis limits its inquiry to a few countries. Principally, the United States, 
and secondarily Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany. The law of Senegal, a 
former French colony, is also examined briefly as is Israeli and Greek law. All 
countries examined permit some form of extraterritorial human rights enforce-
ment including private law enforcement. In practice, most countries examined  
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permit private law enforcement for human rights violations. Numerous count-
ries could not be examined due to limits on space and language. For example, 
Spain offers generous extraterritorial human rights protection but is not exa-
mined. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in Eastern Europe was not examined. The 
thesis limits itself to a discussion of private law rights, principally under inter-
national law, though complementary remedies in domestic law such as the 
TVPA (Torture Victim Protection Act) are considered secondarily. 
Interest of the Inquiry 
A technological revolution has resulted in a smaller world. Global communica-
tion is instant and inexpensive. Transportation is also increasingly inexpensive. 
The result is a world that is more and more closely integrated economically. 
This process is described as globalisation. 
Globalisation requires instruments of governance. The telecom and transporta-
tion revolutions allow, even necessitate, the creation of subnational and super-
national governance. The devolution of state power by privatisation, decentra-
lisation, and the sublimation of state power to transnational and global govern-
ing bodies (EU, WTO, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.). This twin phenomena, 
globalisation and devolution, explains why private remedies are of increasing 
importance. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this work are as follows:    
1.  To determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S. law is consistent 
with U.S. international obligations. I conclude that the ATS (Alien Tort Sta-
tute) and TVPA are not at all idiosyncratic.   
2.  To determine whether and how private law remedies can reduce violations 
of international human rights laws. I conclude that private law can and does 
play an important supplementary role in the defence of human rights.    
3.    To determine how European and U.S. laws can influence each other to 
improve protection of human rights globally. I note that both EU and U.S. laws 
permit extraterritorial defence of human rights in their domestic private law 
but that they use different instruments to do so. The U.S. appears to rely prima-
rily on private law remedies and secondarily on criminal prosecution. The EU 
in contrast relies primarily on criminal law (public law) first but does accord 
private law a secondary role in defence of human rights. The normative con-
clusion is obvious: the U.S. and the EU can each learn from the other. 
Problématique 
The guiding star of this work is simple: Most human rights abuse occurs in the 
third world. Some human rights abuse in the third world is profitable and  
  9
benefits the first world. How can the first world remedy this injustice? How 
can the first world improve the defence of human rights in the third world? 
These questions guide the research but do not limit it. Answering these ques-
tions leads us to discover some other interesting ideas regarding, for example, 
the proper relation between natural and positive law. 
Method 
Materialism, that is empirical examination of facts as they are in the real 
world, is the ontological foundation of this thesis. By examining the existing 
laws we determine their lacunes and can propose remedies. Philosophical idea-
lism is rejected as a method of inquiry since verification of ideal propositions 
is at best purely formal and at worst impossible or even irrelevant. 
Existing Literature 
The method applied, a practical inquiry, is geared not to surveying and synthe-
sizing existing literature but rather to determine existing protection and how 
that protection can best be extended. Thus I cannot claim to have a comprehen-
sive overview of all literature – that would be impossible. However, the prag-
matic approach has resulted in a thorough survey of most English language 
cases and commentary in this field. As well, it has resulted in a solid examina-
tion of leading cases in  French law and as basic knowledge of leading German 
cases and of French and German language commentary. All major U.S. law 
reviews, all leading U.S. cases, most leading European cases, and many Euro-
pean secondary sources are surveyed indirectly for they are they frame the 
inquiry and drive the research to its goal. 
As can be imagined, a comparative study of private law protection of hu-
man rights could be endless. To the best of my knowledge there is no compre-
hensive comparative study of private law defence of human rights. Most inqui-
ries are limited to the national level. This is likely because a comprehensive 
comparative inquiry into private law defence of human rights would be enor-
mous. For these reasons hopefully the limitations on my brief survey are 
forgivable. 
Outline 
The thesis is structured quite simply. First, it examines the law of the United 
States, then transnational corporate law, then the law of Europe. This approach 
allows a smooth transition from U.S. law to European law. It also permits the 
development and testing of hypotheses and results in a solid comparative 
study.  
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Chapter I presents a general outline of the Alien Torts Statute (ATS also 
known as the Alien Tort Claims Act or ATCA). The ATS grants plaintiffs 
private causes of action for torts in violation of the law of nations as does the 
Torture Victims' Protection Act. Private law remedies for violations of inter-
national law such as the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victims’ Pro-
tection Act are controversial solutions to real world problems. Though un-
orthodox, private law remedies are consistent with international law and are 
one remedy to violations of human rights. This chapter explains their jurisdic-
tional foundation and procedural obstacles in U.S. law. While private law 
rights of action in tort are consistent with U.S. international obligations and 
can operate as one remedy to human rights violations securing these rights de-
pends on overcoming a number of jurisdictional and procedural obstacles in 
U.S. law. 
In Chapter I Foucault‘s analysis of power and knowledge is brought to bear 
to explain the historical ubiquity of torture in feudal and prefeudal society 
contrasted by its rapid and total disapprobation, if not outright disappearance, 
in industrial society. Simply put, development and torture are inversely cor-
related and Foucault helps us understand why. The theoretical foundation of 
the thesis on materialism and monism is made here. 
In Chapter II we examine a recent joined case before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. There, Aristotle and Hobbes are brought to bear to show why the U.S. 
Supreme Court has needlessly limited itself in limiting the application of the 
ATS to de lege lata and not extending it to de lege ferenda. This case thus also 
illustrates a growing polarisation and crisis in U.S. legal thought. Aristotle 
shows us how to both adequately diagnose and prescribe remedies to the cur-
rent crisis in U.S. legal thought. Holism, materialism, and monism are ideas 
common to Aristotle and Foucault, which provide a theoretical framework 
consistently taken throughout the thesis. Monism, holism, materialism, cogniti-
vism, and nominalism are the essence of the author’s coherent theoretical posi-
tion. Usually nominalism and holism are cast as necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, just as positivism and natural law are cast not as contradictory. In fact 
neither of those dualisms are accurate. Thus, the thesis proves a secondary 
point: numerous enthymemes in contemporary legal theory are erroneous – a 
point expressly demonstrated in chapter two and implicit throughout the thesis. 
Chapters III and IV address corporate human rights law. Common to both is 
one problem: exploitative profit. The problems facing business in the third 
world – illegality, child labor, and political instability – often hinder economic 
development but present companies the opportunity to make short term profit 
by behaving irresponsibly and unethically. These chapters attempt to address 
and answer that problem.  
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Chapter III explores the liabilities of a parent corporation for the tortious 
acts of its overseas subsidiaries and explores the doctrinal confusion inherent 
in current tests for piercing the corporate veil. The issue here is how to impute 
corporate liability to a corporate main office (usually in the first world) for the 
tortious acts of subsidiaries and/or contractors in the third world. Economically 
this is an example of the problem of internalising externalities. Juridically 
incoherence in the definition of when a company can be held liable for wrong-
ful acts of subsidiaries is resolved by a comprehensive historical examination 
of the development of tort law. Chapter III concludes that corporations can be 
held vicariously liable for the torts of their overseas subsidiaries based on the-
ories of agency such as respondeat superior. It examines European law briefly 
and notes that the legal system there follow similar rules. It concludes that the 
role of corporate governance in the globalising world presents challenges and 
opportunities for the corporation as legal person having rights and duties under 
international law: prudent corporate counsel will note these practical trends 
and theoretical explanations in order to capitalize on opportunities and avoid 
pitfalls of liability. 
Chapter IV keeps the focus on international corporate law and looks at the 
corporate social responsibility movement. Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is an attempt to encourage corporations to act altruistically out of en-
lightened self interest. The corporate social responsibility movement proposes 
that companies should “self regulate” and adopt codes of conduct and general 
guidelines to help companies make ethical decisions. „Soft law“ examples of 
codes of good conduct and labelling schemes are examined here. The corporate 
social responsibility movement is examined critically because corporations 
have every incentive to present themselves as responsible while profiting from 
irresponsibility. Because exploitation is profitable market based remedies 
alone are inadequate to remedy corporate abuse of human rights in the third 
world. 
Chapter IV also considers – and rejects – the idea that the corporate social 
responsibility movement be comparable to the medieval “lex mercatoria”. A 
number of factual differences show why comparing lex mercatoria with inter-
national human rights law is a false analogy. Yet, though corporations will not 
make unprofitable decisions, some modest law reforms can make unethical and 
unfair trading unprofitable. Reforms which are founded on the self interest of 
shareholders are more likely to succeed than those founded on altruism be-
cause altruists are unfortunately a minority. The modest reforms to encourage 
shareholder activism will ensure that the corporation performs in the interest of 
its owners and not its managers. These modest reforms do not go far enough to 
end the problems of malnutrition, inadequate medicine, and labor and resource  
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exploitation, but they are achievable and will, if adopted, improve the lot of the 
third world and so are worth pursuing. 
Having examined U.S. law and corporation law the thesis next turns to 
European law in Chapter  V. The inquiry into European law is intended to 
determine whether the U.S. position on extraterritorial human rights law knows 
parallels in the laws of other developed countries. In fact it does. However the 
accent changes. The main protection of human rights law overseas in the U.S. 
is found in private law due to limited state resources available to prosecutors. 
That is, human rights are, de facto, a secondary concern of the public pro-
secutor in the U.S. This chapter shows that the U.S. and Europe are mirrors of 
each other in the extraterritorial enforcement of international human rights law. 
All countries examined enforce international human rights extraterritorially, at 
least in theory, relying on either criminal or civil law. Yet in Europe the accent 
is placed on criminal prosecution, with ancillary civil remedies whereas in the 
U.S. the accent is placed on civil remedies with ancillary criminal remedies. 
Both the U.S. and Europe have something to learn about human rights. But in 
all events: enforceable individual rights under international law are here to 
stay. Transitioning from British to French, Belgian and German law the hypo-
thesis of transatlantic continuity on these issues holds. Cases litigated before 
these countries demonstrate the theoretical existence, qualified by procedural 
and practical difficulties, of universal jurisdiction for torts in violations of the 
law of nations, in one form or another. 
Chapter V is the final chapter and concludes that the common law countries 
are the most receptive to private law claims in tort, that such claims while 
unusual can be raised in the Francophone countries, and that Germany seems 
least receptive to such claims. Among the latin countries Spanish law is 
unexamined just as among the Germanic countries all of Scandinavia Austria, 
and Switzerland are not examined. The laws of former socialist countries 
(principally the USSR and the PRC) are also not examined. Unfortunately, to 
develop a truly representative cross section of both the continental civil law 
and the common law would have demanded study of at least another dozen 
countries. It is thus hoped that this work may inspire further research among 
specialists in the law of those countries who have at least a reading knowledge 
of those languages which this author is unfamiliar. 
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Chapter I 
The Torture Victim’s Protection Act,  
the Alien Tort Claims Act,  
and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge * 
Abstract: 
Private law Remedies for violations of international law such as the U.S. Alien 
Tort Claims Act and Toture Victim’s Protection Act are controversial solutions 
to real world problems. Private law remedies are however limited by pro-
cedural obstacles both in international law and domestic law. Though unortho-
dox, private law remedies are consistent with international law and are one 
remedy to violations of human rights. This paper describes these substantive 
rights with particular reference to U.S. law as well as the procedural limitations 
under both U.S. and international law. 
 
* This article appeared under this title in 67 Albany Law Review 501 (2003).  
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INTRODUCTION 
To understand the basis for any governmental action criminalizing torture, 
sanctioning torture, or allowing civil recovery for acts of torture, one must not 
only understand the legal issues involved, but also the societal and historical 
events which gave rise to those legal remedies. Modern international society 
condemns torture – as it rightly should – because the international body politic 
has implicitly rejected the theory underlying torture and has accepted the very 
logical and reasonable, as well as moral reasons for rejecting the practice of 
torture. Because of this need to understand both the legal realities, which result 
from the rejection of torture as a viable method of governmental action, and 
the historical backdrop thereto, my comments will first discuss the law pertain-
ing to torture, followed by a brief look at the philosophy, history and theory of 
medieval torture, and then conclude with a discussion of contemporary events 
that implicate or directly involve the modern practice of torture. 
I. THE ATCA AND THE TVPA 
There are two statutes in American law with which I hope you are familiar: the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)
1 and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991 (“TVPA”).
2 The TVPA and ATCA are two wonderful American laws. 
These laws grant persons, not even necessarily United States citizens, a cause 
of action in tort in the United States for torts that violate international law – 
such as torture. When I think of the ATCA and the TVPA, I can only imagine 
that Attorney General Ashcroft is throwing his hands in the air in frustration 
because until September 11
th, the United States could afford to say, we don’t 
torture, we don’t torture, we don’t torture.  Since facing the reality of domestic 
terrorism, the United States is asking itself, should it torture, should it torture, 
and it should not. These laws illustrate the political difficulties of whether or 
not the international community – especially the United States – will in fact 
respect what is the jus cogens norm
3 – namely, the norm against torture as a 
                                                 
1  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
2  Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) [here-
inafter TVPA]. 
3  Jus cogens, from the Latin meaning “compelling law”. See Black’s Law Dictionary 
864 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus cogens as “[a] mandatory norm of general inter-
national law from which no two or more nations may exempt themselves or release 
one another”).  
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non-derogable international law.
4 
The ATCA and the TVPA create a private right of action in the United 
States both for United States nationals under the TVPA and for foreign natio-
nals under the ATCA. The ATCA is a jurisdictional statute.
5 It was enacted as 
a part of the first judiciary act of the United States in 1789. The ATCA pro-
vides that: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”
6 
The legislative history of the ATCA is unknown. The statute itself remained 
relatively dormant until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. In Filartiga, an alien, Filar-
tiga, successfully sued Pena-Irala, a non-citizen living in the United States, in a 
United States court, for torturing Filartiga’s son to death in Paraguay.
7 The 
plaintiff succeeded on his claim, despite defendant’s deportation to Paraguay 
prior to trial, because the court determined that torture is a violation of the law 
of nations, and thus was a valid basis for an ATCA claim.
8 The court noted that 
although the ATCA traces its origins to the Judiciary Act of 1789, the evolu-
tion of international law since that time requires courts to interpret and apply 
current international law to ATCA claims.
9 Filartiga was the first modern case 
to litigate the ATCA. 
As earlier mentioned, the ATCA is merely a jurisdictional statute allowing 
U.S. courts to litigate claims for torts in violation of jus gentium (public inter-
national law).
10 Any criticism of partiality can be easily deflected since the 
ATCA grants only aliens a cause of action against either aliens or citizens. 
Since Filartiga several other cases have also litigated ATCA claims
11 The 
                                                 
4  Jus cogens norms are owed by states towards each other and, possibly, towards 
individuals. For a thoughtful discussion on the ideas of jus cogens, see Anita 
Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity:  From Nuremberg to Rangoon An Examination of 
Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 153-54 (2002). 
5  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
6  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
7 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
8 Id. at 884-85. 
9 Id. at 881, 884. 
10  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
11 See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 
(1989) (citing Filartiga to support its decision that international law is evolving, and 
thus the scope of the ATCA also changes); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2003 WL 
22317923, *3 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that a proper issue on appeal would have  
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Supreme Court has directly addressed the ATCA in at least twice in recent 
years.
12 The Supreme Court does not question the legality of the ATCA under 
international law, instead rejecting plaintiffs’ claims because of the defendants’ 
sovereign immunity.
13 
Not only has the Supreme Court not outright rejected the use of the ATCA 
to litigate claims before the American courts, Congress has expressed its 
approval of the use of the ATCA by enacting the TVPA. The TVPA extends to 
United States citizens a remedy for torture and extrajudicial killing that had 
previously been available only to aliens.
14 While the TVPA is not jurisdictional 
like the ATCA, it creates a substantive cause of action in tort.
15 “Private” 
torture, however, may be recognized as a violation of the TVPA where the 
torture occurred under “color of law”.
16 Like the ATCA, the TVPA requires 
exhaustion of local remedies.
17 Additionally, the TVPA subjects claims to a 
ten-year statute of limitations.
18 This ten-year statute of limitations was also 
applied to the ATCA,
19 although the ATCA is silent as to any limitation. 
                                                                                                                                                      
been whether the alleged conduct violated customary international law); Flores v. S. 
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 143, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction the ATCA claim against a mining company whose Peru-
vian operations caused severe lung disease as a result of pollution); Alvarez-Machain 
v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an arbitrary arrest 
and detention of a Mexican national in Mexico at the direction of Drug Enforcement 
Agency was a violation of the law of nations under the ATCA). 
12  See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993) (finding that the Saudi govern-
ment’s wrongful arrest and torture of Nelson did not fall within the commercial 
activity exception of the ATCA, a necessary condition for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the action); Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434, 439 (ruling that 
since the tort was committed by a foreign state rather than by an individual, the ATCA 
claim was unavailable). 
13  Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363; Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 439. 
14  TVPA § 2(a) specifically uses the word “individual” where the ATCA had used the 
word “alien”. 
15  The title to section two of the TVPA is “Establishment of Civil Action”. 
16  TVPA § 2(a); see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-4(2d Cir. 1995). Whether a 
corporation can be liable under the TVPA is contentious. The TVPA uses only the 
term “individual” which argues against a finding that corporations may be liable for 
torture, but the overall purpose of the statute is to remedy torturous wrongdoings, 
irrespective of which individual is torturing. 
17 TVPA  §2(b). 
18  TVPA § 2(c). 
19  Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002).  
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A. Obstacles to Succeeding Under the ATCA/TVPA 
There are eight distinct domestic obstacles to using these private remedies 
against those who violate the law of nations; all of these obstacles result from 
current interpretation of United States law.
20 The more pertinent and relevant 
discussion focuses on how to meet and overcome these various obstacles. 
1. Jurisdictional  Requirements 
Personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction present the first obstacle to 
finding liability under the ATCA. For example, in the case of An v. Chun,
21 
Young-Kae An sued General Doo-Whan Chun, General Tae Woo Roh, and 
several other military leaders of Korea, alleging that they tortured his father to 
death.
22 The case, though factually similar to Filartiga, was dismissed due to a 
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
23 Though defendants did 
occasionally visit the United States, their visits as government employees were 
not sufficient to trigger general jurisdiction.
24 One defendant did visit the U.S. 
at least once on vacation but that was not considered a sufficient “minimum 
contact” for specific jurisdiction.
25 
What might appear to be a debilitating jurisdictional obstacle need not 
always block a foreign plaintiff from successfully obtaining jurisdiction over a 
defendant in the United States. An should be contrasted with Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.,
26 where New York found it had jurisdiction over a fo-
                                                 
20  For a comprehensive discussion of the inter-relation of international law and the 
ATCA/TVPA see Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and Inter-
national Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Vio-
lations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
21  No. 96-35971, 1998 WL 31494 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 
(1998). 
22  Id. at *1. 
23  Id. 
24  The case specifically states: 
Where service is made under § 1608 of the FSIA, the relevant area in delineating con-
tacts is the entire United States, not merely the forum state. Appellees have not 
engaged in the necessary activity in the United States to confer either general or 
specific personal jurisdiction. They do not own property or conduct business any-
where in the United States. Their visits to this country have been almost entirely 
official visits on behalf of the Korean government, which do not confer general 
jurisdiction, and were unrelated to the cause of action in this case. 
Id. 
25 Id. at n.12. 
26  226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).  
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reign petroleum company, despite the availability of an arguably more 
convenient forum in England.
27 
2. Exhaustion 
Exhaustion presents the second obstacle to a plaintiff’s ATCA/TVPA claim.  
Plaintiffs making claims under the TVPA – and possibly also under the ATCA 
– must have first exhausted their local remedies.
28 In practice, however, the 
realities of lawless regimes indicate that the requirement of exhaustion of those 
local remedies will not be problematic for litigants.
29 This obstacle is more 
theoretical than practical. 
3. Comity 
Comity is a third obstacle that a plaintiff is likely to face.
30 International 
comity has been defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation . . . . ”
31 
Comity is a discretionary doctrine, often invoked by the forum jurisdiction 
upon its concluding that principles of fairness or judicial economy indicate that 
a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum for the cause of action.
32 
4.  Forum non conveniens 
Forum non conveniens is a discretionary jurisdictional defense.
33 A precondi-
tion for a finding of forum non conveniens is the existence of a foreign forum 
with jurisdiction to adjudicate.
34 If such a forum exists and would not refuse 
the suit for discretionary reasons, the court must then balance the interests “any 
public interests at stake”
35 with the interests of the plaintiff and defendant.
36  
                                                 
27  Id. at 92. 
28  TVPA § 2(b). 
29  Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens 
in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1001, 1037-39 (2001). 
30  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398, 409-10 (1964) (finding that the 
privilege of suit has been denied to governments that are at war with the United States, 
but that merely unfriendly relations would not be a sufficient reason to deny the 
privilege of bringing suit in the United States). 
31  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
32  Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 453-54 (2d Cir. 2001). 
33  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2000) (articulating 
that the court may permissibly dismiss a claim under this doctrine, regardless of the 
fact that the court’s jurisdiction was proper). 
34 Id. at 100. 
35 Id.  
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Ordinarily the plaintiff’s choice of forum will be respected,
37 but compelling 
circumstances can cause a court to reject plaintiff’s claim because of incon-
venience either to the court, to the defendant, or to both. Essentially, the inqui-
ry of the court is whether the choice of forum by the plaintiff is oppressive to 
the defendant.
38 If not, and if there are no compelling issues of judicial 
economy, the plaintiff’s choice of forum will be respected. Thus I would argue 
forum non conveniens is a more objectively predictable obstacle than comity. 
In Wiwa, an Anglo-Dutch company was sued in the United States for a tort 
in Nigeria; the forum non conveniens objection was accepted at trial, but rejec-
ted on appeal.
39 The appellate court considered the substantive English law and 
balanced the interests of the United Kingdom, the United States, Nigeria, the 
plaintiffs, and the defendants in determining whether to sustain the defendants’ 
forum non conveniens objection.
40 Before sustaining the objection, the trial 
court first had to find it had jurisdiction over the matter; to support its finding 
of jurisdiction, the trial court pointed to the fact that the defendants were listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, and that they organized ancillary activities 
in the United States.
41 
In terms of forum non conveniens, the Court of Appeals pointed out that 
although such a determination is generally at the discretion of the trial court, 
the trial court had failed to adequately consider two interests: (1) the fact that 
two of the plaintiffs were United States residents, and (2) the policy interest, 
implicit in federal statutory law, to provide foreigners with a forum for 
adjudicating claims of violations of the law of nations.
42 In other words, the 
United States’ commitment to the rule of law is so important that when 
balancing competing interests, it may tip the balance in favor of adjudication in 
the United States. 
5.  Act of State Doctrine 
Plaintiffs seeking recovery in United States’ courts should consider whether 
the act of state doctrine will be applied by the court to “preclude[ ] the courts 
of [the United States] from inquiring into the validity of the public acts [of] a 
                                                                                                                                                      
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 101. 
38 Id. at 102. 
39 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106-108. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at 93. 
42  Id. at 100, 106.  
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recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”
43  
Historically, the act of state doctrine was based on notions of comity.
44 As 
such, it was and possibly still is a discretionary remedy. However, recently the 
act of state doctrine has been viewed as grounded in notions of separation of 
powers,
45 which might indicate it is not discretionary. The act of state doctrine 
evinces a desire to avoid embarrassing foreign powers or risk causing hostile 
confrontation with foreign powers. In substantive terms, the act of state doc-
trine arises where the relief sought or the defense interposed requires a court in 
the United States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign 
performed in its own territory.
46 In determining the applicability of this doc-
trine, the court should also consider whether the foreign sovereign acted in the 
public interest.
47 A mere commercial act is less likely than a sovereign act to 
be designated an “act of state”.
48 
The act of state doctrine is no shield for illegal activity. An act by a state 
official in violation of the state’s laws, or the law of nations, is not an “act of 
state”,
49 either a priori, because the acts are illegal, or a fortiori, if the act of 
state doctrine is interpreted as a discretionary outgrowth of comity. Further-
more, because the use of the doctrine represents a refusal of the court’s usual 
duty to adjudicate cases before it, judicial review of the application of the act 
of state doctrine is not deferential.
50 
                                                 
43  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). 
44  Doe v. Unocal Corp. 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
45 See  id. (suggesting that the courts’ use of the doctrine may improperly encroach upon 
the powers of the other branches of United States government). 
46  Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S at 401. 
47 Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 893. 
48  Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, International Decision:  Prefecture of Voiotia v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, 95 AM. J. INT’L  L. 198 (2001). “‘The distinction 
between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis is effected on the basis of the law of the 
forum and using as a basic criterion the nature of the act carried out by the foreign 
state, i.e., whether it involves the exercise of a sovereign power.’’” Id. (quoting Pre-
fecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No.11/2000 (Areios Pagos 
(Sup. Ct. of Greece)), May 4, 2000). 
49  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). 
50  In discussing the standard of the review, the court stated: 
Although the standard of review of a district court’s decision to abstain is often 
described as an abuse-of-discretion standard, we have noted that in the abstention area 
that standard of review is somewhat more rigorous. Because we are considering an 
exception to a court’s normal duty to adjudicate a controversy properly before it, the 
district court’s discretion must be exercised within the narrow and specific limits  
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6.  Political Question Doctrine 
As a part of domestic United States law, the political question doctrine may 
also present a significant challenge to the plaintiff. For example, in Kadic v. 
Karadzic,
51 Radovan Karadzic, purported head of state of the Republic of 
Srpska, resisted trial in the United States based on head of state immunity; he 
also argued that his presence in the United States was incidental to his political 
functions,
52 and that the trial was thus political rather than legal. In other 
words, Karadzic invoked the “political question” doctrine as his last defense 
against standing trial in the United States.
53 
There were two central issues in Karadzic: (1) presuming Karadzic was the 
head of a de facto state, under what circumstances may such a foreign head of 
state be sued in the United States,
54 and (2) whether the executive or legislative 
branch – rather than the judiciary – should determine if the claims presented in 
the action were “political”, as Karadzic argued.
55 The court found that Karad-
zic’s presence within the United States was a valid basis for jurisdiction.
56 
Even if Srpska was a de facto state, the court carefully pointed out that it was 
not yet so recognized. Therefore, Karadzic had no head-of-state immunity by 
virtue of his position within a recognized government, friendly to the United 
States.
57 
Though Srpska was not recognized as a state, it had several attributes of 
statehood (territory, population, functioning government)
58 and may even have 
had some de facto recognition. Despite these factual and legal questions, 
                                                                                                                                                      
prescribed by the particular abstention doctrine involved . . . . Thus, . . . there is little 
or no discretion to abstain in a case which does not meet traditional abstention require-
ments. 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hachamovitch 
v. DeBuono, 159 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
51  70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S 1005 (1996). 
52 Id. at 245-47. 
53  Id. at 249. 
54  Id. at 247-48. 
55  Id. at 248-50. 
56  Id. at 247-48 (holding that the narrow circumstances expressly providing immunity 
from suit by the Headquarters Agreement were not applicable here as Karadzic was 
neither served within the Headquarters District nor was he a designated representative 
of any member of the United Nations). 
57  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248. 
58  Id. at 245.  
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neither political question nor sovereign immunity was found in Kadic.
59 
7. Immunity 
While the political question doctrine itself does not present an insurmountable 
obstacle to plaintiff, the related issue of immunity may present the plaintiff’s 
most serious obstacle. The historical basis of sovereign immunity was in 
principles of “grace and comity”, not the Constitution.
60 
The issue of sovereign immunity encompasses two distinct types of immu-
nity: (1) immunity of the state itself – sovereign immunity, and (2) immunity 
of the state’s agents – official immunity. Ministers and heads of state enjoy 
absolute immunity during their terms of office.
61 Though official immunity is a 
valid defense against an ATCA/TVPA claim where the act committed by the 
official was illegal under the law of the state,
62 trying former heads of state can 
still present a challenge.
63 However, official immunity did not prevent the 
United States from successfully trying Manuel Noriega, the former dictator of 
Panama, for drug trafficking,
64 perhaps in part because the United States never 
recognized the legitimacy of the Noriega government. 
Suits against foreign states themselves are generally barred by sovereign 
                                                 
59 Id. at 250 (“In a ‘Statement of Interest,’ signed by the Solicitor General and the State 
Department’s Legal Adviser, the United States has expressly disclaimed any concern 
that the political question doctrine should be invoked to prevent the [current] 
litigation . . . . ”). 
60  Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(implying that comity was one justification for the grant of immunity to Germany). 
61  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 
121, 18 (Feb. 14), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe 
_ijudgment_20020214.PDF. 
62  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that 
“Paraguay’s renunciation of torture . . . does not strip the tort of its character as an 
international law violation, if it in fact occurred under color of government authori-
ty”). 
63  In 1998, Spain unsuccessfully attempted to extradite former Chilean dictator, Senator 
Pinochet, from the United Kingdom to try him for acts committed by him or under his 
direction in violation of international law during his tenure in office. Regina v. Bartle 
& the Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis–Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 583-85 
(1999). 
64  United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1997). The Noriega court 
articulated the idea that in assessing an immunity claim, the court must look to the 
Executive Branch for guidance as to whether or not immunity is appropriate. Id. at 
1212.  
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immunity, unless that state has waived such immunity.
65 In Sampson v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, the court held Germany to be immune under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) when sued for compensation by an 
individual, Sampson, who had been interned in a concentration camp and 
forced to work during World War II.
66 Sampson, a pro se litigant, argued for 
an implied waiver of immunity for acts in violation of jus cogens. However, 
the court held that there is no implied waiver of immunity under the FSIA for 
acts in violation of jus cogens.
67 
The general rule both within the United States and internationally is that the 
state is immune for its sovereign acts, but not for its commercial acts.
68 For 
example, when a Liberian (neutral) vessel was attacked by the Argentine Air 
Force outside the zone of exclusion during the Falklands War, Argentina was 
immune from liability under the ATCA for the resulting property damage 
because the action did not amount to a commercial act.
69 
The exceptions to the FSIA provide the only means of obtaining jurisdic-
tion in the United States over a foreign sovereign.
70 The general rule of the 
FSIA is that foreign states are immune from suit in the United States.
71 There 
are several exceptions to the general grant of immunity, which can be catego-
rized as either based on waivers of immunity or on the commission of com-
mercial acts.
72 
The FSIA permits suit against a state where the state has waived its im-
munity.
73 Waiver may be implied, but implied waivers are strictly construed.
74  
                                                 
65  Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001). 
66  Id. at 1156. 
67 Id. For a discussion of the legal issues in related cases, see Scott A. Richman, Com-
ment, Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA Grant Immunity for 
Violations of Jus Cogens Norms? 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 967, 994-96 (1993) (arguing 
that the FSIA should be interpreted to exempt from protection those acts committed in 
violation of jus cogens norms because no act of Congress can be construed to violate 
international law, and granting immunity for violations of jus cogens norms would be 
tantamount to a violation of international law). 
68  Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983). 
69  Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439, 441, 443 
(1989). 
70 Id. at 443. 
71  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). 
72  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (2000) (providing the exclusive means of circumventing 
the general grant of immunity). 
73  Id. at § 1605(a)(1).  
  24
For example, in determining the Sampson case, where there was no implied 
waiver of immunity under the FSIA just because the actions taken were in 
violation of jus cogens,
75 the court held that declarations by Germany of her 
desire to compensate compulsory laborers were not sufficient to waive Ger-
many’s sovereign immunity.
76 Clearly, direct evidence of intent to waive must 
be presented to successfully argue that a state has impliedly waived her im-
munity. 
The FSIA also provides for liability for purely commercial acts.
77 Though 
claims are permitted where a tortious act either occurred in the United States or 
has a direct effect in the United States,
78 mere financial effects may not be 
sufficient to support a finding of “direct effects” under the FSIA.
79 
As to the procedure of arguing the applicability of FSIA immunity, the 
initial burden of proof is on the defendant state to demonstrate that it is 
immune,
80 but it is the plaintiff’s burden of production to demonstrate that one 
of the exceptions to the general rule of immunity applies.
81 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
amended the FSIA to permit claims against states which are considered by the 
United States to be sponsors of state terrorism.
82 It creates a privately enforce-
able cause of action in tort in cases of extra-judicial killing and aircraft 
hijacking.
83 Thus, “foreign states that have been designated as state sponsors of 
                                                                                                                                                      
74  Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 2001). 
75  Id. at 1156. 
76  Id. at 1151. 
77  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). 
78  Id. at § 1605(a)(2). 
79 See, e.g., Australian Gov’t Aircraft Factories v. Lynne, 743 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 
1984) (holding that the economic losses suffered by the Mission Aviation Fellowship 
because of the destruction of their plane did not constitute “direct effects” for the 
purposes of the FSIA). 
80  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
81 Id. 
82  Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1241, 1241–43 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 
1605 (a)(7)). For a critique of the AEDPA, and a discussion of its retroactive appli-
cability, see: Robin C. Trueworthy, Note, Retroactive Application of the Anti-Ter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to Pending Cases:  Rewriting a Poor-
ly Written Congressional Statute, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1707 (1997). The Supreme Court 
resolved this issue, to some extent, in Lindh v. Murphy, where the Court ruled that 
Congressional intent supported the finding that the AEDPA did not apply to pending 
non-capital cases. 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 326-27 (1997). 
83  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000).  
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terrorism are denied immunity from damage actions for personal injury or 
death resulting from aircraft sabotage.”
84 The victim (or the claimant) must be 
a United States national
85 and the tort must have occurred in the territory of a 
so-designated foreign state.
86 
An obvious use of the AEDPA is against hijackers. For example, the rela-
tives of the victims of the Lockerbie disaster
87 used the AEDPA to sue the 
government of Libya.
88 However, the AEDPA may be a violation of inter-
national law because of the international law doctrine of sovereign equality.
89 
Sovereign equality holds that one state may not impose its will upon another 
sovereign.
90 
8.  Burdens of Proof 
The last issue a plaintiff must consider relates to the different burdens of proof 
applicable in this area of law. These burdens are used to resolve doubtful cases 
and thus have great practical importance. A brief list of relevant burdens of 
proof under the various claims and defenses follows: 
(A)  The plaintiff is held to have presumptively exhausted all local reme-
dies; therefore, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that plaintiff 
has not in fact exhausted all local remedies.
91 
(B)    The defendant must prove any immunity asserted.
92 Though state 
                                                 
84  Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1998). 
85  28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7)(B)(ii) (2000). 
86  Id. at § 1605 (a)(7)(B)(i). 
87  See The Pan Am 103 Crash Website, at   
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/headpage.html (last updated Mar. 19, 
2003) (describing the details of the horrific explosion of Pan Am flight 103, which 
exploded over Scotland, killing all 259 people aboard and eleven people on the 
ground). 
88  Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 753 (2d Cir. 1998). 
89 See  William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire With . . . Mire?  Civil Remedies and the New War 
on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE  J. COMP. & INT’L  L. 105, 139 (2002) 
(suggesting “[t]he doctrine [of sovereign equality] could be used to characterize the 
[AEDPA] as an unlawful attempt by one state to abrogate unilaterally the immunity of 
another sovereign state without that state’s express or implied consent”). 
90 See  S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, 4, 32 (Sept. 7) (rejecting 
France’s contention that the Turkish criminal proceedings against Lt. Demons, the 
officer on watch on the Lotus during the collision with the Boz-Kourt, violated 
international law principles of sovereign equality). 
91  Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357-58 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
92  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1997).  
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defendants are presumed immune under the FSIA, they bear the burden of 
proving that none of the FSIA exceptions to sovereign immunity apply.
93 
(C)  The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction exist.
94 
(D)  The party asserting the applicability of the act of state doctrine must 
also bear the burden of proof as to its applicability.
95 Thus, these burdens of 
proof reduce, to some extent, the impact of the procedural obstacles plaintiff 
faces in prosecuting a private law action. 
II.  FOUCAULT – A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND TORTURE 
Law can only be understood within the presumptions upon which it is founded. 
These first presumptions are the province of philosophy. Understanding and 
changing those presumptions is the most effective way to effect systematic 
change. Thus I would like to direct your attention to a methodology which 
might permit you to pose and perhaps even answer fundamental questions. I 
will attempt to analyze torture from the perspective of Michel Foucault. Fou-
cault was a brilliant and prolific French scholar who died in 1984, at the age of 
57. Foucault is one of the best contemporary theorists. His work, although cut 
off in the middle, is nonetheless voluminous. I would like to try to undertake a 
brief inquest into torture using Foucault’s methodology, as I think his method 
reveals where the efforts at resistance against power would be most effective. 
Foucault’s life work was an attempt, I think successful, to construct an 
archaeology of power and knowledge.
96 Foucault saw power and knowledge as 
intimately related:  he would refer to them occasionally as power-knowledge,
97 
perhaps in emulation of the continuous theory of space-time. The center of 
                                                 
93  Id. 
94 See  An v. Chun, No. 96-35971, 1998 WL 31494, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1998); 
Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1352 (explaining the requirement that the complaint 
allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction). 
95  Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989). 
96  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE ON 
LANGUAGE  (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969); MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE:  SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans. 1980) [hereinafter POWER/KNOW-
LEDGE]. 
97  See M ICHEL  FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, & PRACTICE: SELECTED 
ESSAYS & INTERVIEWS 199-217 (Donald F. Bouchard, ed. 1977) (discussing the inter-
relation of knowledge and power, often in tandem with the work of Gilles Deleuze) 
[hereinafter LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE].  
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Foucault’s study of power-knowledge, however, was the body.
98 He was 
focusing his attention on power-knowledge, and the body as both vector and 
victim of power was the center of this focus. 
Foucault’s perspective on power is interesting because it is an attempt to 
radically re-situate discourse about power in order to influence the exercise of 
power; it does this in two ways. First, he places the center of the study of 
power upon the body. Second, Foucault insisted that we look at power not as a 
raw, undifferentiated, instantaneous, mechanical manifestation of the state, but 
as a continuous social relationship not only occurring over time but also im-
pacting all ranks in society.
99 
Foucault once said, « Nous avons tous du fascisme dans la tête. Mais nous 
avons tous pouvoir sur le corps. »
100 I would translate this as, “We all have a 
little fascism in our head. But we all have power over our bodies.” This reflects 
his ontology, his conception of power. Power is knowledge, and the mind and 
body are one. Foucault was working toward liberation of the physical body by 
pointing out the malleability of the assumptions and foundations of the body 
politic.
101 Foucault, in my opinion, was not at all a dualist; he saw the body and 
mind as an integral whole.
102 
Foucault wanted us to change our perspective on power from a dualistic, 
mechanistic, rationalist, instrumentalist view – the view that allows power to 
be easily exercised – to a more monist and materialist perspective. However, 
he does not center his discourse on monism versus dualism, or materialism 
versus philosophical idealism, since that would simply recreate the very intel-
lectual mechanism from which he was struggling to help us escape. Instead 
Foucault focuses on power in all varieties of intricate, organic, and even inti-
mate relationships – with multiple subtle implications and nuances that mani-
                                                 
98  See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(1979) [hereinafter DISCIPLINE & PUNISH]. 
99  See LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY & PRACTICE, supra note 98, at 205-17 (delineat-
ing the various intersections of power, where it lodges and who it commands, with 
Gilles Deleuze). 
100  See  MICHEL  FOUCAULT,  Preface to GILLES  DELEUZE  & FELIX  GUATARRI, ANTI-
OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM & SCHIZOPHRENIA, at xiii (Robert Hurley et al. trans. 1983). 
101  See generally DISCIPLINE & PUNISH, supra note 99. 
102  See id. at 30 (writing most famously, regarding the uses of the “soul” as a tool of 
power, that “the soul [is] the illusion of theologians. A ‘soul’ inhabits him [the con-
demned subject of power] and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the 
mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a 
political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body”).  
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fest pervasively throughout a society. 
Likewise, he invites us to reconstruct our focus on power in a similar 
manner. He would not just want us to look at torture as a fist smashing a face. 
Rather, he would want us to understand why this face, why this fist: who is 
directing the fist? Why?
103 He would ask, who is applying power, when, where, 
and how? He would look not only at the rough visible aspects of power – 
which had already been thoroughly analyzed before Foucault but almost al-
ways within a dualist rationalist perspective – but also at the social implica-
tions, consequences, and causes thereof. Foucault’s perspective gives us a 
better understanding of the outcomes of power – and also allows us to escape 
from mechanistic dualism. 
A genealogy of torture using Foucault’s methodology enables us to escape 
both dualism and philosophical idealism, and forces us to place contemporary 
events in their historic context and reveals much about our own preconcep-
tions. For example, this methodology would allow us to evaluate whether 
electrocution is torture, cruel and unusual; whether rape is torture;
104 and 
whether non-state actors can torture. I don’t propose to answer any of those 
questions here, but I do think these are some of the places where battle-lines 
could and should be drawn. 
III.  THE USE OF TORTURE:  A SHAMEFUL CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF 
EUROPEAN SOCIETY 
A brief look at the history of torture in Europe is necessary to fully understand 
what it is that modern society purports to reject. When one looks at medieval 
Europe and the types of torturous acts committed during that era, what we 
expect to see, perhaps unconsciously or semi-consciously, is the Inquisition. 
When we think of the Inquisition, we usually envision arbitrary, capricious 
violence, terrible violence, grounded thoroughly in death. But was it really so?  
Actually, when we look at the history of torture we discover that torture was 
used along gradations of seriousness,
105 from the mere threat of being tortured, 
                                                 
103  See POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 97, at 1972-77 (giving a comprehensive over-
view about the types of questions to be asked about the nature of power in Western 
society). 
104  Many thanks to South African scholar and activist Ms. Bonita Meyersfeld, J.S.D. 
candidate, Yale, for raising this interesting argument. Her article, Reconceptualizing 
Domestic Violence in International Law appears in this volume of the Albany Law 
Review. 
105  Contemporary law still recognizes these gradations of torture. See In re J-E-, 23 I&N  
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to branding, to bodily injury, to greater bodily injury, to bodily injury which 
would induce death. When we look at the history of torture, we discover it was 
not, in fact, an undifferentiated, raw, irrational fist. Rather, it was an oper-
rational exercise crude but defined power. 
How did this rational instrument of state-church power disappear? If torture 
was commonplace in medieval Europe, even as recently as the 1600s, by the 
late 1800s it was effectively abolished. When an instrument of church-state 
power exists for hundreds if not thousands of years and suddenly disappears – 
practically overnight – it really is remarkable. This type of change was the 
fulcrum which Foucault attempted to point out: that an entire society can 
rapidly change its methods of distributing power.
106 Marx would agree with 
Foucault that social practice is malleable and would point out its evolution is 
based on changes in productive forces which in turn are reflected in changes to 
relations of production.
107 The history of torture bears that out; it is clear that 
the social practice was malleable, and it changed rapidly as a consequence of 
changes in productive forces. 
The disappearance of torture is one mark of the transition from the feudal 
mode of production to the industrial mode of production. Justice in feudal 
society is very much by word of mouth. Modern society, in contrast, has both 
the technical means and economic surplus to literally afford to be less cruel; or 
more exactly, to be cruel in highly-refined and subtle ways.
108 If we look at 
industrial societies, they fairly uniformly reject torture. And if we look at 
feudal societies, even contemporary feudal societies, they fairly consistently 
use torture.
109 The reason why feudal societies use such a rough instrument, 
such blunt, violent instrument is because they simply don’t have other instru-
mentalities of power, whereas modern society can afford both economically 
                                                                                                                                                      
Dec. 291, 295, 314 (Mar. 22, 2002), 2002 WL 481156 (BIA). 
106  See DISCIPLINE & PUNISH, supra note 99 (outlining the shift from state power manifest 
on the body of the condemned to the internalized self-regulation depended upon by 
the modern state). 
107 DAVID MCLELLAN, KARL MARX: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT 308-309 (1973). 
108  For example, the United States has the largest prison population on earth, both in 
absolute terms and per capita. See Frank M. Conaway, Seal All the Cracks in Our 
Justice System, BALT. SUN, Dec. 5, 2001, at 17A, 2001 WL 6177176. 
109  For an excellent discussion on the history of torture, see  Matthew Lippman, The 
Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT’L  & 
COMP. L. Rev. 275, 275-89 (1994) (tracing the history of torture from ancient Greece 
and Rome through the first half of the 20
th century).  
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and in terms of actuating power, to distribute power in ways that appear more 
subtle. 
There are still remnants of such rough instruments – for instance, police 
brutality. Police often kill people who don’t need to be killed, particularly in 
the United States, but people tend to look the other way.
110 When we study the 
differences of power between an industrial system of production and a feudal 
system of production, we see that though the instrumentalities of the feudal 
system are generally less refined and rougher, modern, industrial society still 
experiences similar problems. 
A.    A Theory of Torture 
The theory of torture presents the interesting question of whether or not acts of 
torture were consistent with the purported religious and societal bases of those 
acts. While there was a theoretical explanation and justification, to fully under-
stand those ideas, one needs to assume the mindset of zealous medieval pre-
lates, who would say, generally, well, what does it matter that we tortured you 
to death, for we have saved your immortal soul.
111 The system was designed to 
deter dissent by punishing it, and its practice was what I call a mixture of the 
interrogatory phase and the punitive phase. 
The system was the result of an ontological dualism which sees the spirit as 
divine and immortal, and the body as corrupt and wicked. It was not merely 
operational, i.e., following certain procedures with a fair degree of predictabi-
lity; it was also rational in the sense that if one accepted the presumptions, one 
would be compelled to the same conclusion. And thus the system was capable 
of rationalizing burning people to death and just about anything else. 
While rehabilitation did not figure at all in medieval concepts of crimi-
nality, punishment and deterrence were central concepts to medieval penology. 
                                                 
110  See generally, Amnesty International, United States of America: Police Brutality and 
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http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510361996 (June 1996)   
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Imprisonment as a punishment was highly exceptional; as such, the idea of 
repentance also did not figure prominently as in medieval times as we tend to 
think today. After being punished, generally corporally, one said one’s pen-
ance and was then forgiven. If prison was not the main form of medieval 
punishment, what was? Medieval punishment was just that – medieval. Brand-
ing was one common punishment, so that others would know that the criminal 
was a thief; neither maiming nor lashings were unusual. Such punishments 
required fewer resources and carried lower information costs than imprisoning 
criminals. Despite the natural revulsion most of us have to these forms of 
punishment, they were not necessarily more cruel than current punishment.
112 
Punishment in the industrial mode is also distinguishable from punishment 
in the feudal system by the fact that industrial societies at least claim to not 
inflict violent, cruel and barbaric punishments, but claim, rather, to seek to 
reform and rehabilitate the “sick” criminal. Though this rehabilitative function 
has not been taken very seriously in the United States since about 1980, most 
of the rest of the industrialized world does take the rehabilitative function of 
penal law very seriously – with the possible exception of the ex-apartheid 
regime of South Africa. 
B.  Four Reasons Why Torture Disappeared 
If the existence of torture is in itself a phenomenon, its disappearance is even 
more intriguing. Torture disappeared for four main reasons. The first reason is 
that since people who were tortured would lie, it was an ineffective method of 
obtaining information. Second, not only do victims lie, they also die. And 
when they die, the victim is no longer providing the police or the government 
with information. 
The third reason I posit that torture has, for the most part, been eradicated, 
and why today it is a jus cogens norm, is because the victims of torture are 
wonderful martyrs. These martyrs generate great sympathy. One such victim 
was Stephen Biko,
113 a South African activist who opposed the police state and 
the apartheid regime of South Africa.
114 The police denied having killed him 
while he was in prison, yet via the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, it was 
                                                 
112  If you had the choice of being put in stocks, or whipped, or wasting away in jail for 
months or even years, which would you choose? 
113  See Stephen Bantu Biko, at http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/biko,s.htm. 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (documenting Biko’s relationship to the South African 
anti-apartheid movement and his death as a symbol of martyrdom). 
114  See id.  
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revealed that he was killed by the police while in prison.
115 He became a won-
derful martyr. A final reason for the disappearance is that just as it creates 
martyrs, these martyrs motivate not only the victims’ families, but also their 
friends, distant relatives, and people they never met to resist the system that is 
trying to oppress. 
In understanding the history of torture, its theoretical underpinnings as well 
as the four main reasons for its disappearance, one has an even greater 
appreciation for the level of social change contemporary society has achieved 
in this area of human rights. Yet, despite how far we have come, clearly there 
is work left to be done. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY EVENTS 
The United States foreign policy elite do nothing to discourage the tendency of 
the American people to have very naïve and uninformed views of United 
States foreign policy. And yet just a cursory examination of a few contem-
porary events demonstrates that for all the anti-torture rhetoric apparent in 
American statutory and case law, there are serious questions as to the commit-
ment of the United States’ government to securing the basic human right of all 
persons to live free of torture. The actions of the United States’ government 
must be assessed in the context of the international jus cogens norm against 
torture. 
Currently, in my opinion, the United States is moving from a categorical 
rejection of torture in all forms to a qualified rejection of torture. The TVPA 
clearly defines torture as any form of coercion, including mental coercion.
116 
Yet recently reported incidents allow one to speculate that the United States 
itself is engaging in torture. There is a facility in Afghanistan called “Hotel 
California” and two Afghan prisoners, apparently under exclusive United 
                                                 
115  See Cyrille Hugon, In South Africa, 20 Years After Steven [sic] Biko’s death, the Truth 
Commission Grapples with the Meaning of Justice, at    
http://www.columbia.edu/cu.sipa/PUBS/SLANT/SPRING97/hugon.html (last visited 
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States control, died from blunt force trauma while in custody at that facility.
117 
From this, one can fairly infer that the detained prisoners, who were presumab-
ly being interrogated, were tortured. The detention facilities run by the United 
States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, present another example of this type of situ-
ation. It was reported in August, 2002, that a senior Taliban official died after 
being subjected to severe torture while in custody at that facility;
118 another 
recent report from the detention facility stated that the United States plans to 
construct a “death chamber” on the base.
119 
Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) tried to reduce the 
United States’ obligations under the Convention against Torture.
120  Though in 
this particular instance, the court intervened to overturn the BIA’s decision,
121 
a decision clearly in contravention to the Convention, it may be indicative of a 
future trend. If the United States gradually begins to accept small or insigni-
ficant amounts of torture, it will likely generate even more enemies. To justify 
this progression, the United States may draw on foreign case law. In looking at 
the European Court of Human Rights, one finds cases which arguably support 
finding exceptions to international law’s absolute prohibition of torture.
122 
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against a wall spread-eagle, subjecting them to continuous monotonous noise, depriv-
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Perhaps equally disturbing is the United States’ willingness to extradite pri-
soners held in the United States or those locations under United States’ control 
to countries that do torture.
123 Because the norm against torture is a jus cogens 
norm, extradition of a person to a country that tortures is itself a violation of 
the Convention against torture.
124 No state is required to remedy a violation of 
a jus cogens norm, but every state is obligated to obey it.
125 The administra-
tion’s willingness to extradite prisoners to countries that torture illustrates its 
flagrant disrespect for and clear operation outside of international law 
norms.
126 
Acts of aggression committed by the United States in violation of internati-
onal law also raise the question whether the United States is committed to the 
rule of law in international affairs. From an international law perspective, it is 
relatively clear that the war waged by the United States against Iraq constituted 
a criminal act.
127 United Nations Resolution 1441 did not, on its own terms, 
authorize the use of force against Iraq;
128 force was nonetheless used. The 
Nuremberg trials determined that planning, plotting and executing wars of 
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aggression constitutes a crime against peace.
129 It is at least arguable that since 
Iraq holds a vast amount of the world’s oil supply,
130 the war waged by the 
United States against Iraq amounts to a war of aggression, motivated by the 
United States’ desire to reduce the price of oil by controlling its production. 
One can ask themselves whether the Bush administration’s acts should be 
characterized as crimes against the peace. 
Violations of an individual’s rights under international law provide yet 
another example of United States’ lawlessness. In the case of Robert LaGrand, 
LaGrand, a German national, was awaiting execution in the United States on 
the charge of capital murder. Prior to execution of the death sentence, the 
International Court of Justice ruled that the United States could not execute 
him as Texas had violated his right under the Vienna Convention to access the 
German consulate.
131 The United States chose to ignore the Court’s ruling 
against it, and summarily executed LaGrand. As a result, his execution was 
illegal as a flagrant violation of international law. 
These instances do not stand alone. The United States has also either con-
ferred with or signed treaties which it later refused to effectuate or to enforce; 
two excellent examples of this  are the United States’ respect – or lack thereof 
– for the International Criminal Court
132 and the Kyoto protocol.
133 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In our collective youth, we all had a tendency to see the world in simplistic 
terms; the “heroes” always defeated the “villains”. However, as adults, we 
know these simplistic descriptions of reality are almost never accurate. This 
discussion attempts to present a complex yet accurate description of the objec-
tive reality of this area of law, with the hope that it might have some huma-
nizing influence on American foreign policy. It is our collective responsibility, 
as members of an increasingly global society, to look in the mirror and, with 
candor, see our own errors and mistakes. Then we must take the courageous 
next step and begin the arduous process of correcting those mistakes. The law, 
with all its faults and flaws, may be the best way to do that. 
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CHAPTER II 
ALVAREZ-MACHAIN V. UNITED STATES AND ALVAREZ-
MACHAIN V. SOSA:  
THE BROODING OMNIPRESENCE OF NATURAL LAW * 
Abstract: 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the Alien Tort Claims Act shall be 
interpreted strictly. In doing so however the court opens questions without 
explicit addressing other as yet unanswered questions where the circuits 
diverge. In determining that the Alien Tort Claims Act is purely procedural 
and does not create an additional claim under U.S. but rather gives individual 
claimants directly enforceable rights under international law before U.S. courts 
the court notes some points raised by Blackstone. Here we examine the issues 
presented by the Justice Department. The author argues that these issues were 
miscast preventing the court from reaching the merits on some still unans-
wered points of law. Finally, the author points us to further intriguing paasages 
of both Coke and Blackstone which may help future courts to understand the 
significance of the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
 
*  This Article was published in 13 Williamette Journal of International Law and Dispute 
Resolution 216 (2004).  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A criminal combination kidnaps and tortures a DEA agent in Mexico. A physi-
cian, Dr. Alvarez, is suspected of having worked as an agent of the criminal 
combination. Namely, he is believed to have acted to keep the captive DEA 
agent alive so that the agent can be tortured further. Consequently, the United 
States procures the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez. Let us presume that the kid-
napping only involved a brief detention and little violence. Clearly, the kidn-
apping is in violation of international law, and Mexico has a right to a remedy 
against the United States. Does Dr. Alvarez have a right to compensation in 
tort from the United States? 
Such, in sum, are the facts of the cases of Alvarez-Machain v. United 
States,
1 and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa,
2 which address some of the difficult 
issues in universal jurisdiction before U.S. courts. Based on a painstaking 
textual and historical analysis, the Supreme Court reached an intellectually 
honest and logically defensible conclusion to the substantive law: in limited 
cases the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
3 provides a remedy before U.S. courts for 
tortious violations of international law – possibly only for cases of violations 
of jus cogens
4 norms, but at least for such heinous violations of international 
                                                 
1  96 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996). 
2  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004). 
3  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) reads in whole: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The ATS is also referred to as the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 
4  “A mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more nations 
may exempt themselves or release one another.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
A jus cogens norm is a special type of customary international law. A jus cogens norm  
“is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” 
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679). Most famously, jus cogens norms supported the pro-
secutions in the Nuremberg trials. See id. “The universal and fundamental rights of 
human beings identified by Nuremberg – rights against genocide, enslavement, and 
other inhumane acts .  .  .  – are the direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental 
norms recognized as jus cogens.” Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 
1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001). Note, however, that while jus cogens and customary inter-
national law are related, they differ in one important respect. Customary international  
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law.
5 The Supreme Court in Sosa reached a principled and prudential decision 
of restrained judicial activism.
6 The Court explicitly stated the international 
laws which could be the basis of a claim under the ATS must be clearly deter-
mined existing norms or de lege lata
7 and not emerging norms of international 
law
8 or de lege ferenda.
9 
Unfortunately, the Court did not use these Latin terms of international law. 
The Court did however, specifically uphold the decision of Filartiga v. Pena 
Irala:
10 International law for the Alien Tort Statute must not be understood as 
frozen in time in 1789, when the ATS was enacted, but rather as evolving over 
time. If the Court’s neo-formalist result was a perfect example of judicious 
equipoise; balancing implicitly the conflict between presidential power and 
individual liberty, and a minor victory for human rights, it was built on the 
quicksand of a false dichotomy between natural law and positivism – a dicho-
tomy which has needlessly bedevilled legal scholarship in the last century. 
In Part I, the Introduction outlines the issues presented, the issues the Court 
decided, the unsettled isuses which caused the Sosa Court to grant certiorari, 
and the issues the U.S. Justice Department and the Court ignored. Part II con-
sists of a practical legal analysis of the exact issues the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment and its agent Sosa presented to the Supreme Court in Sosa. Part II inclu-
des both a comparative law analysis, examining other common law jurisdic-
tions, and a historical analysis based on the writings of Blackstone and Coke to 
help determine the meaning torts in violation of the law of nations. Finally, in 
                                                                                                                                                      
law, like international law defined by treaties and other international agreements, rests 
on the consent of states. In contrast, a state is bound by jus cogens norms even if it 
does not consent to their application. 
Id. at 1150 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan 
(“CUSCLUN”), 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
5 See  Sosa,  124 S.Ct. 2739. 
6 Sosa,  124 S. Ct. at 2744 (“A decision to create a private right of action is better left to 
legislative judgment in most cases.”). 
7 See  BLACK’S DICTIONARY 459 (9th ed. 2004). 
8 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2765 (“[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize 
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm 
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”). See also U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 
163-180 (1820) (illustrating the specificity with which the law of nations defined 
piracy). 
9 See  BLACK’S DICTIONARY 459 (9th ed. 2004). 
10 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2761-62.  
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Part III, I present a theoretical synthesis of the implications of the false dicho-
tomy of positivism and natural law by looking at Aristotle and Hobbes. Aris-
totle and Hobbes both show that the supposed dichotomy of natural law and 
positivism does not in fact exist. Consequently, the presumption that the Court 
in Sosa makes is wrong. The court presumes that it cannot engage in a holist 
analysis of the common law and international law to develop synergies bet-
ween them in the interest of justice. Thus, the Court concludes it must limit the 
future interpretations of the ATS to existing positive law (de lege lata) and cut 
off any normative application of international law (de lege ferende). However, 
since the main premise of the Court, that natural law does not exist, or is 
inevitably vague, inchoate, prescientific, or otherwise flawed, is wrong, the 
consequence of that premise, that the court cannot teleologically interpret nor-
mative content into the ATS, is not only no longer inevitable, it is downright 
questionable. The Court thus continues to follow a failed heuristic that has 
plagued it since Erie, which was also wrongly decided. The failure of the 
Court to understand that positive law and natural law complement each other 
as parts of a unified theory of justice is due to the Court’s ignorance of Aris-
totle. A proper understanding of Aristotle’s theory of justice and of his theory 
of teleological interpretation would enable the Court to do exactly what it 
claims it cannot: Lead the World in the defense of Human Rights. 
A.  The Issues Presented to the Supreme Court in Sosa 
The Justice Department presented the following questions to the Supreme 
Court:
11  (1) Whether federal law enforcement officers, and agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in particular, have authority to enforce a federal 
criminal statute applying to acts perpetrated against a U.S. official in a foreign 
country by arresting an indicted criminal suspect on probable cause in a for-
eign country? That is, in plain language, whether the U.S. executive may exer-
cise jurisdiction to enforce overseas, in violation of the law of nations and in 
violation of the law of foreign states.  (2) Whether the Alien Tort Statute cre-
ates a private cause of action allowing aliens redress for torts committed any-
where in violation of the law of nations or treaties of the United States or, 
instead, is a jurisdiction-granting provision that does not establish private 
rights of action.  (3) Whether the actions the ATS authorized are limited to 
suits for violations of jus cogens norms of international law.  (4) Whether Dr. 
Alvarez’ abduction constitutes a tort in violation of the law of nations action-
able under the ATS. 
                                                 
11 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2739.  
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Both cases reached the Supreme Court because of split decisions in the 
circuit courts over some of these issues, which are very well summarized in 
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.
12 The Court was also asked to decide 
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act would bar an action for false arrest due to 
the fact that the FTCA bars “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country. . . .”
13 
This paper does not address that issue but briefly discusses the remaining four. 
To a certain extent, the Justice Department miscast the issues before the 
Court. This may be due to a basic misunderstanding or ignorance of principles 
of international law and the history of the common law vis-à-vis international 
law. Common law lawyers often misunderstand international law because the 
sources of law, their hierarchization, and the methods used to derive and apply 
them are not the same in international law and the common law. In fact, 
international law resembles the national legal structure of pre-codification 
civilian legal systems. This means stare decisis is not a rule of international 
law,
14 and case law has no binding precedential value, but may be persuasive 
evidence of the law. Conversely, general principles of law, a key element of 
civilian legal systems and international law, are not a source of law in the com-
mon law.
15 Scholarly writings in international law are a source of law;
16 
                                                 
12  343 F.3d 140, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2003). The court in Flores points out that both the ninth 
and eleventh circuits, following Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), 
recognize the ATS as granting a private cause of action, citing Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 
72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 
(9th Cir. 1994). The court further states that the D.C. Circuit criticized Filartiga in 
concurring opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic and Al Odah v. United 
States, 1146 (D.C.Cir. 2003), rejecting Filartiga’s holding that the ATS creates a 
private cause of action, citing Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1146-47 and Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 
811, 826, resulting in a split of authority at the appellate level. 
13  28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2004). 
14 See,  e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 103 cmt. b (1986) (noting the “traditional view that there is no stare decisis in inter-
national law”). 
15  Blackstone analyzes the common law as consisting of written law (statutes) and 
unwritten law (the common law). See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES]. Common law is customary law, whether local or natio-
nal. Blackstone specifically considers the maxims of law, which, in civil law, are 
expressions of general principles of law, as a possible source of the common law. Id. 
However, he rejects the maxims as a source of law, arguing that they are but expres-
sions of custom and that maxims are vague and inchoate and must be proven via 
inquiry into custom. Id. These maxims of law, however, persist in the common law in 
equity and it may be argued that maxims are in fact expressions of general principles 
of law, as is the case in the civil legal systems. Examples of such maxims include: sic  
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however, in the common law, legal scholarship is at best merely persuasive. 
Finally, concepts proper to international law do not necessarily have corres-
ponding concepts in domestic law and vice versa.
17 
B.  The unsettled issues which caused the Sosa Court to grant certiorari 
Though some issues in Sosa were miscast by the Justice Department, there 
were important issues undecided prior to Sosa: First, what substantive law 
applies under the ATS? Second, does the ATS only remedy violations of jus 
cogens? 
1.  What Substantive Law is to be Applied? 
Prior to Sosa, it was not determined whether the ATS itself created a new inde-
pendent cause of action under U.S. law, in addition to permitting claims under 
                                                                                                                                                      
utero tuo ut alienum non laedes. See Bassett v. Company, 43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862); 
Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 442 (1870). Pacta quae contra leges et constitutiones, vel 
contra bonos mores sunt nullam vim habere indubitati Juris est – ”Good morals” 
While  jus cogens and customary international law are related, they differ in one 
important respect. Customary international law, like international law defined by trea-
ties and other international agreements, rests on the consent of states. In contrast, a 
state is bound by jus cogens norms even if it does not consent to their application.– 
contracts against the constitution or good morals are void. Austin’s Adm’x v. Win-
ston’s Ex’x, 11 Va. 33, 36 (1806). Because the common law, as opposed to statutory 
law, is induced from specific cases and not deduced from general principles, the 
simpler and better view is Blackstone’s. Maxims and general principles continue to 
haunt the common law due to methodological incomprehension of the role of general 
principles as deductive instruments in a system of written law (i.e., the European 
civilian legal system). Thus in The Harrisburg, the U.S. Supreme Court quite correct-
ly links the ideas of “natural equity and the general principles of law.” 119 U.S. 199, 
206 (1886). Blackstone appears to be the source of the split on the role of maxims and, 
by extension, general principles of law in the common law and civil law. One could 
accuse Blackstone of misapprehending the role of general principles in legal deduc-
tion. This may be because he assigns the role of general principles to ecclesiastical 
courts, where the general principles atrophied. See COMMENTARIES at 83. 
16  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) (stating that international law 
“may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public 
law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recog-
nizing and enforcing that law”); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.Supp. 
292, 295 (E.D.Pa. 1963). See  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. See also State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 
201 F.2d 455, 461 (2d Cir. 1953). 
17 See,  e.g., Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Sub-
missions Under The Nafta Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 159 (2002).  
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international law to be heard before U.S. courts or instead, whether it merely 
permitted U.S. courts to take jurisdiction as to tortious violations of internatio-
nal law. The Supreme Court rightly took the second view. However, the Jus-
tice Department attempted to argue, unconvincingly, that the ATS did not con-
tain any substantive element at all, whether under national or international law. 
That argument, which the court rejected, seems spurious, as a plain text read-
ing of the statute and a consideration of its history reveal. This was not the 
only unanswered question compelling the Supreme Court to hear the Sosa 
case. Another issue, still explicitly unresolved, is whether the ATS only applies 
to jus cogens norms, or in the better view, whether it also applies to ordinary 
rules of international law. 
2.  Does the ATS Only Apply to Violations of Jus Cogens? 
The Supreme Court did not directly answer whether the ATS only applies to 
violations of jus cogens. The Court does imply, however, that jus cogens 
claims will be heard and that they may also be the only claims it hears. 
Although the Supreme Court reached proper results on the merits, the Jus-
tice Department miscast the issues; consequently, the court missed an oppor-
tunity to dispel more confusion. Worse, because the issues were not properly 
presented, the court unknowingly choked on a false dichotomy of “natural law 
versus positivism.” I discuss the issues as presented and the proper presenta-
tion to rectify some of the misunderstandings. In the first half of the paper, 
“Practical Analysis,” I examine the issues presented to the court. In the second 
half, “Theoretical Synthesis,” I look at the theoretical framework within which 
the court determined its answers to these questions.  
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II. PRACTICAL ANALYSIS: THE ISSUES THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND ITS 
AGENT SOSA PRESENTED 
A. “Whether federal law enforcement officers, and agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in particular, have authority to enforce a 
federal criminal statute that applies to acts perpetrated against a United 
States official in a foreign country by arresting an indicted criminal sus-
pect on probable cause in a foreign country.”
18 
The Government’s brief in Sosa miscasts the legal issues in a desire to compel 
its desired outcome. It states the issue as: “Whether federal law enforcement 
officers, and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration in particular, 
have authority to enforce a federal criminal statute that applies to acts perpe-
trated against a United States official in a foreign country by arresting an indic-
ted criminal suspect on probable cause in a foreign country.”
19 The issue ig-
nores the fact that the arrest was illegal under international law as an invasion 
of Mexico’s sovereignty. Nor does the government consider the legality of 
abduction under international law. Finally, the government does not present the 
issue in terms of its jurisdiction to enforce. 
The government could have presented the issue as whether the U.S. exe-
cutive branch may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction to enforce, through its 
police power, overseas in violation of the law of nations and the law of foreign 
states. Perhaps surprisingly, the honest quick answer to this question is “yes.”
20 
The government’s temerity here was unnecessary; ironically, miscasting the 
issue deprived the Court of a chance to affirm the self-help rights of the United 
                                                 
18  Brief for Respondent at 1, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 669 (1992) 
(No. 03-485). See also Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 
2739 (2004) (No. 03-485). The Supreme Court joined two cases, United States v. 
Alvarez Machain and Sosa v. Alvarez Machain. The former case was briefed both at 
the petition phase and on the merits. Ignoring the briefs at the petition phase we must 
still look both at the brief on the merits and the reply briefs. This analysis of the 
questions presented is based on the questions presented by the Justice Department in 
its brief on the merits in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain as that brief seemed to best represent 
the numerous complex issues in the cases and the confusion in the government’s 
positions. In its reply brief in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) argued: I.  The drug enforcement administration’s arrest of respondent was 
authorized, and II. The federal tort claims act exception for claims arising in a foreign 
country bars Respondent’s lawsuit. 
19  Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sosa (No. 03-485). 
20 See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1886).  
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States under international law with regard to fugitives. The power of the 
executive to conduct foreign policy, within the limits of the Constitution, is 
exclusive and nearly, in the Hobbesian sense, despotic.
21 Thus, an exercise of 
jurisdiction to enforce overseas is constitutionally permissible, though such 
exercise is illegal under customary international law. Yet, the constitutionally 
permissible exercise of jurisdiction to enforce overseas, if illegal under inter-
national law, may also be illegal in national law for, absent contrary statute, 
customary international law is a part of the common law.
22 To reiterate, inter-
national law prohibits abduction of any person by a state. Customary inter-
national law is one element of the common law. However, as to conflicts bet-
ween the constitution and ordinary laws, whether customary (and here is where 
international law enters the pictures) or statutory, the constitution shall control. 
1.  Customary International Law Prohibits Abduction by one State of any 
Person in another State Absent Consent of that State 
Under international law it is clear that the United States, as the cause of 
Alvarez-Machain’s kidnapping, acted contrary to well-established principles of 
international law. Specifically, the U.S.-instigated kidnapping violated at least 
the principles of sovereign equality of nations,
23 the principle of non-
intervention,
24 and perhaps, also a norm against arbitrary arrest and detention.
25 
                                                 
21 See,  e.g., United States v. Messina, 566 F.Supp. 740, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he 
broad authority of the executive in matters bearing on foreign affairs is not absolute 
when constitutional interests are implicated.”). Thus, conversely, when a constitutio-
nal interest is not implicated, the Executive’s authority on foreign affairs is absolute. 
[P]olitical matters in the realm of foreign affairs are within the exclusive domain of 
the Executive Branch, as, for example, issues for which there are no available stan-
dards or which are textually committed by the Constitution to the executive. But this 
is far from saying that the Constitution vests in the executive exclusive absolute 
control of foreign affairs. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 461 (1963) (White, J., dissent-
ing). 
22  Customary law, however, may be overridden by statute. 
23 See  West v. Multibanco Comermex, 807 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1987); The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 
2, para. 1; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, art. II, 28 I.L.M. 493, 
500; United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1296-97; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7). 
24 See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 795, n.14 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United  
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The U.S. abduction of Alvarez-Machain was illegal under international law 
and likely under Mexican law as well. Mexico strenuously protested the illegal 
but possibly constitutional act.
26 The illegality of an unconsented exercise of 
jurisdiction to enforce on foreign territory under international law as an inva-
sion of another state’s sovereignty is obvious. However, that entails the less 
obvious conclusion that – barring contrary statute – unconsented extraterri-
torial abduction is also illegal in U.S. common law because customary inter-
national law is a part of the common law. Essentially, the President requires 
Congress’ permission to legally violate international law, at least as to the 
unlawful exercise of jurisdiction to enforce – here, abduction. 
2.  Customary International Law as Part of the Common Law: The Kid-
napping of Alvarez-Machain was Illegal under Common Law 
The Sosa Court addressed this issue, the role of international law in the com-
mon law, only indirectly in its discussion of federal common law post-Erie. 
However, due to the confusion Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins generated,
27 that 
issue persists and was in no way settled or even directly addressed by the Sosa 
court. 
At least prior to the destruction of the World Trade Center, it was well-
settled
28 that customary international law was a part of the common law in the 
United States
29 and the basis of claims for violations of the ATS.
30 If 
                                                                                                                                                      
Nations Declaration on Intervention, Jan. 14, 1996, 5 I.L.M. 374, 375-76; Regina v. 
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 3) 1 A.C. 147, 154 (House of Lords, 2000); Military and Paramilitary Activities 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 107 (June 27). 
25 See  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. IX, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175-76. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432-33 (1987). 
26  Brief for the United Mexican States at 937, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 
U.S. 669 (1992) (No. 91-712), in 31 I.L.M. 934 (July 1992). 
27  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
28 See,  e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 193 (D.Mass. 1995) (“[I]t is well sett-
led that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is subsumed 
and incorporated by federal common law.”). 
29 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (1900) (stating that “international law is a 
part of our law”). See also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. 
Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
previous courts did not hold that “international law is not part of federal common law 
if there are no contradictory federal statutes”); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (“[T]he law  
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customary international law is part of the common law, then absent contrary 
statute the United States also violated its own domestic law in abducting 
Alvarez-Machain. 
Professors Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith recently questioned 
this well-settled fact that customary international law is an integral part of the 
common law, arguing erroneously that the idea of customary international law 
as a part of U.S. common law is a modern position.
31 Thus, a discussion of 
history and comparative law is necessary to demonstrate what should be obvi-
ous: customary international law is a part of the common law. 
a.  Comparative Law: Customary International Law is an Integral Part of 
the Common Law in Britain, Canada, and Australia 
Legal history reveals the obvious fact that common law, based on customary 
law, includes customary international law. Furthermore, looking at the practice 
of other common law jurisdictions confirms this fact. Customary international 
law is an integral part of the common law of England
32 and a part of Canadian 
national common law as well.
33 In Canada, treaties require an enabling act to 
                                                                                                                                                      
of nations . . . has always been part of the federal common law.”). 
30  The Second Circuit stated that § 1350 provides jurisdiction and gave aliens, in this 
instance Muslim and Croat citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a cause of action against 
the leader of the Bosnia Serbs for violations of “the law of nations” and treaties. Kadic 
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir.1995); see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.2000). The Ninth Circuit also held that § 1350 gave a 
district court jurisdiction over the estate of the former Philippine President Marcos, 
although all plaintiffs and defendants were Philippine nationals and although the torts, 
alleged to violate international law, occurred entirely in the Philippines. Trajano v. 
Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation), 978 F.2d 493, 
499 (9th Cir.1992); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand 
Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir.1994); Martinez v. 
City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir.1998). The Eleventh Circuit 
also held that § 1350 not only confers jurisdiction, but also gives federal courts the 
power to “fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of 
customary international law.” Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
31 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
32  See In re McKerr (AP) (Northern Ireland) 2 All E.R. 409, 538 (House of Lords 2004) 
(“[C]ustomary international law forms part of the common law of England.”). See also 
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. The Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, [2003] C.P. Rep. 28 Q.B.D. (Admin. Ct.). 
33 See  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 2 F.C. 592  
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operate domestically;
34 however, customary international law is part of the 
common law and requires no enabling act – it is directly effective.
35 This is 
also the case in Britain, Australia,
36 the United States, and likely all other com-
mon law jurisdictions. This is understandable, as Canada, like the United Sta-
tes and other former British dominions, received British common law.
37 So the 
idea of customary international law as one element of the common law is hard-
ly idiosyncratic. To gain insight into the meaning of the ATS and to answer 
whether this is a “modern position,” I briefly examine legal history. 
b.  Legal History: Customary International Law has been Part of the 
Common Law for Centuries 
The Court in Sosa correctly looks at legal history, including the works of 
learned scholars such as Blackstone, to determine the content of the ATS.
38 Its 
analysis of Blackstone, though cursory, cannot be called superficial. However, 
it could have also gone further. Accordingly, let us extend this analysis and 
also consider the writings of Coke. Both Coke and Blackstone regarded cus-
tomary international law as an integral part of the common law – namely, as 
another element of customary law. 
i.  What Blackstone can tell us about the Alien Tort Statute 
Understanding the ATS requires serious examination of Blackstone. As the 
leading legal commentator at the time the ATS was drafted, he was almost 
certainly known by the authors of the ATS. Blackstone tells us exactly what 
“the law of nations” (jus gentium) is: 
T[he] law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and 
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world 
a 
; in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and 
                                                                                                                                                      
(Federal Court of Appeals, 2000) (“While principles of customary international law 
may be recognized and applied in Canadian courts as part of the domestic law, this is 
true only in so far as those principles do not conflict with domestic law.”). 
34 See  R. v. Bonadie, [1996] 109 C.C.C. 3d 356. 
35 See  id. 
36  Langer v. Commonwealth [No 3] (1996) 186 CLR 302, 309. 
37  Beaver-Delta Machinery Corp. v. Lumberland Building Materials Ltd., [1985] F.C. 
894 (“[P]ronouncements of the English courts do not constitute binding authority for 
us but they may be regarded as persuasively illustrative of common law principles 
developing in England, aboriginal home of the common law which has been received 
in Canada.”). 
38 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2757-62.  
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to insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which 
must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the 
individuals belonging to each . . . .
39 
What was true when Blackstone wrote remains, mutatis mutandis,
40 true today: 
the law of the nations generally regulates only state conduct vis-à-vis other 
states but, exceptionally, governs individual conduct as well. This is because 
“offences against the law of nations can rarely be the object of the criminal law 
of any particular state. For offences against this law are principally incident to 
whole states or nations.”
41 
Even more importantly, Blackstone notes that customary international law 
is an integral part of the common law – a perfectly logical position, since the 
common law is but customary law: 
I[n] arbitrary states this law [i.e. the law of nations], wherever it contradicts or 
is not provided for by the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the 
royal power: but since in England no royal power can introduce a new law, or 
suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of nations (wherever any 
question arises which is properly the object of it’s jurisdiction) is here adopted 
in it’s full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the 
land.
42 And those acts parliament, which have from time to time been made to 
                                                 
39 William  Blackstone,  Commentaries on the Law of England,  in  PUBLIC  WRONGS, 
BOOK IV OXFORD 66 (R. Burn, LL.D. ed., 1978) (emphasis added). 
40  “All necessary changes having been made.” BLACK’S  DICTIONARY 1044 (8th ed. 
2004). 
41 Blackstone,  supra note 40, at 68 (emphasis added). 
42  It is worth noting that by “law of the land,” Blackstone is referring to the Lex Non 
Scripta or common law, namely the British Constitution. Article 39 of the Magna 
Charta and Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution speaks of “the law of the 
land” as a standard for determining constitutionality. Much of U.S. Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in fact belongs in Article VI. Blackstone is 
repeating, in my opinion rightly, the idea of the unwritten constitution. Furthermore 
this Lex Non Scripta, which the colonists fought a revolution for, was received at 
independence and explicitly incorporated into the Lex Scripta, or written law, of the 
U.S. Constitution. A comparison of Article VI of the U.S. Const. and Article 39 of the 
Magna Charta helps reveal this. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
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enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of it’s (sic) decisions, 
are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as 
declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom.
43 
Thus, it is in no way a “modern” or idiosyncratic view that customary inter-
national law is an integral part of the common law. 
This is still true today: International customary law is a part of the common 
law. Statutory law is presumed consistent with customary international law 
interpreted, where possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute, 
consistently with international law. Statutory law can however displace the 
common law, including customary international law. 
Customary international law is a part of “the law of the land.” These exact 
words, guaranteed by the Magna Charta, are also guaranteed word for word 
under the U.S. Constitution.
44 This is unsurprising since American colonists 
fought for the same rights as Englishmen, namely those constitutional elements 
of lex non scripta such as habeas corpus, trial by jury, and most famously, 
taxation only with consent. Because of this, one could argue customary inter-
national law is constitutional and clearly customary international law is a part 
of the law of the land, even post-Erie. 
A reading of Blackstone makes the significance of the ATS term “law of 
nations” blindingly clear. Blackstone even gives insight into which torts could 
also be violations of the law of nations: “In all disputes relating to prizes, to 
shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there is no other rule of decision but 
this great universal law,”
45 i.e., the law of nations. Again, this explains why the 
framers of the ATS explicitly wanted to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts: 
these claims were otherwise exclusively international and could not be handled 
by the states as the federal government has exclusive foreign policy power. 
Blackstone also discusses international criminal law, which may be used to 
adduce more “torts in violation of the law of nations” since each corresponding 
common law crime implied a corresponding common law intentional tort.
46 
                                                                                                                                                      
“No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way 
destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CHARTA art. 39. 
43 Blackstone,  supra note 40, at 67. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46  For specific examples of this general principle, see Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 250 
(Ky. 1984) (finding where statutory criminal law prohibits harassment, a correspond- 
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Blackstone enumerates: “T[he] principal offence against the law of nations, 
animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, are of three kinds; 
1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors 
[sic]; and, 3. Piracy.”
 47 
ii.  What Coke can tell us about the Alien Tort Statute 
Blackstone is not alone in clarifying the role of customary international law in 
the common law. Earlier, Coke also regarded the law of nations, or jus 
gentium, as a part of the common law.
48 Coke influenced Blackstone’s defini-
tion of piracy; particularly the idea of the pirate as hostes humani generis
49 and 
liable by implication to universal jurisdiction. Blackstone goes so far as to 
quote Coke.
50 Coke also clarifies, as does Blackstone, that the definition of a 
tort still means an injury against one’s rights, i.e., a non-consensual relation.
51 
Piracies, per Coke, are subject to forfeiture.
52 Coke also gives us further insight 
into the meaning of the ATS: 
[W]here divers did in the reign of the late Queen Elizabeth commit Piracy and 
Robbery upon the High Sea, of divers Merchants of Venice in amity with the 
said Queen, and after the Pirates, being not known, obtained a pardon granted 
at the Coronation of King James, whereby the King pardoned them all 
                                                                                                                                                      
ing private right of tort exists); Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, Inc., 616 F.2d 528, 548 (3d Cir. 1979) (showing historically, the tort of 
conspiracy corresponded to crime of conspiracy); Buck v. Oliff, 1990 WL 751239 *2 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1990) (holding that the civil torts of assault and battery find a corres-
ponding wrong in the criminal offense of malicious wounding). But see Direct Lbr. 
Co. v. West Plywood Co.  [1962] S.C.R. 646, affirming [1962] 37 W.W.R. 177) 
(holding that not all breaches of statutory criminal law create a corresponding tort 
action). This apparent conflict can be resolved by recognizing the distinction between 
common law crimes and statutory crimes where common law crimes, barring contrary 
statute, necessarily implies common law torts and statutory crimes possibly imply 
with corresponding statutory torts. 
47 Blackstone,  supra note 40, at 68. 
48 Mortimer  Sellers,  Ethics and Authority in International Law, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
1597, 1600 (1998) (book review). 
49  “Enemies of the human race.” BLACK’S DICTIONARY 755 (8th ed. 2004).  See, e.g., 
U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
50 Blackstone, supra note 40, at 68. 
51 EDWARD COKE, ON MAGNA CARTA 14 (“The law is called rectum, because it dis-
covereth that which is tort, crooked or wrong, for as right signifieth law, so tort, 
crooked or wrong signifieth injurie, and injuria est contra jus, against right.”). 
52 EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 111 (1681).  
  52
felonies (inter alia) first, that before this Statute, Piracy or Robbery on the 
High Sea was no felony whereof the Common Law took any knowledge, for 
that it could not be tried, being out of all Towns and Counties, but was only 
punishable by the Civil Law, as by the Preamble it appeareth; the attainder by 
which Law brought no forfeiture of lands, or corruption of blood. Secondly, 
that this Statute did not alter the offence, or make the offence felony, but 
leaveth the offence as it was before this Act, viz a felony only by the Civil 
law, but giveth a mean of triall by the Common law, and inflicteth such pains 
of death as if they had been attained of any felony etc.
53 
Here, we see Parliament expressly transposing a claim in the Admiralty courts 
(i.e., under international law)
54 into the common law courts to avoid procedural 
injustice. This is exactly what the ATS seeks! However, while the anti-piracy 
statute Coke examined does provide for forfeiture, that forfeiture might have 
been granted not to the victim of the crime, but to the sovereign. Moreover, 
Coke states the claim against the pirate in Admiralty (i.e., the international 
court) was “only punishable by the Civil law.” One could argue, wrongly, that 
the definition of “Civil law” equals what is meant today – a claim not in crime, 
but in tort. I believe, however, what is meant here by “Civil law” is the Ad-
miralty courts: International law in its sources and structures mirrors civilian 
legal systems and civil law concepts continue to hold influence in the common 
law in Admiralty and Equity courts. Alternatively, the reference to “Civil law” 
may mean not ecclesiastic courts, but royal courts. 
Whatever conclusion these points lead to, this much is clear: Coke’s analy-
sis of this statute explains why Congress wanted to enact the ATS. Congress 
meant to transfer a claim from Admiralty, and possibly from state courts, to the 
civil courts to avoid procedural difficulties and irregularities leading to a lack 
of remedy for substantive injustice. Lest critics underrate the importance of 
Coke, even today the U.S. Supreme Court still cites his writings, among others, 
as persuasive evidence of the law.
55 
                                                 
53 Id. at 112. 
54 See  Sosa,  124 S. Ct. at 2756 (“The law merchant emerged from the customary 
practices of international traders and admiralty required its own transnational regula-
tion.”). 
55 See,  e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 300 n.3 (1981).  
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3.  The Government’s Abduction, while Illegal under International Law may 
have been Legal under National Law if a statute had displaced the cus-
tomary law. In all events, the Government’s Abduction was Constitu-
tional. 
The abduction of Alvarez-Machain was clearly a violation of international 
law.
56 That does not mean, however, the U.S. government does not have the 
constitutional power to breach international law.
57 Constitutionally, it is clear 
that although U.S. law should be interpreted consistently with international 
law, U.S. law can conflict with international law and nevertheless be constitu-
tional.
58 It is also clear that customary international law is a part of the com-
mon law,
59 but federal statute may overrule it. So it is possible that U.S. 
                                                 
56 See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD)  OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
432(2) (1987) (“A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the 
territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly 
authorized officials of that state.”). See also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 
U.S. 116, 136 (1812); The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1824); In re Eichmann, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 208-14 (1961). 
57 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (“Though it 
clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to 
have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”). 
58 See  Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (holding that while it is permissible for 
U.S. law to conflict with customary international law, where legislation is susceptible 
to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that does not conflict with “the law of 
nations” is preferred). See also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
59  The easiest but most superficial view is simply that customary international law is part 
of federal common law. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1146. 
That view, while roughly accurate, requires refinement because of the question of the 
role of customary international law in federal common law post-Erie: 
After Erie brought an end to “general federal common law,” federal common law has 
been mostly interstitial or generated by the need for uniformity throughout the States. 
[F]ederal common law of customary international law is justified by neither con-
sideration. Congress, when it ratifies treaties, often does so with reservations in order 
to avoid altering domestic law. Yet treating customary international law as federal law 
would alter domestic law because of the Supremacy Clause. 
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1148 (citation omitted). 
The issue is carefully outlined, but remains unanswered, as noted in Sampson v. 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
Several early Supreme Court decisions explain that customary international law is part 
of the law of the United States. During the nineteenth century, however, this apparent-
ly meant that customary international law was included in the general common law  
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actions, while clearly a violation of international law, are not necessarily a 
violation of U.S. domestic law. That would depend on whether any U.S. statu-
tes in question operate to abrogate the common law. If any federal statute ab-
rogated the common law on extraterritorial abduction then the actions were 
legal and constitutional. But constitutional power is not exercised in a vacuum. 
All states are subject to the command of international law: No state may 
exempt themselves from international laws which are also jus cogens through 
persistent objection thereto.
60 Thus, the United States has the power to 
abduct,
61 but lacks a legal right to do so. Indeed, when it does so, it will incur 
the wrath of its allies and risk worsening an already isolated global position.
62 
                                                                                                                                                      
recognized in Swift v. Tyson. The general common law, unlike the federal common 
law of today, did not fall under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. Thus, the exact meaning of these early pronouncements on the domestic role of 
customary international law became less certain after the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
a general common law in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. One view of customary inter-
national law holds that, post-Erie, it is federal common law. Another leading view is 
that customary international law is “like common law.” Under this theory, customary 
international law is federal law that can arguably supersede prior federal statutes. 
250 F.3d 1145, 1153 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
Thus, a massive lurking issue briefed by neither party before the Court was the status 
of customary international law as a part of the common law after Erie. The Sosa Court 
addresses this issue, but not decisively. In all events, the holding of The Paquete 
Habana states: 
[I]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no 
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must 
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. 
175 U.S. at 700. 
This law does not appear to have been expressly overruled. See Ahmed v. Goldberg, 
Nos. CIV.00-0005, CIV.A.99-0046, 2001 WL 1843390 at *7 (D. N. Mar. I. May 11, 
2001) (“[s]ince any treaty or other international agreement of the United States, and 
any applicable rule of customary international law, is federal law (§ 111), it super-
sedes inconsistent State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later.)”; Harold 
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV.L.REV. 1824, 1835 
(1998). 
60  Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).  C.f., 
Gisbert v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993), op. amended, 997 
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether jus cogens supersedes 
domestic law). 
61  U.S. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1997). 
62 See,  e.g., Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35  
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Legally, other states will be entitled to the self-help remedies of retorsion
63 and 
reprisals.
64 Thus, the U.S. executive violates international law at its own peril 
and the peril of the republic. Federal law enforcement officers have constitu-
tional power to enforce U.S. law overseas.
65 They do not, however, have the 
legal right to do so when such exercise of jurisdiction to enforce also consti-
tutes a violation of international or foreign laws. The act may be legal in the 
domestic laws of the United States, but it would nevertheless be illegal under 
international law. 
B.  Is the Alien Tort Statute solely a grant of jurisdiction, or does it provide a 
cause of action for aliens who are victimized by tortious violations of 
international law?
66 
Again, the Justice Department miscast the issue, for although the ATS is 
                                                                                                                                                      
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 939 (2003) (“Choosing to wrongfully detain an individual may weaken 
the U.S. position in the international community and lead to acts of retorsion or 
reprisal, even war.”). 
63  Marks v. U.S., 28 Ct. Cl. 147 (1893) (stating that retorsions are retaliatory acts short 
of war). See also George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Free-
dom’s Self-Defense Responses,  37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 534 (2003) (stating that 
“[r]etorsions are unfriendly but lawful acts,” such as mobilizing reserves or recalling 
ambassadors). 
64  The power of reprisal is explicitly recognized in the U.S. Constitution.  “[Congress 
shall have the power] to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 11. See 
also Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp To 1945 – Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anti-
cipatory Self- Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 
1, 7 (2003) (“While acts that constitute reprisals would normally be illegal, they 
become legal because of the aggressor’s previous illegal act. Moreover, reprisals con-
tain a distinctly punitive purpose and are frequently viewed as justified sanctions.”). 
65  American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 771 (N.D.Cal. 
1989) (“Congress is not constitutionally bound to abide by precepts of international 
law, and may therefore promulgate valid legislation that conflicts with or preempts 
customary international law.”). See, e.g. U.S. v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 909, 916-17 
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating that the permissible actions of law enforcement officers acting 
overseas are, however, subject to the U.S. constitution). 
66 See  Brief of United States Department of Justice, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 
2739 (2004) (No. 03-339). See also Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Social Responsi-
bility at *i, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) (posing the 
issue of “Whether the ATS creates a private cause of action for aliens for torts 
committed anywhere in violation of the law of nations or treaties of the United States 
or, instead, is a jurisdiction-granting provision that does not establish private rights of 
action”).  
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“merely” jurisdictional, it grants jurisdiction for substantive claims in violation 
of the law of nations.
67 This is facially apparent by reading the plain language 
of the statute. This was also the conclusion the Supreme Court in Sosa 
reached.
68 Some of the U.S. Courts of Appeals had at least implied that the 
ATS created a supplementary cause of action in addition to the substantive 
international cause of action. However, the better view, taken by the majority 
of the circuit courts and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sosa,
69 is that the 
ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute and does not itself create any new inde-
pendent cause of action.
70 The Court reached this result through a textual
71 and 
historical
72 analysis of the ATS. It also considered a systemic analysis, placing 
the ATS in the context of the judiciary act – a jurisdictional law – to reach the 
logical conclusion that the act does not create an independent cause of action 
under U.S. law.
73 On the basis of this solid black letter analysis, the Court 
concluded that the statute permits the transposition of tortious violations of 
international law into U.S. law.
74 
Although the ATS does not create an independent cause of action under 
U.S. law, this does not mean no remedy exists for a private person when their 
rights under international law are violated. Rather, it means that the internatio-
nal law is the basis of the substantive claim.
75 
                                                 
67  “[T]he state has no inherent right to enforce its criminal laws or restrictions imposed 
under those laws outside the United States. Only with the permission of the foreign 
country in question may the law enforcement officers of one country exercise powers 
in another one.” Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 432(1), (2) (1987)) (citations 
omitted). 
68 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2759. 
69 Id. at 2754. 
70 See,  e.g., Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992). But see In re 
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting the argument that the ATS is merely jurisdictional). 
71 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2755. 
72 Id. at 2756-58. 
73 Id. at 2755 (“The fact that the ATS was placed in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute 
otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction, is itself support for its 
strictly jurisdictional nature.”). 
74 Id. at 2758. 
75 See Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 631-32. 
The district court . . . reasoned that “it is international law, not the ATCA,” that gives 
individuals fundamental rights. Therefore, a claim under the ATCA is based on a 
violation of international law, not of the ATCA itself. This reading is consistent with  
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As well as the ATS claim, there may be an independent, implied private 
cause of action for violation of jus cogens norms and constitutional torts as a 
possible remedy for international human rights violations.
76  The Court in 
Sosa, however, continued the trend of limiting Bivens claims for constitutional 
torts.
77 
A substantive claim for a “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States”
78 litigated before U.S. courts should be considered “derived” 
from international law.
79  Sosa addressed a split of authority on this issue 
between U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Court’s  plain meaning interpretation 
yielded the conclusion that the ATS does not grant an independent cause of 
action, but rather provides U.S. federal courts the jurisdiction to hear claims 
                                                                                                                                                      
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in U.S. v. Smith. . . . The language of § 1350 creates no 
obligations or duties. Admittedly, the ATCA differs from the Gonzalez Act in that it 
creates a cause of action for violations of international law, whereas the Gonzalez Act 
limited the common law liability of doctors. . . . Nonetheless, we find nothing in this 
distinction to cause us to deviate from the plain language of the statute. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
76 See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F.Supp. 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“Federal 
courts may, however, imply a private right of action for violations of jus cogens norms 
of international law.”). See also White v. Paulsen, 997 F.Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. 
Wash. 1998). The Supreme Court recognizes that private rights of action may be 
implied for violations of federal constitutional rights for which no express statutory 
right of action exists. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1999) (holding that the right to sue federal agents for 
damages could be judicially implied from the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unconstitutional searches and seizures). Judicial authority to recognize implied 
remedies for violations of constitutional rights applies equally to violations of jus 
cogens norms such as those prohibiting genocide, torture, and slavery. See White, 997 
F.Supp. at 1383; Benas v. Baca, No. CV-00-11507, 2001 WL 485168, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 23, 2001). 
77 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2772 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“Bivens is ‘a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law 
powers to create causes of action.’”). See also Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (“While Bivens stands, the ground supporting it has eroded. 
For the past 25 years, ‘we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any 
new context.’”). 
78  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
79 See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n 
order to state a claim under the ATCA, a plaintiff must allege either a violation of a 
United States treaty or of a rule of customary international law, as derived from those 
universally adopted customs and practices that States consider to be legally obligatory 
and of mutual concern.”).  
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for violations of international law which are also torts injuring aliens. The ATS 
states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”
80 The illegality to be remedied under the ATS 
is violation of international law or the law of nations, i.e., jus gentium.
81 The 
ATS does not envision ordinary torts which injure aliens, which would be 
“private law,” but rather tortious violations of international law.
82 
Also, attempts to infer the limits and meaning of the ATS from the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) are problematic at best: Congress 
enacted the TVPA hundreds of years after the ATS. Furthermore, the ATS and 
TVPA differ in that the ATS addresses international law.
83 In contrast, the 
TVPA is a creation of American law, not international law. International law 
may be persuasive evidence of the content of the TVPA, but it is not the source 
of the claim.
84 This distinction is clouded by the fact that customary inter-
national law grows out of state practice. If all states recognized claims like the 
TVPA, then an independant cause of action would exist based on international 
law for the same set of facts that may be remedied in U.S. law under the 
TVPA. 
It is better to look at the ATS in its own terms to understand its meaning. 
The only two law sources explicitly mentioned in the ATS were the law of 
nations, not U.S. law, and treaties of the United States,
85 both of which are 
sources of international law, custom, and treaty. The evidentiary role of the 
TVPA in interpreting the ATS should be seen only in negative terms; the 
Supreme Court regards the TVPA as evidence that Congress did not dis-
                                                 
80  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (emphasis added). 
81  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
82  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
83  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
84  See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1146 (Randolph, J., concurring). 
The House Report on the torture victim bill did state that § 1350 “should remain intact 
to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into 
the rules of customary international law.” But the statement of one congressional 
committee is by no means a statement of “Congress,” as some have supposed; the 
wish expressed in the committee’s statement is reflected in no language Congress 
enacted; it does not purport to rest on an interpretation of § 1350; and the statement 
itself is legislative dictum. 
See id. (citation omitted). 
85 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-61.  
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approve of use of the ATS.
86 However, the Court goes further by raising a 
rather unpersuasive argument that Congress must somehow explicitly autho-
rize the Court to enforce laws it has enacted.
87 It would certainly be more 
logical to presume that all laws enacted are also meant to be enforced, unless 
Congress explicitly stated a law was merely an “enabling act” or similar prepa-
ratory legislation. It would be a strange interpretation of separation of powers 
for the Court to simply refuse to adjudicate the laws Congress enacted. 
The doctrine of expressio unius
88 reinforces the plain meaning interpreta-
tion.
89 Logical arguments also support the interpretation that the substantive 
aspects of the ATS are based in international law and not in domestic law. 
What purpose would be served by creating two causes of action, one based in 
domestic substantive law and the other in international law within one legis-
lative act, particularly since both causes of action would be almost exactly co-
extensive? Why would the ATS authors want to “mirror” all international law 
claims with equivalent domestic claims? There seems to be no sensible reason 
to do so. Thus, a reductio ad absurdam
90 argument also leads to the logical 
                                                 
86 See id. at 2765 (“Congress, however, has not only expressed no disagreement with our 
view of the proper exercise of the judicial power, but has responded to its most 
notable instance by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial determination in 
some detail.”). 
87 See id. at 2763. 
It is true that a clear mandate appears in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 
106 Stat. 73, providing authority that “establish[es] an unambiguous and modern basis 
for” federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing. But that affirmative authority is 
confined to specific subject matter, and although the legislative history includes the 
remark that § 1350 “should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that 
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.” 
Congress as a body has done nothing to promote such suits. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The argument is well-taken until the last clause. Congress does not need to authorize 
the adjudication and enforcement of the laws that it enacts. What action was the court 
looking for beyond the retention of § 1350 and enactment of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act? 
88  “A cannon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S  DICTIONARY 620 (8th. ed. 
2004). 
89  Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 436 (1902) (holding that “general principles 
applicable to the construction of written instruments” apply to the construction of trea-
ties). 
90  “In logic, disproof of an argument showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.” 
BLACK’S DICTIONARY 1305 (8th. ed. 2004).  
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conclusion that the ATS is purely procedural, but vests in U.S. courts the 
power to remedy violations of international law. The substantive component 
of the ATS is found in international law, while the procedural aspects are 
found in U.S. law. 
Statutes, like treaties,
91 are to be interpreted not in isolation,
92 but rather in 
light of the Constitution,
93 congressional intent, international law, and other 
statutes with the goal of giving full effect to all of their provisions. Statutes are 
to be interpreted wherever possible to be consistent with treaties and the U.S. 
constitution.
94 There is very little evidence of legislative intent as to the scope 
and purpose of the ATS.
95 The Supreme Court in Sosa did however, do the 
best job possible to analyze what little historical evidence it could find.
96 
Interpreting the ATS as creating an independent substantive cause of action in 
                                                 
91  Maximov v. U.S., 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), aff’d, 373 U.S. 49 (1963) (stating 
that treaty interpretation seeks to “give the specific words of a treaty a meaning con-
sistent with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties”). See also 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988) 
(stating that when interpreting a treaty, we “begin with the text of the treaty and the 
context in which the written words are used. Other general rules of construction may 
be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages”). 
92 See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (“[C]ourts do not interpret statutes in 
isolation.”). 
93 See,  e.g., In re Cross, 662 P.2d 828, 834 (1983) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of 
several interpretations, some of which may render it unconstitutional, the court, 
without doing violence to the legislative purpose, will adopt a construction which will 
sustain its constitutionality if at all possible to do so.” (quoting State ex rel. Morgan v. 
Kinnear, 494 P.2d 1362 (1972))). 
94 See,  e.g., Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, AFL-CIO v. Taca Int’l Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 
965, 969 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902)) 
(“It is axiomatic that statutes and treaties are to be interpreted, to the maximum extent 
possible, so as to be consistent and harmonious.”); Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 
405 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“While Petitioners may not directly invoke rights under non-
self-executing treaties, or challenge statutes when Congress has clearly abrogated 
international law, they certainly may argue that the Court should adopt the statutory 
interpretation that is consistent with international law.” (citing  Kim Ho Ma v. 
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
95 See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The 
intended purpose and scope of the ATCA never have been definitively established by 
legal historians or by the Supreme Court, and the ATCA lacks a legislative history 
that could provide courts with guidance as to its intended meaning.”). 
96 See  Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2758 (“Given the poverty of drafting history, modern commen-
tators have necessarily concentrated on the text.”).  
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addition to claims under international law would not be inconsistent with U.S. 
treaties or the constitution, but such an interpretation would contradict maxims 
of statutory construction such as “plain meaning” interpretation and expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. 
Statutes are also to be interpreted according to their plain meaning.
97 The 
ATS does not explicitly state creation of an independent cause of action, but 
rather explicitly uses the terms “committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.”
98 No more, no less. Had Congress wished to 
create an independent cause of action under domestic U.S. legislation or 
domestic common law, it would have said so, as it did in the Torture Victim 
Protection Act
99. 
The ATS opens U.S. courts to alien litigants to redress substantive viola-
tions of international law to overcome the key limitation of international law: 
the absence of enforcement mechanisms. International courts and tribunals are 
only partial answers to the problem of unenforced international laws because 
international tribunals are themselves limited by the second main problem of 
international law: the absence of a single sovereign. International law is also 
limited because, as a general rule it addresses itself principally to nations and 
not individuals.
100 An independent cause of action would not need to be cre-
ated to grant individuals, as opposed to states, remedies for certain violations 
of international law.
101 
This conundrum leads to another question: whether a claim for a violation 
                                                 
97 See In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When a 
statute is unambiguous, resort to legislative history and policy considerations is 
improper.”). 
98  28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000). 
99 See  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
100 See Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F.Supp. 885, 903 (D. Tex. 1980) 
(“There is a general consensus .  .  .  that [the law of nations] deals primarily with the 
relationship among nations rather than among individuals.”). 
101 See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The court of 
appeals . . . recogniz[ed] the emergence of a universal consensus that international law 
affords substantive rights to individuals and places limits on a state’s treatment of its 
citizens.” (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-87)). These well-defined, but limited 
exceptions include, inter alia, torture, acts of genocide, war crimes, piracy, and sla-
very. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Individuals may be 
held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and 
genocide.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES pt. II, introductory note (1986))).  
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of international law injuring only a state would nonetheless also create a right 
to a remedy in the United States? Unfortunately, the better answer is “no.” The 
issue of when and whether an international norm applies to individuals is not 
without controversy.
102 This controversy, however, is due to a lack of under-
standing of international law or perhaps skepticism at the proof of international 
custom.
103 Such proof necessarily calls before the court texts from foreign legal 
systems, which are often, but not always, in foreign languages.
104 With a 
proper understanding of the general rule that international law governs only 
relations among states inter se,
105 but does exceptionally recognize rights and 
                                                 
102 See Naoum v. Attorney General of U.S., 300 F.Supp.2d 521, 527 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
Whether or not customary international law may be used by individuals to assert 
rights against state or private actors is a somewhat unsettled proposition. The Sixth 
Circuit, in Buell v. Mitchell, held that the determination of whether customary inter-
national law prevents a State from carrying out the death penalty, when the State 
otherwise is acting in full compliance with the Constitution, is a question that is 
reserved to the executive and legislative branches of the United States government, as 
it [is] their constitutional role to determine the extent of this country’s international 
obligations and how best to carry them out. However, in Buell, the Sixth Circuit 
expressly limited its holding to the context of the case stating that it took ‘no position 
on the question of the role of federal courts to apply customary international law as 
federal law in other contexts, a subject of recent lively academic debate. 
Id. 
103 See,  e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“A treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of a norm of customary international 
law if an overwhelming majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States 
uniformly and consistently act in accordance with its principles.”). See also U.S. v. 
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102 n.35 (2d Cir. 2003). 
104 See,  e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 449 U.S. 530, 536-40 (1991). The Supreme 
Court, though methodical in its textual analysis reaches the right result, but its reason-
ing is incorrect. The Court’s decision was based on the mistaken notion that the sour-
ces of law and their hierarchization in France are the same as in the United States. 
That is simply not the case; both the sources of law and their hierarchical relationships 
are different in French and U.S. law. Eastern Airlines is a perfect example of how 
courts should try to determine foreign law via a methodical textual analysis, but the 
glaring error of the Court shows us why other courts are reluctant to attempt to inter-
pret foreign law. But see Rudetsky v. O’Dowd, 660 F.Supp. 341, 348 (D. N.Y. 1987) 
(finding the absence of language barrier factor in favor of determining and applying 
British law in U.S. court); Stanley v. Bertram-Trojan, Inc., No. 89 CIV.8160, 1991 
WL 221116, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) (finding a similar absence of language barrier fac-
tor in favor of determining and applying Bahama’s law in U.S. court). 
105 Inter  se references “a right or a duty owed between the parties, rather than to others.” 
BLACK’S DICTIONARY 839 (8th ed. 2004).  See U.S. v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 575  
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duties of individuals, delimiting the exceptions becomes possible. 
The problem of determining whether a claim for a violation of international 
law creates an individual right becomes manageable by understanding that the 
sources and methods of common law and European continental civilian law are 
in fact similar. International law generally does not create individual rights 
because the rights it creates are held by states, which then mediate the com-
plaints of individuals. Normally, individuals can only complain of a violation 
of international law through the intermediary of their state.
106 Violations of the 
rights of non-intervention and sovereign equality are not within the limited, but 
well-recognized, exceptions where individuals have directly enforceable 
claims under international law. Consequently, U.S. law may only recognize a 
novel individual claim for a violation of international law by relying on the 
flimsy argument that the ATS only imports international substantive law and 
not international procedural law and the question of who has a right to a 
remedy is a procedural, not substantive question. Such an argument is flimsy 
because it is against common sense. The international claim does not recognize 
a private cause of action, so why would it do so under the ATS? Furthermore, 
the argument relies on formalist distinctions between “substance” and “pro-
cedure,” which have been shown to be manipulable and thus untenable. In all 
events, for political reasons, the Supreme Court in Sosa wished to limit ATS. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the circuit courts would adopt this line of argument. 
C.  “If it is proper to imply or create a cause of action under the ATS, 
whether those actions should be limited to suits for violations of inter-
national legal norms to which the United States has assented.”
107 
The issue is again somewhat miscast because it ignores the category of norms 
                                                                                                                                                      
(4th Cir. 2004) (“Even where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a 
particular state . . . it is traditionally held that any rights arising from such provisions 
are, under international law, those of the [sic] states and . . . individual rights are only 
derivative through the states.” (quoting Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 
259 (7th Cir.1990))). What is generally true of treaties, however, does admit excep-
tions and is not true of custom; if Congress finds a customary international law repug-
nant, it can legislate against it. 
106 See  United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is 
traditionally held that any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international 
law, those of the states and  .  .  . individual rights are only derivative through the 
states.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 115, cmt. e (1965))). 
107  Brief of Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (No. 03-339).  
  64
erga omnes.
 108 There are international obligations of all states inter se which 
are not derogable. Those are laws jus cogens. However, obligations of all 
states to the international system as a whole also exist:
109 Those are norms erga 
omnes.
110 
The distinction
111 may seem unimportant; one might be able to subsume 
                                                 
108  See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon an 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multi-
national Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 91, 153 (2002) (stating that erga 
omnes obligations are a consequence of general principles of international law); The 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 
32 (Feb. 5) (stating that norms erga omnes are non-derogable duties owed by all states 
to the international community and that all states have an interest in the protection of 
an erga omnes norm). 
109  Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In 
the words of the International Court of Justice, these norms, which include ‘principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,’ are the concern of all 
states; ‘they are obligations erga omnes.’” (citing Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 
32 (1970))). 
110  The concept of erga omnes norms appears first clearly in Barcelona Traction. There, 
the International Court of Justice stated: 
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in 
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of 
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes . . . Such 
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlaw-
ing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules con-
cerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into 
the body of general international law; others are conferred by international instru-
ments of a universal or quasi-universal character. 
Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 (citation omitted). 
111 See Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protec-
tion of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria For Peremptory Norms, 11 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 106 (1998) (“The relationship among the different kinds of 
‘community obligations’ (jus cogens, erga omnes obligations, international crime) is 
still an open issue.”); Jochen Abr. Frowein, Obligations Erga Omnes, in 3 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 757 (1997) (“Although the notions jus cogens 
and obligations erga omnes refer to different legal consequences, they are related to 
each other in important aspects. A rule from which no derogation is permitted because 
of its fundamental nature will normally be one in whose performance all States must 
be seen to have a legal interest.”).  
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erga omnes norms into jus cogens.
112 U.S. law may no longer recognize the 
distinction between jus cogens norms and erga omnes norms,
113 but the dis-
tinction still persists internationally. Jus cogens norms are those rules of inter-
national law which no state may violate.
114 They are duties owed to other states 
and individuals.
115 Norms erga omnes are those norms which no state may 
violate because they are duties owed to the international community as a 
whole.
116 The distinction may be relevant for the determination of whether a 
state may exercise universal jurisdiction. At any rate, the Supreme Court in 
Sosa does not address the distinction between jus cogens and erga omnes. In 
fact, neither term even appears in the Supreme Court’s decision! Elsewhere, 
U.S. courts have held that although no state may violate jus cogens norms,
117 
neither is any state obligated to remedy violations of such norms,
118 although 
states are under a duty to extradite or punish international criminals in their 
                                                 
112  For an example of a U.S. court, probably erroneously, subsuming jus cogens into erga 
omnes and thus confusing two distinct legal concepts, see Siderman de Blake, 965 
F.2d at 715. 
113 See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(Wald, J., dissenting) (stating, in my opinion erroneously, that erga omnes norms and 
jus cogens norms are one and the same). 
114  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 64, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.39/27, at 289 (1969), 1155 U.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) 
(stating that a jus cogens norm is “a norm accepted and recognized by the internatio-
nal community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character”). 
115 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp.2d 401, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Karen 
Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan’s World War II War-Rape 
Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 524 (1994); Anita Ramasastry, 
Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon an Examination of Forced 
Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 154 (2002). 
116 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 306 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Violations of jus cogens norms constitute violations of obligations 
owed to all (‘erga omnes’)” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
702 § cmt. o (1987))).  See also Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32. 
117 See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD)  OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
702 (1987). 
118 See Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“[J]us cogens norms do not require Congress (or any government) to create jurisdic-
tion.”).  
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territory.
119 
1.  Plain Meaning Argument – The ATS facially does not distinguish between 
jus cogens norms and other rules of international law 
Regardless of the contours of the distinction between norms erga omnes and 
norms jus cogens, a distinction in all events not directly addressed by the court 
in Sosa, clarifying the distinction between erga omnes norms and jus cogens 
norms is not necessary to determine whether only jus cogens rules can be the 
basis of an ATS claim. A plain meaning interpretation of the ATS disposes of 
that question. The ATS does not facially distinguish between violations of jus 
cogens and ordinary international law. The text of the ATS only distinguishes 
customary norms from other customary norms based on whether they are torts. 
The implication from the text is that no criminal remedy may be imposed. 
2.  Historical Argument – At the time of drafting of the ATS international law 
did not distinguish between jus cogens norms and ordinary rules of inter-
national law. 
Not only does a plain meaning argument lead to the conclusion that the ATS 
does not distinguish between jus cogens violations and other violations of 
international law, a historical argument leads to the same conclusion. The con-
cept of norms erga omnes or jus cogens basically dates from the 20th Century, 
long after enactment of the ATS. Erga omnes appears to date from the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in Barcelona Traction.
120 The concept 
of  jus cogens appears first in the Vienna Convention on Treaties in the 
1960s,
121 a treaty to which the United States is not a signatory. Nonetheless, 
the concept has since become a part of customary international law, recognized 
by the United States due to the U.S. government’s non-objection to the 
                                                 
119  The duty to extradite or punish criminals is known by the maxim “aut dedere, aut 
judicare.” In its origins, like jus cogens, aut dedere was a principle incorporated into 
extradition treaties. Has it since, however, grown through widespread usage into 
customary international law? The better view, in the interest of the rule of law, is yes. 
For an argument in favor of the customary status of the general principle aut dedere, 
aut judicare,  see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, AUT  DEDERE, AUT 
JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995). 
For an example of aut dedere in a U.S. treaty, see The Montreal Convention, May 10, 
1984 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2004)). 
120 See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 3. 
121  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
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custom.
122 
Whatever the origins, contours, and impact of the concepts of jus cogens 
and erga omnes in customary international law, the fact is the concept of non-
derogable norms binding all states, without exception under any circumstances 
(whether called erga omnes or jus cogens), was not a part of international law 
in 1789. So the ATS in 1789 would have remedied any violation of internatio-
nal law, at least where there was a private cause of action (the case of piracy 
for example,
123 but also the case of injuries to diplomatic personnel.)
124 
3.  Systemic Argument – The hermetic separation of the international legal 
system into a “public-state” and “private-individual” sphere did not exist 
at the time of the drafting of the ATS, is increasingly ignored today, and 
provides no argument that the ATS address only jus cogens violations. 
Some argue, correctly, that the hermetic division of the legal system into 
separate private and public legal orders, likely a result of continental pandecti-
cism and codification, was in fact a development of the mid-19th century and 
not at all a feature of law in 1789.
125 That is an argument in favor of continuing 
the contemporary trend of ignoring this division. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the ATS’s substantive content does 
evolve with international law.
126 However, the creation of concepts of jus 
cogens norms and norms erga omnes enhances and does not reduce the pro-
tection of persons under law. Thus, it would be entirely backwards to argue 
that the development of norms so fundamental that no state under any circum-
stance may violate them somehow justifies permitting states to violate other 
norms with impunity. It is a strange argument indeed that the creation of norms 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) (holding individuals liable for acts of 
piracy in violation of law of nations). 
124 See Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784) (holding individuals liable in 
tort for assault on French consular official). 
125 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
126 See  id.  at 816. 
The substantive rules of international law may evolve and perhaps courts may apply 
those new rules, but that does not solve the problem of the existence of a cause of 
action. If plaintiffs were explicitly provided with a cause of action by the law of 
nations, as it is currently understood, this court might – subject to considerations of 
justiciability – be required by section 1350 to entertain their claims. But, as discussed 
below, international law today does not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action. 
Id.  
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intended to protect individuals against the worst breaches of international law 
somehow denudes the rest of international law (and by extension the ATS) of 
substantive protections of lesser breaches of international law. The ATS clear-
ly applies both to claims for violation of jus cogens and for claims of ordinary 
violations of international law. 
4.  Individual Rights under International Law   
This shows that the relevant issue is whether international law recognizes an 
individually enforceable right, in which case, the ATS would grant a remedy. 
International law in principle addresses only states. Exceptionally, though 
increasingly,
127 international law does recognize individual rights and duties, 
not only as to violations of jus cogens but also for violations of ordinary inter-
national law.
128 Further, whether international law grants rights and duties to 
individuals does not necessarily turn on whether the right in question is a jus 
cogens norm. 
a. Abduction 
Presently, international law, does not recognize a right of an individual to 
make a claim against a state for violating the integrity of another state. Thus, 
the remedy for the violation of international law, the violation of Mexican 
sovereignty, can be invoked only by the Mexican government and not by 
Alvarez-Machain. Therefore, in the cases of Israel v. Eichmann,
129 Argoud,
130 
                                                 
127 See,  e.g.,  Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439-440 (D.N.J, 
1999) (expanding the interpretation of slavery to include forced labor as a subset 
thereof; it reached this result by relying on international conventions, tribunals, and 
U.S. case law). 
128 See,  e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex. 
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 1 App. Cas. 147, 154 (2000) (“During the course of the 
century the treatment by a state of its own citizens, at least in certain areas of 
fundamental importance, has ceased to be regarded as a matter of internal affairs. The 
violation of a norm of jus cogens certainly is not so regarded.”). 
129  Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (District Ct. 1961) (Isr.). 
130  In re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cour de Cassation 1964) (Fr.). Thus, Eichmann is not the 
only case where a national was kidnapped in a foreign state by a prosecuting state but 
had no remedy because the remedy was held by the state where he was kidnapped 
from. See also Brigette Belton Homrig, Comment, Abduction as an Alternative to 
Extradition – A Dangerous Method to Obtain Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants, 
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1993). On this point, although abduction is unpleasant, 
assassination is abominable.  
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and United States v. Noriega,
131 though the abductions were illegal under inter-
national law, the abductee had no remedy because the injured states did not 
object. Though Alvarez-Machain has no international law remedy for abduc-
tion, the distinction is not whether the injury is a violation of jus cogens. The 
principles of sovereign equality
132 and non-intervention are likely themselves 
jus cogens norms!
133 The distinction is whether international law recognizes a 
right inhering in an individual and not merely mediated by the state of which 
the individual is a citizen.
134 Certain violations of jus cogens, such as slavery, 
piracy, and torture committed by state actors, also create a directly enforceable 
private cause of action under international law.
135 And these norms are indeed 
also  jus cogens. However, there are international rules which are directly 
enforceable by individuals, yet which are not jus cogens.
136 
                                                 
131  117 F.3d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1997). 
132 See  generally Henry J. Richardson, Failed States, Self-Determination, And Preventive 
Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia And Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 1 (1996); David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who can say No?, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 619 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n. (1987). 
133 See Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions 
Under International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 2-4 (2001) (arguing the principle 
of non-intervention is a jus cogens norm); Jeremy Levitt, The Responsibility to 
Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 153, 159 (2003) (reviewing 
INTERNATIONAL  COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE  SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT) (asserting the principle of non-intervention is a jus 
cogens norm). 
134 See  Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[W]here a 
treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state . . . it is traditionally 
held that ‘any rights arising from such provisions are, under international law, those of 
the states and . . . individual rights are only derivative through the states.’”). That is 
the general rule, but there are a growing number of exceptions to that general rule. 
135 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II, 
introductory note (1987) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses against inter-
national law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.”). 
Although international law generally governs the relationship between nations, and 
thus a violation thereof almost always requires state action, it has been recognized that 
a handful of particularly egregious acts – genocide, war crimes, piracy, and slavery – 
by purely private actors can violate international law. As of now, however, only the 
acts mentioned above have been found to result in private individuals being held liable 
under international law. 
Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *22 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 
26, 2001) 
136 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708 (during time of war, fishing vessels are  
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b. State  Action 
The question whether the ATS only provides remedies for violations of jus 
cogens appears to arise due to miscasting the ATS in terms of “state action” 
when dealing with non-state actors. Historically, however, non-state actors, 
whether pirates or mobs, could be held liable as individuals for their torts 
against other individuals in violation of the law of nations. So the state action 
requirement, a result of the unsuccessful attempt in the 1800s to render 
international law the exclusive province of states, is really misplaced in ATS 
cases. There is, logically speaking, no “state action” requirement under inter-
national law. Unfortunately, this confusion was neither addressed nor resolved 
in Sosa. 
Courts that erroneously impose a “state action” requirement on the ATS,
137 
a requirement which figures nowhere in that statute, usually do so operating 
from assumptions of, and analogies to, U.S. civil rights laws
138 (which are 
wholly inappropriate to norms of international law), or on the principle that 
international law as a general rule only grants rights and duties to states
139 (a 
                                                                                                                                                      
protected from capture by the law of nations); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) 
(engaging in sabotage makes enemy aliens liable for violations of the laws of war); 
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887) (counterfeiting foreign government 
securities violates the law of nations). 
137 See,  e.g.,  Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2000). 
138  Brad J. Kieserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate 
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 888 
n.29 (1999). 
Courts apply “color of law “ jurisprudence derived from a domestic civil rights statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), to test for state action in [ATS] claims. The cases deciding 
whether private action may be fairly ascribed to the state “have not been a model of 
consistency.” Application of § 1983 in corporate [ATS] litigation has been similarly 
inconsistent. Compare Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91 (finding state action in the 
absence of any allegations that the corporate defendant actually committed human 
rights abuses), with Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 374-80 (finding no state 
action although the corporate defendant allegedly committed human rights abuses and 
a “close” business relationship existed between the corporation and the foreign host-
government). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
139 See,  e.g., Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc. 305 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1301 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003). The court in Aldana stated: 
While international law does not require state action for certain violations such as 
genocide and piracy, Plaintiffs have conceded that there must be state action for the 
claims asserted in their Third Amended Complaint. Mere conclusory allegations 
regarding state action cannot satisfy a plaintiff’s burden under the ATCA.  
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principle with many exceptions). They seem to be operating under an implicit 
and erroneous presumption that international law only grants direct rights and 
duties to individuals in cases of jus cogens violations.
140 This is in spite of the 
fact that no requirement of “state action” or “color of law” appears anywhere 
in the text of the ATS, or the TVPA for that matter. In actuality, under inter-
national law no requirement of “state action” to find violations of international 
law exists.
141 International law does not look at “state action” to determine 
whether a right exists or was violated. 
Despite confusion stemming from inappropriate attempts to transpose U.S. 
domestic law into international law, or simply misunderstanding of internatio-
nal law, some courts do reach the correct results for the proper reasons.
142 This 
might be because states are responsible to the international community not 
only to govern their own behavior, but also that of their subjects. So illegal 
private action could, under international law, rightly be attributed to the non-
feasance or misfeasance of a state. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Id. (citations omitted). 
140 See,  e.g.,Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV.8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 
319887, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). To add to the confusion: though it seems 
clear the court is thinking in terms of jus cogens – namely that for jus cogens 
violations, no showing of state action is required – the court does not seem to clearly 
state, perhaps because of uncertainty as to which provisions of law are jus cogens and 
how to hierarchize jus cogens norms. 
141  Some courts get the issue right despite the confusion. For example, in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Edwards, correctly, did not impose a state action 
requirement on international law. He held that piracy, the slave trade, and “a handful 
of other private acts” are violations of international law by private actors. 726 F.2d 
774, 794 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Bork also noted that international 
law prohibited private acts such as piracy and interference with ambassadors. Id. at 
813-15 (Bork, J., concurring). 
142 See  e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its 
reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals. An early example of the application of the law of nations to the 
acts of private individuals is the prohibition against piracy. In The Brig Malek Adhel, 
the Supreme Court observed that pirates were “hostis human generis’ (an enemy of all 
mankind) in part because they acted “without . . . any pretense of public authority.” 
Later examples are prohibitions against the slave trade and certain war crimes. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
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D.  “Whether a detention that lasts less than 24 hours, results in no physical 
harm to the detainee, and is undertaken by a private individual under 
instructions from senior United States law enforcement officials, 
constitutes a tort in violation of the law of nations actionable under the 
ATS.”
 143 
As already stated, it is quite clear that the abduction itself was a violation of 
international law. This is not because the abduction was particularly violent, 
but simply because Mexico is a sovereign state. Any abduction, no matter how 
violent, would violate Mexico’s sovereignty and be illegal under international 
law. Again, the issue is miscast perhaps by failing to understand basic prin-
ciples of international law and projecting U.S. concepts onto international law 
which are not actually found in that body of law. The U.S. government appears 
to be arguing that if the abduction was not particularly violent, there would be 
no violation of international law. That is the wrong issue. The violence of the 
abduction goes to whether the abduction constituted torture, which is a separ-
ate claim from the claim of abduction. Thus, the issue as cast confused not 
only international and domestic law, but also the facts at bar. At any rate, the 
United States cannot successfully argue that it did not cause Alverez-Machain 
to be kidnapped because of the principle “qui facit per alium facit per se.”
144 
The abduction, whether direct or indirect, was instigated by the United States 
and is an example of the exercise of jurisdiction to enforce.
145 
However, merely because the abduction was a violation of international law 
does not necessarily mean that Alvarez-Machain has a right to a remedy. 
Again, the question seems miscast. International law only exceptionally grants 
individuals remedies. There were, however, always exceptions to this rule, and 
there are an increasing number of such exceptions. As stated, the abduction of 
Alvarez-Machain, while constitutional and perhaps legal in U.S. law, was 
nonetheless illegal under international law. However, the remedy for this 
abduction is not Alvarez-Machain’s, but Mexico’s. The issue is not whether 
Alvarez-Machain has a right to a remedy for abduction under international 
law; he does not. Alvarez-Machain’s sole remedy under international law for 
                                                 
143  Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-
339). 
144  United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing United States v. 
Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (1827), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). 
145 See  Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003). But see United 
States. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2) (1987).  
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the abduction would be to ask his state, Mexico, to intervene on his behalf.
146 
But abduction is not Alvarez-Machain’s only claim. He is also making a claim 
for a remedy of torture. The issue then is whether Alvarez-Machain has a 
remedy for torture (and thus implicitly whether there was torture). If Alvarez-
Machain’s captors tortured him, then he would have a right to a remedy under 
international law, regardless of whether torture is a norm jus cogens – though it 
is. Thus, the fourth issue is actually two issues, and must be recast by the 
Court. 
III. THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS:  
THE NATURAL LAW/POSITIVISM DICHOTOMY IN SOSA 
Not only are the issues as presented to the Court miscast and confused, the 
theoretical framework within which the Court analyzes these issues is 
incomplete. In determining the questions presented, the Supreme Court in Sosa 
considers legal history – the opinion of Blackstone, as well as legislative 
evidence circa 1789 and legal theory. The Court notes that the dominant legal 
theory in 1789 was natural law (jus naturale), but that the dominant contempo-
rary legal theory is positivism; this influences the Court’s analysis.
147 The 
Court is unwilling to empower the circuit courts to “discover justice” in some 
vague nous.
148 Instead, the Court wishes to limit the action of the circuits by 
requiring the circuits to exercise their function prudentially and judiciously. 
Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court favors the dominant contem-
                                                 
146 Paul  Michell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcib-
le Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 421 n.195 (1996) 
(enumerating cases where lack of effective government precluded objection to 
abduction). 
147 See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2744. 
[T]he prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1790. When §1350 
was enacted, the accepted conception was that the common law was found or 
discovered, but now it is understood, in most cases where a court is asked to state or 
formulate a common law principle in a new context, as made or created. Hence, a 
judge deciding in reliance on an international norm will find a substantial element of 
discretionary judgment in the decision. 
Id. 
148  (Nous νούς), the Greek word for cognition, is used here as an abbreviation for induc-
tive synthesis or deductive analysis coupled with the presumption that such synthesis 
or analysis is a reflection of an eidetic world of pure thought existing somehow 
independently of the material world. The adjective is noetic; a related noun form is 
noesis. Eidos, (είδος), the ancient Greek word for form, is the root of the English word 
eidetic.  
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porary trend to positivism. 
However, by doing so the Court falls victim to a false dichotomy. It 
presumes, as has most of legal discourse since Justice Holmes, that positivism 
and natural law are antithetical. However, this is not at all the case. To show 
that positivism and natural law are compatible, even complementary, we look 
to Aristotle’s thorough and penetrating analysis of justice. To show that Aris-
totle is not alone in seeing positivism and natural law as complementing each 
other, we then look at Hobbes. After exposing the theoretical framework which 
the modern courts have consistently ignored since Holmes, we then look at 
how this false dichotomy has led U.S. law down a constitutional dead end 
since the Court’s decision in Erie. 
A.  The False Dichotomy of Positivism and Natural Law 
The opposition of positivism to natural law is a false dichotomy. This basic 
fact, though easily proven, remains the greatest stumbling block in contem-
porary legal philosophy. This proposition, simple on its face, is on closer 
examination rendered complex by the multiple meanings of natural law. Fur-
ther, both positivism and natural law can be regarded as either descriptive 
theories of what law is, prescriptive theories of what law ought to be, or even 
how legal science ought to be done. Because of this multiplicity of meanings it 
is all too easy to “lose the forest for the trees.” However, we can maintain a 
holistic view of the law by considering a classical thinker, Aristotle, and a 
more modern thinker, Hobbes. 
1. Aristotle 
Aristotle believed that there was a natural world (physis), inevitable and 
unchanging.
149 This physical world could not be otherwise than it is. He also 
believed there was a man-made world, the artificial (tekhne), which could be 
other than it is.
150 This ontology only appears to be dualistic: each of these 
“different” worlds is a complementary part of a whole which is greater than 
either alone. This ontology, dialectical opposition of competing principles syn-
thesized into a whole greater than either alone, is reflected in Aristotle’s theory 
                                                 
149 ARISTOTLE, Physics 192b:7-8 (R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye trans.), in 1 THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 329 (Jonathan Barnes ed., rev. Oxford trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1984) (“Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes.”). 
150 ARISTOTLE,  On the Universe 392a:31-5 (E.S. Forster trans.), in 1 THE  COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 628 (Jonathan Barnes ed., rev. Oxford trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1984).  
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of justice. For Aristotle, some laws were natural – they could not be other-
wise.
151 Yet other laws were conventional, i.e., positive.
152 Aristotle correctly 
recognized that while some acts would be illegal in all societies, for example 
unprovoked murder, others would only be wrongful in certain societies. Aris-
totle even recognized that the narrow and common view that justice must 
either be natural or positive is erroneous: “Further, this last-mentioned Just is 
of two kinds, natural and conventional; the former being that which has 
everywhere the same force and does not depend upon being received or not; 
the latter being that which originally may be this way or that indifferently but 
not after enactment.”
153 
Failure to understand that these two different types of justice are mutually 
complementary and are reconciled through dialectical synthesis is the source of 
the false dichotomy. This blind spot in modern thought was a result of Carte-
sian scepticism which, along with nominalism and atomism, saw the world 
only in terms of constituent elements and not in terms of the whole which 
arises therefrom
154. 
Aristotle’s ontology, which sees nature (physis) and art (tekhne) as comple-
mentary parts of a greater whole, is reflected in his treatment of justice in the 
particular (i.e., justice not in the abstract but as a specific relation). Aristotle 
saw particular justice as of two types, natural and positive.
155 Natural justice 
applied to nature; those things which could not be otherwise (thus correspond-
                                                 
151 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 117 (D.P. Chase trans., Ernest 
Rhys ed., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1911) (1920) (“Nay, we may go further, and say 
that it is practically plain what among things which can be otherwise does exist by 
nature, and what does not but is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even 
granting that both are alike subject to be changed.”). 
152 See  id. (“Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and conventional; 
the former being that which has everywhere the same force and does not depend upon 
being received or not; the latter being that which originally may be this way or that 
indifferently but not after enactment.”). 
153 Id. 
154 See  WILLIAM  SHAKESPEARE, THE  MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2 (“[M]urder 
cannot be hid long; a man’s son may, but at the length truth will out.”). 
155 Id. at 105 
Now of Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species is that which is 
concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth, or such other things as are to be 
shared among the members of the social community (because in these one man is 
compared with another may have either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is 
that which is Corrective in the various transactions between man and man. 
Id.  
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ing to physis). Positive justice applied as a result of human convention and was 
man made (thus corresponding to tekhne). Those laws which were positive 
were the result of social justice, which Aristotle called proportional justice, 
described as a geometric relation between two unlike things mediated by a 
positive common element.
156 This mean, a variable, could be otherwise. Thus 
in the communist society of Sparta, equality of property was the mean deter-
minant of social justice. Although citizens were unequal in other rights and 
duties, their commonality of property was seen as a factor that bound them 
together and also prevented the state from becoming decadent.
157 In contrast, 
the mean element in liberal Athens was excellence.
158 Thus, persons of dif-
ferent ability would have different shares in social wealth according to their 
virtues.
159 
As to social justice, i.e., the proportion of shares of social wealth distributed 
to each individual, which Aristotle called distributive justice, Aristotle was 
clear – it was determined by positive law and would vary from society to 
                                                 
156 See  id. at 108. 
157 See THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, POLITICS, Book II, Ch. V, 
1263b-1264a (Benjamin Jowett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966). 
The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a com-
munity by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which 
he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by 
regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those 
which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator 
has made property common 
Id. 
158  Alexander Hamilton described Athens as a commercial republic. See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Athens, unlike Sparta, was a bustling city-state where 
trade, commerce and the arts flourished.”). See also Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification 
and Excuse: What they Were, What they Are, and What they Ought to Be, 78 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 743 (2004). 
159 See THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1785 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton University Press (1984). 
[I]f they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of 
quarrels and complaints-when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or 
unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be 
“according to merit”; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be 
according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of 
merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy 
with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence. 
Id.  
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society.
160 Aristotle even points out the conventional nature of the value of 
money as indicated by its name “nomos,” which is nearly the same word in 
Greek as the name for the concept of law.
161 
Distributive justice in Aristotle’s thought, in my opinion, corresponds to 
positive justice, since different societies chose to share out their wealth accord-
ing to different measures. But there is also an invariant, natural justice which 
for Aristotle inevitably results from nature. This, in my opinion, corresponds to 
his concept of arithmetic justice. Arithmetic justice, that is justice in trans-
actions, exists where each party to a transaction receives an equal benefit for 
an equal burden.
162 Thus, for example, where a person trades shoes for shirts 
they should receive the same amount of shirts whether in Athens or Sparta. 
For Aristotle, in sum, there is a positive justice as to those things which 
could be otherwise, for example, traffic ordinances. And there is a natural jus-
tice as to those things which are determined by human nature, such as parri-
cide. We can already see that the dichotomy of natural and positive justice, that 
justice must be either positivist or naturalist, is false. As to those invariables, 
those things which cannot be otherwise, there is a natural justice. But to those 
                                                 
160 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 107 (D.P. Chase trans., Ernest 
Rhys ed., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1911) (1920) (“[F]or all agree that the Just in 
distributions ought to be according to some rate: but what that rate is to be, all do not 
agree; the democrats are for freedome, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of 
birth, and the aristocratic party for virtue.”). 
161 See  id. at 113 (“[M]oney has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of 
Demand: and the account of its Greek name [nomisma] is this, that it is what it is not 
naturally but by custom or law ([nomos]), and it rests with us to change its value, or 
make it wholly useless.”). 
162
  Id. at 108-11. 
And the remaining one is the Corrective . . . [T]he Just which arises in transactions 
between men is an equal in a certain sense, and the Unjest an unequal, only not in the 
way of that proportion but of arithmetical. Because it makes no difference whether a 
robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or by a bad man on a 
good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed adultery: the law looks only to 
the difference created by the injury.  .  .  . [T]his Unjust, being unequal, the judge 
endeavours to reduce to equality again, because really when the one party has been 
wounded and the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the suffering 
and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the judge tries to restore equality 
by penalty, thereby taking from the gain. . . . So then the Just we have been speaking 
of is a mean between loss and gain arising in involuntary transactions that is, it is the 
having the same after the transaction as one had before it took place. 
Id.  
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things which are variable, which depend on climate, geography or culture, 
there is a positive justice which could be otherwise but is conventionally so in 
this particular society. 
2. Hobbes 
Aristotle is not alone in showing us that the supposed dichotomy of natural law 
versus positivism is a false one. According to Hobbes, there is such a thing as 
natural law, which he calls jus naturale, but it is the law of the jungle – the 
right of self preservation.
163 Hobbes distinguishes between natural law and 
natural justice. Natural law is the law of the strongest, while natural justice is 
the use of reason to derive commands of positive law, the first of which are 
directly related to natural law, such as the right to self-defense.
164 
Again, we can see that Hobbes, like Aristotle, provides a plausible explana-
tion of how positive and natural law co-exist. Hobbes’ natural law, the law of 
the jungle, is in fact identical to some accounts of positive law, notably “the 
bad man theory.”
165 Accordingly, people obey law, ultimately, because of the 
fear of sanction. When we understand “natural law” as meaning “the law of the 
jungle,” we see that the distinction between positivism and naturalism simply 
disappears. 
                                                 
163 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press) 
(1996). 
The right of nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power as he will himself[ ], for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing which, in 
his own Judgement and reason, he[ ] shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 
Id. 
164  See id. 
A law of nature, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away 
the means of preserving the same: and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be 
best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and 
Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in 
liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so 
that Law and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the 
same matter are inconsistent. 
Id. 
165  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997) 
(Reprint of address Justice Holmes of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
delivered at the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law on 
Jan. 8, 1897).  
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Of course, Hobbes’ view of natural law is not the only one. His is a descrip-
tive view of natural law and does not argue that the law of the jungle should be 
the human law. Indeed, Leviathan is an argument for an “artificial man” – the 
state – which will replace the natural law of the jungle with a conventional 
(positive) law. Where Hobbes and Aristotle diverge, however, is that Hobbes 
postulates the possible existence of a “state of nature,,” of persons outside of a 
state. For Aristotle such would be a physical impossibility. Aristotle recog-
nizes, correctly, that man (he was a sexist) is a social animal and could not live 
in isolation without debasing himself. For Aristotle, the individual is not self-
sufficient – as proven by example in newborn humans. This postulated state of 
nature is, however, central to the American concept of democracy. Its false-
hood explains the failure of the American constitutional order, as reflected in 
recurring constitutional crises shored up by ever more desperate constitutional 
fiats issued by nine elderly, unelected, learned judges, most of whom are white 
men, and all of whom are wealthy. 
Hobbes’ “state of nature,” his “war of all against all,”
166 is in fact impos-
sible because individuals, even adult individuals, are not self-sufficient.
167 
Homo sapiens is a social animal
168 and consequently, “the state of nature” is 
impossible. Still, if natural law is identical to the law of the jungle, then we can 
avoid the false dichotomy which opposes naturalism and positivism a second 
way. However, Aristotle’s explanation is at once more elegant and has greater 
explanatory power and correspondence to material reality, and thus, to a mate-
                                                 
166 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88-89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) (1651). 
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of 
every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of 
fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it 
is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or 
two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war 
consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the 
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. 
Id. 
167 See THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, POLITICS, Book I, 1253a 
(Benjamin Jowett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (“The proof that the state is a 
creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is 
not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.”). 
168 See  id. at 1252b (“[M]an is by nature a political animal.”); id. at 1253a (“A social 
instinct is implanted in all men by nature.”).  
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rialist scientist, is the better answer. 
How does this understanding of the relationship of positivism and natural 
law affect our understanding of legal science? First of all, it obviates a majority 
of the discourse of U.S. legal theory in the last century. Since Holmes, at least, 
U.S. law has taken the position that there is a “positive” law capable of scien-
tific exposition and analysis and that “natural” law is ambiguous at best, a 
charade at worst. That view has been shown to be false. Positivism, despite its 
claim to scientificity, is an amoral theory. But law is an inherently normative 
discipline. Legal science is a master science, for it determines which science is 
to be studied and to what degree. 
We can also see the enduring relevance of natural law in the greatest failure 
of the last two millennia in the collapse of fascism. Fascism proved the nor-
mative folly of divorcing law and morality. Consequently, natural law thinking 
pervades the German constitution to this day and rightly so, for the conse-
quences of an amoral law were 15 million dead Germans and over 20 million 
dead Russians. Yet the failure of peoples who have not yet endured fascist 
tyranny to appreciate the moral character of law is perhaps understandable. 
Given the life and death stakes, however, such an error is unforgivable. 
This failure of positivism to adequately describe reality can also be seen in 
the post-war Nuremburg judgments. There is no doubt that the crimes of the 
accused at the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals were not crimes under any 
positive law in 1939. Consequently, the only plausible argument was that the 
accused were guilty of violating laws unwritten in the law books but inscribed 
on every human heart. The natural law elements of the Nuremburg tribunals 
emerge, usually reluctantly. This reluctance to defend the moral virtue of 
natural law is due to either the multiple meanings of natural law (“the law of 
reason,” “the law of nature,” and “the law of God”), the perceived unscientific 
character of natural law, or both. As evidenced in our brief exposition of 
Aristotle, scientificity and naturalism go well together. 
A final legal development, which should conclusively prove the enduring 
character of naturalist theories of law, is the idea of “jus cogens.” Jus cogens 
norms, those rules of international law
169 that are non-derogable, are basically 
                                                 
169  The Court in Sosa also reiterates the U.S. view on the sources of international law 
found in The Paquette Habana: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,  
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a post-war phenomenon. Again, it is unclear how to justify the punishment of 
individuals by another state for unwritten laws unless those unwritten laws 
were somehow binding and universally enforceable. While universal jurisdic-
tion could be traced to piracy, the idea that there are universal laws which can 
be violated by no one is the essence of natural law thinking. 
In the post-war era, it does not take much insight to realize that there was a 
quiet, and absolutely necessary, revival of natural law as a healthy reaction to 
the excesses of national socialism. U.S. legal theory would do well here to 
consider the lead taken by European and international legal scholarship and 
grapple further with Aristotle on natural law and positivism. 
B.  The Implications of Re-Cognizing the False Dichotomy of “Naturalism v. 
Positivism” 
All this may seem like abstract philosophy with no legal significance. How-
ever, to make this more practical, contrast the determination whether law is 
“discovered” “out there,” i.e., a naturalist view, with the view that law is 
legislated positively by a legislator. For the naturalist, the common law has a 
“brooding omnipresnce” and is discoverable by reason.
170 But the idea that law 
is either positive or natural, a dichotomy which has dominated the last century 
of legal reasoning with the emergence of the dominance of positivism,
171 is, as 
                                                                                                                                                      
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for 
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trust-
worthy evidence of what the law really is. 
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2766-67 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). 
170 See  Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2760. 
[I]n the late 18th century . . . positive law was frequently relied upon to reinforce and 
give standard expression to the “brooding omnipresence” of the common law then 
thought discoverable by reason. As Blackstone clarified the relation between positive 
law and the law of nations, “those acts of parliament, which have from time to time 
been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of [its] deci-
sions, are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declara-
tory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without which it must cease 
to be a part of the civilized world.” 
Id. 
171 See  id. at 2762. 
When § 1350 was enacted, the accepted conception was of the common law as “a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it 
unless and until changed by statute.” Now, however, in most cases where a court is 
asked to state or formulate a common law principle in a new context, there is a general  
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has been explained, a false dichotomy. 
This fact has important implications for legal practice. If the positivist/ 
naturalist dichotomy is, or at least can be, a false dichotomy, then that puts into 
question decisions such as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
172 which abrogated 
the existence of a general federal common law.
173 Erie presumes the positivist/ 
naturalist dichotomy and accords it a decisive role in decision-making.
174 The 
positivist decisions of the early 20th century were justified by the idea that a 
positive legal science was possible and it was, moreover, desirable as a natura-
list legal science would be at best superstition, at worst charlatanism. But a 
naturalism based not on the view of natural law as the will of God, but rather 
as the deliberative result of logic (Cicero’s right reason in accord with nature – 
the deist approach taken by the founding fathers), or a harsher view of natural 
law as inevitable in human nature or the world (the nasty and brutish view 
taken by Hobbes – natural law as the law of the jungle, positive law as 
attempts to tame it), shows us that science and two of the three main variants 
of natural law are perfectly compatible. But most importantly, when we situate 
positivism and naturalism within the schema of justice described by Aristotle, 
we see that natural law and positive law are complementary, and we cannot 
understand justice with either alone. Roughly simplified, positive law cor-
responds to social justice and natural law corresponds to justice in the par-
ticular, i.e., individual transactions among physical persons. 
Because Erie was based on a false dichotomy, it was wrongly decided. That 
reopens the possibility, and necessity, of federal common law received by the 
United States as a successor state to the British Crown. So the recognition of 
naturalism, whether in Aristotle, Cicero, Hobbes, Coke, Blackstone or any of 
the other great legal minds, and its application to modern legal thought, should 
be obvious. Yet “natural law” is regarded as superstitious nonsense and 
unscientific charlatanism? 
                                                                                                                                                      
understanding that the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either made or 
created. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
172  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
173 See  Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2762 (“Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . was the watershed in which 
we denied the existence of any federal ‘general’ common law . . . which largely with-
drew to havens of specialty, some of them defined by express congressional authori-
zation to devise a body of law directly.”). 
174 See  id. at 2771 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“Because post-Erie federal common law is made, not discovered, federal courts must 
possess some federal-common-law-making authority before undertaking to craft it.”).  
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Recognizing naturalism explicitly as described and advocated in this article 
would reopen vast tracts of legal terrain to argument. This is, however, no 
argument in a legal system which is increasingly regarded as illegitimate due 
to its isolation from democratic impulses and its own historical roots. The truth 
will out.
175 
C.  Examining the ATS in Light of the False Dichotomy 
The Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain implies that the Alien Tort Statute may 
only be applicable to those norms which violate jus cogens,
176 but that is where 
the Court trips over the false dichotomy. On the one hand, the Court justifies a 
static view of positive law embodied in Erie due to the rejection of naturalism 
by Holmes and his successors. On the other hand, it justifies its decision to 
limit the application of the ATS by relying on a natural law concept, jus 
cogens! That is a contradiction: You simply cannot have it both ways. 
The Court does recognize that international law is a part of the common 
law, but it also ignores a major problem – after Erie there is no general com-
mon law.
177 Yet international law is a part of the common law and all foreign 
policy competences in the U.S. constitution are vested in the federal govern-
ment. So, if we accept the Erie decision, the only coherent solution would be 
to regard customary international law as part of a (supposedly non-existent) 
federal common law. Or preferably, we can recognize the logical facts: the 
United States is a successor state to the British government. It did not speci-
                                                 
175 See  WILLIAM  SHAKESPEARE, THE  MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2 (“[M]urder 
cannot be hid long; a man’s son may, but at the length truth will out.”). 
176 See  id.  at 2765-66. 
This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the reasoning of many 
of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court. And the 
determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action 
should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the prac-
tical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
177 See id. at 2771 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not 
possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision. The general 
rule as formulated in Texas Industries is that “[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in the 
federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal 
common law.” This rule applies not only to applications of federal common law that 
would displace a state rule, but also to applications that simply create a private cause 
of action under a federal statute. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
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fically abrogate the common law. Quite the opposite, the formula of Magna 
Charta, “the law of the land,” is explicitly used in the U.S. Constitution, which, 
moreover, specifically guarantees elements of the common law and states that 
the enumeration of some rights does not imply the exclusion of other rights
178. 
In dubitas, pro libertas
179  is the logic of the U.S. Constitution, at least as 
written by the founders. As the revolution was fought, in part, to preserve the 
civil rights of the colonists as British subjects under the unwritten British Con-
stitution, it would be a peculiar thing to deny the applicability at the federal 
level of the common law which guarantied their liberties. The states could not 
always guarantee the liberties of the citizen under the common law because 
some powers, notably foreign policy, were reserved to the federal government. 
Thus, whether there is a general federal common law,
180 there is certainly a 
customary international law applied by the federal government as common 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The seemingly basic questions presented in Sosa in fact lead to complex issues 
of legal history, comparative law, and legal theory. Superficially, the Court’s 
decision appears well reasoned. However, an in depth analysis reveals that the 
Court’s decision is predicated on an erroneous presumption. Consequently, no 
synopsis of the case can be satisfying; the Court’s work here is incomplete. 
Although a conclusion is not possible in the sense of a climactic resolution 
of dramatic tension, it is possible to summarize the basis of the author’s 
critique of the Court in order to cast light on paths for future research. Sosa is 
important not because it reaches conclusive answers. Rather, it reaches incon-
clusive answers, particularly when we recognize it is founded on several false 
propositions: that law must be either positive or natural and that natural law 
can, should, and has been rejected. Sosa reveals a certain bankruptcy in the 
courts’ thinking, a certain impasse that U.S. political and constitutional thought 
finds itself in, which also is due, incidentally, to a false presumption of the 
existence of a mythical “state of nature” and “social contract.” Though no 
                                                 
178 U.S.  CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
179  “When in doubt, freedom.” (author’s translation). 
180  Notwithstanding the expedient, if not opportunist, decisions of the court, there is a 
general federal common law, as the United States is a successor state to the British 
crown, having fought a revolution to guarantee the common law liberties of its 
citizens.  
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conclusion is possible, a summary may help highlight how these issues should 
be resolved. 
A.  Aristotle and Hobbes 
Legal theory for the last 150 years has been trapped in positivist discourse due 
to the multiple meanings associated with the concept “natural law.” Positivists, 
correctly, associate one line of natural law theory with pre-scientific religious 
thinking, and rightly reject it as unscientific superstitious nonsense. But that is 
like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A scientific natural law theory 
based not on religious faith or superstition but rather on empirical observation 
is not only possible, Aristotle actually employed it over 2000 years agoThe 
idea that positivism and natural law are mutually exclusive propositions, which 
predicated the decision in Sosa, and Erie for that matter, is a false dichotomy. 
Aristotle, though describing positive law and natural law and assigning each a 
different role in a just state, never conceived of the two as being in conflict. 
The dichotomy can also be escaped, albeit rather nastily and brutishly, as 
Hobbes does. He subsumes positive law into natural law by defining the law of 
nature as the law of the jungle – survival of the strongest. He then comple-
ments his jus naturale with the idea of a conventional lex naturalis which 
arises therefrom through contractual agreement. Thus, for Hobbes the ideas of 
fairness which we usually associate with natural law are in fact associated with 
the positive law. For Hobbes it is natural law, not positive law, which is cruel 
and indifferent! However Hobbes’ conventional law is not in conflict with his 
natural law; rather, it flows therefrom. 
Hobbes is of course completely wrong about the idea of a social contract.  
There never was, nor ever could be, a “state of nature.” His law of the jungle 
ignores the basic truth Aristotle presents – man is a social animal unable to 
meet all his needs alone (so much for individualism). Thus, one escapes the 
false dichotomy with much less baggage simply by looking to Aristotle.
181 
Still, since social contract theory is the foundational stone of the U.S. republic 
I thought it might be easier for the reader to digest these hard truths by looking 
at someone a little less brilliant who does not reject the erroneous and unrea-
listic individualistic presumptions which characterize thinking in the United 
States. Rejecting social contract reasoning because it is factually untrue gives 
us the means to resolve the constitutional crisis because we can a) ask the right 
                                                 
181  Aristotle, was also the source of the idea of courts of equity, of cause-in-fact, efficient 
causality, and of a few other ideas such as botany, grammar and logic.  
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questions – what type of social organization leads to the good life and b) stop 
asking false questions (e.g., how to integrate black persons into a non-existing 
social contract to which they were never a party even in myth). Both Aristotle 
and Hobbes compel us to conclude that there is no dichotomy of positive law 
as opposed to natural law. Simply figuring out that conclusion would be one 
step forward in American constitutionalism. 
B.  Sosa and Machain 
Unfortunately, the Court in Sosa appears to be blissfully ignorant of Aristotle 
and reaches a decision predicated on a false dichotomy. It makes this mistake 
because it is trying to escape the theoretical problem of pre-scientific thinking 
which does exist in some schools of natural law thinking. The result however 
is that the Court denies itself the power of normativity. Thus, the Court jumps 
from the frying pan (pre-scientific law) into the fire (the normative vacuum of 
positivism) and does not vindicate the rights of those wrongly injured, even 
though the proper role of the court is as the last peaceful resort for those 
wrongfully injured. 
Once we recognize that the dichotomy of natural law and positive law that 
underlies the Court’s reasoning is a false one, we escape from the mistaken 
presumption of the Court. Instead of cutting ourselves off from all naturalist 
thinking (people like Cicero, Aquinas, Aristotle) to avoid the superstitious, we 
avoid pre-scientific thinking through methodic empiricism. That allows us to 
do exactly what the Court believes it cannot – we can ask ourselves what sub-
stantive content of international law can be deduced from the totality of our 
empirical experiences and understanding. This is the function of the judge: to 
determine, a posteriori,
182 the law to be applied to this particular person. In 
contrast, the legislator’s role is to determine objective rules of law a priori
183 
that are valid for all persons. By abdicating normativity due to the false dicho-
tomy of positivism vs. natural law, the right wing of the Court cripples its role 
in democracy exactly at the time when the left wing of the Court, via legal 
realism, overreaches its role and acts as super-legislator! That, of course, is the 
most grave but least visible, and least violent, of the multiple crises currently 
facing the Republic. Judicial self-abnegation through positivism, i.e., denying 
the normative role of law in the sense of law as moral force, cripples the body 
politic just as much as judicial overreaching. Both wings of the Court under-
mine the role of the Court in democracy. One by overreaching, the other by 
                                                 
182  “From what comes after.” BLACK’S DICTIONARY 105 (8th ed. 2004). 
183  “From what is before.” BLACK’S DICTIONARY 111 (8th ed. 2004).  
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under-achieving. Were America not facing several converging economic and 
political crises, this might be tolerable. But in a time of crisis the Court’s 
misapprehension of its role exacerbates dangerous trends that threaten the 
health of the Republic. 
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Chapter III 
U.S. Corporate Liability  
For Torts of (foreign) Subsidiaries * 
Abstract: 
This paper explores the liabilities of a parent corporation for the tortious acts 
of its overseas subsidiaries and explores the doctrinal confusion inherent in 
current tests for piercing the corporate veil. It explains these apparent 
incoherencies through a comprehensive theory of the historical development of 
tort law. It concludes that corporations can be held vicariously liable for the 
torts of their overseas subsidiares based on theories of agency such as respon-
deat superior. It examines European law briefly and notes that the legal system 
there follow similar rules. It concludes that the role of corporate governance in 
the globalising world presents challenges and opportunities for the corporation 
as legal person having rights and duties under international law: prudent cor-
porate counsel will note these practical trends and theoretical explanations in 
order to capitalize on opportunities and avoid pitfalls of liability. 
* This article appeared under this title in 23 Corporate Counsel Review 15 (2004).  
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Introduction 
Can a U.S. corporation be liable for the acts of its third world subsidiary or its 
third world sub-contractor? A cursory examination might yield the wrong 
impression: It is true that U.S. law is generally presumed to have no extra-
territorial effect.
1 Thus, U.S. corporations overseas are not ordinarily bound by 
U.S. labor or environmental law standards.
2 Further, procedural obstacles such 
as forum non conveniens
3 or even the existence of subject matter jurisdiction 
also often block transnational litigation. But a lawyer who contented themsel-
ves with a superficial analysis might be one day be surprised unpleasantly: 
Though U.S. laws are presumed to have no extraterritorial effect, that pre-
sumption can be overcome by specific evidence of congressional intent to the 
contrary.
4 U.S. corporations can be directly liable for some wrongful acts 
abroad which are illegal under U.S. law
5 such as violations of securities and 
exchange commission rules
6 and the the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
7 Furthermore, 
U.S. corporations can have the liability of their subsidiaries imputed to them 
via principles of agency such as respondeat superior. And of course some torts 
will themselves be transnational. The quick answer “no liability” is not always 
the correct answer. Corporate liability for subsidiaries is not merely esoteric or 
theoretical: globalisation, NAFTA
8 and the resulting outsourcing of jobs to 
                                                 
1 See,  e.g.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2003). 
2  David Emerick, Mark Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law 
and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domes-
tic and International Standards, 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 123, 123-124 (1996). 
3  For an examination of the forum non-conveniens doctrine in the context of torts of 
first world parent corporations committed by their third world subsidiaries see: Mal-
colm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in The Global Eco-
nomy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, 
Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 Texas International Law Journal 299 (Spring 
2001). 
4 See,  e.g.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2003). 
5  One example of a U.S. law which specifically does apply to overseas conduct is the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which illegalizes the most egregious instances of bribe-
ry overseas. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95 -213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. s 78dd-1). 
6  Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1018 (1975) 
7  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993). 
8  Critics of free trade decry the fact that inefficient jobs are eliminated through compe-
tition. However the fact is that on the balance NAFTA has overall created more jobs 
for both Mexico and the United States.   
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Mexico make head-office liability for branch-plants a very real legal issue.
9 
This article attempts to outline the pitfalls for U.S. corporations doing busi-
ness in the third world through subsidiaries and subcontractors. A U.S. corpor-
ation can be attacked for its subsidiaries’ acts on several theories. These in-
clude (in decreasing likelihood of success): theories based on actual or con-
structive fraud,
10 theories of agency (principal and agent, master and servant, 
respondeat superior
11), joint and several liability,
12 strict liability,
13 imputed 
negligence
14 (vicarious liability
15) – under a theory of respondeat superior or 
under a theory of vicarious liability and finally and most confusingly by "pierc-
ing the corporate veil".
16 Though "piercing the corporate veil" is the most 
frequent attack it is also the most doctrinally confused and thus the least likely 
to succeed – but mainly because it is generally not well plead by plaintiffs. In 
fact, most claims made by victims of torts fail to inculpate parent corporations 
not because the courts are reluctant to compensate defendants, nor because 
courts are concerned about over-compensating defendants: judges regularly 
find cause to reduce the damages awarded by juries in cases of corporate liabi-
lity for subsidiary's torts and just as regularly pierce corporate veils, particular-
ly in cases of personal injury. When attacks on corporations fail this is usually 
because plaintiff's lawyers misunderstand or misapply the various theories of 
                                                 
9  For a general discussion of macquilla operations in Mexico see, Daniel I. Basurto 
Gonzalez, Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of Maquiladora Operations: 
A Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 Saint Mary's Law Journal 659 
(1991). 
10  See, e.g., Green v Equitable Powder Mfg. Co. (1951, DC Ark) 95 F Supp 127, 121. 
(Liability of a subsidiary for the tort of another subsidiary in the corporate group: 
defective product - dynamite). 
11  See, e.g., Ex parte Union Camp Corporation (Re: Joel Cobb v. Union Camp Corpora-
tion) 2001 Ala. LEXIS 197,*;816 So. 2d 1039 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 2001). 
12  See, e.g., Real Estate Investors Four, v. American Design Group Inc., 2001 Mo. App. 
LEXIS 566,*;46 S.W.3d 51 (Mo. App. 2001) 
13  See, e.g., Charles Lennon vs. Dacomed Corporation, Alan Podis, M.D., Miriam 
Hospital, Limagyn Technologies, Inc., Formerly Known as Urohealth Systems, Inc., 
and National Union Fire Insurance Company, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 48,*;CCH 
Prod. Liab. Rep. P16,572 (R.I. App. 2003). 
14  See, e.g., Edward A. Swan, Sr. v. New Orleans Terminal Company, 745 So. 2d 
52;1999 La. App. LEXIS 1549 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
15  See, e.g., Pappalardo v. Richfield Hospitality Services, 790 So. 2d 1226;2001 Fla. 
App. LEXIS 11092;26 Fla. L. Weekly D 1927 (Fla. App. 2001). 
16  See, e.g., Sandra Jean Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., 73 Conn. App. 78;807 A.2d 1009;2002 
Conn. App. LEXIS 520 (Conn. App. 2002).  
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liability. 
Any defence based on an opponent making a mistake is necessarily weak. 
The consequences of liability can be disastrous to the corporation. So corporate 
counsel interested in defending their clients – and in real reform to the expen-
sive and inefficient tort system
17 – should carefully consider the various theo-
ries presented here so as to properly advise their clients as to what the law per-
mits, what the law might tolerate, and what the law will not tolerate. Prudent 
lawyers counsel clients against committing acts in "the grey zone". Given the 
number and strength of potential attacks on corporate defendants this advice is 
all the more pertinent: personal injuries in the United States can, even after 
judicial rectification, still mount in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and 
exceed the company's insurance coverage. Factual complexity and legal ambi-
guity explain why companies that think they can outsource their problems 
should not blithely assume they escape liability by resorting to legal forma-
lism. 
A. Practical  Scenarios 
There are two core scenarios of liability this paper addresses. The first case is 
the liability of a first world parent company for its third world subsidiary. The 
second case is the liability of the first world company for subcontracting 
(outsourcing). In both cases the parent company or its directors, officers, 
employees and even shareholders could be held liable for tortious acts of their 
subsidiary or even sub-contractor. Such negligence may either be imputed or 
direct. Theoretically, liability could be chained: a subsidiary could be held 
liable by respondeat superior for the negligent act or injury to its employee – 
and this negligence could in turn be imputed via agency to the U.S. parent cor-
poration. That theory is basically sound in substance, but would obviously 
meet with serious procedural obstacles, notably forum non-conveniens
18 and 
possibly also jurisidictional questions.
19 These jurisdictional obstacles are not 
                                                 
17  See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law 73 Cal. L. Rev. 555 
(1985). 
18  The most famous case of a corporate parent accused of the tortious act of its subsidi-
ary is In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India 634 F. Supp. 
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Ultimately the case was heard not in the U.S. but in India on the 
basis of forum non conveniens. 
19  See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen 345 U.S. 571;73 S. Ct. 921;97 L. Ed. 1254;1953 U.S. 
LEXIS 2533 (U.S. S. Ct. 1953)  
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discussed here as they are addressed by the author elsewhere.
20 These pro-
cedural obstacles while serious are not insurmountable. Here however we 
confine our analysis to substantive law. 
Both respondeat superior and strict products liability are examples of 
imputed torts. The law is willing to impose liability in cases of employee torts 
committed in the scope of employment.
21 This is because, though the employer 
may not have been actually negligent they are in the position to control the 
employee’s behavior. Similarly, the law imposes strict liability for defectively 
designed or manufactured products on any merchant in the stream of com-
merce.
22 The merchant held liable for the defective product they sold may not 
have been in fact negligent: a distributor of a product does not necessarily have 
the expertise required to recognize hidden design or manufacturing defects in a 
product. However the merchant is in a position to know who actually is neg-
ligent and thus to seek indemnisation – unlike the tort victim who may not be 
able to identify the negligent tortfeasor due to “conspiracies of silieence”. 
Again, reasons of information and control explain why negligence is imputed. 
Imputed negligence for acts of a corporate subsidiary or subcontractor is 
similar to strict products liability and respondeat superior: The law is willing to 
extract wrongful profits from any company in the stream of commerce
23 profit-
                                                 
20  See, Eric Allen Engle, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Can Rico Protect Human Rights? 
A Computer Analysis of a Semi-Determinate Legal Question. 3 J. High Tech. L. 1 
(2004). 
21  "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for 
the tortious acts of its employees only if those acts were committed in furtherance of 
the employer's business and within the scope of employment (see, Riviello v Waldron, 
47 NY2d 297, 302)." 
N. X., v. Cabrini Medical Center, 97 N.Y.2d 247;765 N.E.2d 844;739 N.Y.S.2d 
348;2002 N.Y. LEXIS 184, *7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
22 See,  e.g.,  Daniel M. Williams, v. Rep Corporation, 302 F.3d 660;2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17275, *4;CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P16,399 (7th. Cir 2002). 
23  A typical example of the willingness of the court to ignore legal formalisms in the 
interest of rendering substantive justice in cases of personal injuries is seen in Petroc-
co v. At&T Teletype, Inc., 273 N.J. Super. 613, 642 A.2d 1072 (Law Div. 1994): 
"To allow the defendant to hide behind the exclusive remedy provision in this situ-
ation would effectively allow a manufacturer who had already put defective products 
into the stream of commerce to shield itself from injuries those products may later 
cause by virtue of subsequently entering into a business transaction with someone 
other than the injured party. The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act was not intended to immunize a third-party manufacturer in such a situ-
ation.  
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ing from labor law violations and externalisation of costs via piercing the cor-
porate veil.
24 Where does the court draw the line? What are the limits of 
liability? To understand these questions a brief historical exposition is neces-
sary. 
B. Historical  Perspective 
How are we to understand these strange tendencies in the law? By contextu-
alising the positive law through legal theory and history we can understand 
apparently contradictory tendencies in the law. The history of modern negli-
gence law is marked by the progressive abandonment of the enlightenment 
principle of the rational, free moral agent as the definitive legal subject. This 
person supposedly was or could be free to negotiate any and and all trans-
actions with other actors who were also presumed to be freely bargaining indi-
viduals. This theory of the individual legal subject was radically different from 
feudalism. It did however correspond somewhat to the yeoman society of the 
late feudalism and even early capitalism. But that model of the legal subject 
obviously no longer corresponds to the reality of late capitalism, with its name-
less, faceless and all-powerful corporations and continental governments. 
Legal scholarship has not been blind to these facts: the law has recognized that 
the enlightenment homo economicus was in fact never an accurate description 
and that the reality of industrial relations of mass production meant that the 
enlightenment archetype of the free citizen, even if true at a certain time or at 
least among some sectors of late feudal Europe was soon amalgamated and 
crushed into alienable and alienated consumer-producers with very little real 
freedom of negotiation. This can be seen most notably in products liability and 
also in compulsory insurance systems. 
In tort law this historical fact played itself out in the gradual rejection of 
enlightenment legal doctrines and their replacement by an understanding of the 
individual as just about inevitably socially constrained. This redefinition of the 
role of the individual in society led to the rise of a variety of strict liability 
regimes which no longer look to fault as the primary basis of liability. Legal 
formalism with its precision and rigidity has been rejected in favor of am-
biguous contextual balancing tests.
25 Consequently, for example, manufac-
                                                 
24 See,  e.g.,  Delfina Kaczorowska, v. National Envelope Corporation - East 342 N.J. 
Super. 580;777 A.2d 941;2001 N.J. Super. LEXIS 307, *20 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
25  “The precise legal relationship between the parties has not played a particularly signi-
ficant role in the cases imposing strict liability” 
Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325; 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (Cal. App. 1970).  
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turers of defectively designed or produced merchandise – including the licen-
sors and franchisors thereof – can be held strictly liable at any point in the 
stream of commerce – even outside the U.S. – without showing negligence.
26 
This is in fact a reappearance of negligence per se – a legal formalism which 
supposedly had been abandoned. Similarly, employers have over time been 
increasingly held liable for the torts of their employees (for example, the aban-
donment of the fellow servant rule, wherein the tort of a fellow servant as to 
another co-worker would not be imputed to the employer). 
Regardless of doctrinal inconsistencies one fact is certain: Industrial society 
just about guarantees a large number of grave accidents due to mechanisation. 
Long hours, low pay and dangerous machinery translates into death and 
disfigurement at the workplace. But, since capitalist society was richer than 
feudal society some of the riches produced were used to improve work-place 
safety. The irony of capitalist production is industrial society, with its greater 
dangers and risks to machine workers than feudal society recognizes the need 
for social stability and thus admits some limited reforms to maintain the 
system qua system. 
The decline of the individual as atomistic legal subject is combined with a 
loosening of the concept of causation. Causality is less strictly regarded today. 
This is most clearly seen in cases of toxic torts: there probabalistic proofs are 
allowed. Thus, where two tortfeasors exclusively produce a given product 
which caused the damage each would be responsable according to their market 
share. Similarly, the rejection of the "all or nothing rule" (any negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff no matter how slight operated as a total bar to the 
plaintiff’s claim) in cases of contributory negligence in favor of "comparative 
negligence" (a plaintiff X% negligent would only recover 100% minus X% of 
their damages) is another example of the decline of formalism and greater 
tolerance of systemic uncertainty in the interest of a more exact result in the 
specific case at bar. 
These are far from the only examples where the rationalist categorical 
enlightenment view of the law has been implitly rejected. Legal uncertainty 
has also increased through the pervasive adoption of interest balancing tests 
and the rejection of bright line tests. Another example of the departure from 
the principle of individual responsibility for definite acts – appropriate in a 
                                                 
26  Kasel v. Remington Arms Company, Inc., Defendant and Respondent (Cal. App. 1972) 
101 Cal.Rptr. 314, 24 Cal.App.3d 711. (U.S. manufacturer held liable for Mexican 
subcontractor/franchisee’s defectively manufactured product – ammunition).  
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feudal society, and impossible in an industrialized world – as is the rise of 
social insurance generally. Insurance is clearly the more economical remedy to 
the problem of externalities because it avoids the transaction costs and 
uncertainties of trial and windfall judgements. 
In light of these facts the litany of complaints from industry as to the injus-
tice and anti-economic action of tort regulation is easier to understand. How-
ever, corporations struggling for tort reform should recognize that their argu-
ments will be taken more seriously as they focus on general compulsory insu-
rance as a cheaper way to protect against wrongs than the "crap-shoot" of jury 
trials. When corporations argue that no one should be responsible for the acci-
dents which are just about inevitable in industrial society they lose credibility. 
In contrast it is true that as a regulatory system tort law is expensive. It is also 
true that punitve damages encourage frivolous litigation and result in windfall 
gains to plaintiffs. A compulsory insurance system, like those found in most all 
European countries, would avoid windfall benefits to tort victims via punitive 
damages and could be combined with a scheme of fines in case of wrongful 
conduct thus reducing not only litigation burdens but also tax burdens and 
perhaps even be nearly self financing. 
Having sketched the theoretical questions and reform proposals, this article 
now turns to the liability of a parent company for acts of its subsidiary or for 
acts of its sub-contractors particularly where the sub-contractor or subsidiary is 
overseas. Potential defendants are shareholders, directors, officers and emplo-
yees of the parent company. The tortious act is committed by the subsidiary/ 
subcontractor or its employee. 
I. IMPUTED  LIABILITY 
Part of the confusion in the field of imputed or direct liability of a corporation 
for the acts of its subsidiary is due to a confusion of direct and imputed liabi-
lity. By keying on this distinction we can avoid a confusion. A shorthand de-
scription may help: in a case of imputed liability there is only one tort with two 
or more tortfeasors. In cases of direct liability there is only one tortfeasor – the 
parent corporation. 
The rationale of imputed liability is that the tortious act of one person (legal or 
natural) will be attributed to another person (legal or natural) because of the 
control exercised by the one over the other. The legal theories of imputed liabi-
lity are respondeat superior and agency. However we shall see that agency 
principles also appear in the issue of piercing the corporate veil. But piercing  
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the corporate veil is not a form of imputed liability! This type of doctrinal 
confusion is inherent in the current structure of veil-piercing. We now examine 
the various legal theories to expose this confusion, its sources, and possible 
solutions. 
A. Respondeat  Superior 
Arguments based on respondeat superior seek to impute liability to the parent 
the company for the act of its employee. They include “chaining” arguments 
wherein the employees wrongful act is attributed to the employer corporation 
(generally a subsidiary) which in turn is imputed to the parent company under 
any of the various theories. 
Briefly, to be liable for the act of the employee the plaintiff must prove
27 
that the employee acted within the scope of their employ at the time of the 
injury. Employers are not liable for the acts of the employee which are inde-
pendent, self-serving acts and in no way facilitate or promote the employer's 
business.
28 Thus acts of abuse by supervisors of employees motivated by sub-
jective negative emotions of the employee are not within the scope of employ-
ment and will not be imputed to the employer.
29 However, the scope of 
employment not by formal description but by actual practice and custom.
30 
Thus conduct may be determined to be within the scope of employment due to 
implicit authorization
31 and can even including employees’ acts which conflict 
with commands of the employer
32 where those acts further the purposes of the 
employer.
33 Thus employers can be liable under a theory of respondeat supe-
rior for the acts of security personnel in their employ.
34 
B.  Liability based on a Theory of Agency 
A second form of imputed liability relies on principles of agency: namely that 
the principal exercised such a degree of control over the act of the agent that 
the court can fairly impute the agent’s wrongful act to the principal. 
                                                 
27  Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v Western Sur. Co. (CA1 Mass) 936 F2d 1364, 
1373; 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 809, 20 FR Serv 3d 409 (1
st. Cir. 1991). 
28  Favorito v Pannell (CA1 RI) 27 F3d 716, 720;  (1
st. Cir. 1994).  
29  Mason v Kenyon Zero Storage, 71 Wash App 5, 856 P2d 410 (Wash. App., 1993). 
30  Wilson v Joma, 537 A2d 187 (S. Ct. Del. 1988). 
31  Deuchar v Foland Ranch, 410 NW2d 177 (S.Ct., S.Dak.1987). 
32  In re Albano, 143 BR 323 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992). 
33  Aliota v Graham 984 F2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. Den. (US) 126 L Ed 2d 37, 114 S. 
Ct. 68. 
34  Giant Food, Inc. v Scherry, 51 Md App 586, 444 A2d 483, 29 ALR4th 134 (1982).  
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Arguing that the subsidiary corporation is acting as the agent of the parent 
corporation is probably the strongest argument the plaintiff can make. In most 
cases where this argument is made and where there are grave personal injuries 
the court is willing to impute negligence to the parent company – especially 
where the subsidiary is thinly capitalized or appears to have been formed pre-
cisely to avoid liability. In contrast, courts are extremely reluctant to pierce the 
corporate viel in cases of purely pecuniary losses, namely where the creditors 
of a bankrupt corporation seek to reach the personal assets of the shareholders 
of the corporation.
35 This is for the obvious reason that general financial liabi-
lity of shareholders for all debts of a corporation would discourage investment 
in stocks with deleterious economic consequences.
36 In contrast, courts are 
willing to pierce the corporate viel in cases of negligence resulting in personal 
injury. There negligence is imputed to the principal for the act of the agent.
37 
This imputation of negligence from one actor in a corporate group to another is 
based on the same rationale which justifies the imputed negligence of the 
master for their servant: the principal directed the agent to undertake the 
wrongful act or at least delegated them the necessary power to do the wrongful 
act. Thus both the agent and principal are jointly and severally liable for the 
act’s wrongful consequences. However we shall also see that agency principles 
underlie one theory of piercing the corporate veil – and thus can also be the 
basis of a form of direct liability. Naturally the result is doctrinal confusion. 
II. DIRECT  LIABILITY 
A.  Joint and Several Liability 
Where the parent corporation and its subsidiary together commit a tort they can 
of course be held jointly and severally liable under the ordinary rules of tort 
law. In such a case the corporate form is not ignored: each corporation is 
jointly and severally liable for the wrongful act. 
                                                 
35  Daniel L. Schilling, vs. Emerald Green International, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 1041 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (Corporate veil not pierced: shareholder not held personally 
liable for debt of company). But see: NEROX POWER SYSTEMS, et al. v. M-B 
CONTRACTING COMPANY et al.54 P.3d 791;2002 Alas. LEXIS 140 (S. Ct. 
Alaska, 2002) (Corporate veil pierced: Majority shareholder of corporation held 
personally liable for debts of pierced corporation). 
36 See,  e.g.  Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 
1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973). 
37  Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107 (Cal. 
S. Ct. 1955).  
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B. Fraud 
The fraudulent acts of a parent corporation whether effected through or 
independantly of the subsidiary corporation are of course an independent basis 
of liability and thus can be the foundation of direct liability. However, just as 
principles of agency can be the basis for piercing the corporate veil so also can 
the corporate veil be pierced under a theory of fraud. Since the substantive 
fraud is relatively simple doctrinally we reserve discussion of the theory of 
fraud as a basis for piercing the corporate veil for later in the paper just as the 
discussion of the agency theory of veil piercing is also discussed infra. 
C.  Piercing the Corporate Veil – Theories of Veil Piercing 
Piercing the corporate veil is an exceptional remedy
38 equitable in nature.
39 
Courts are reluctant to ignore the corporate form because that would dis-
courage investment in corporations. and thus must meet the usual procedural 
requirements of any equity case. Whether the corporate veil should be pierced 
is a question of fact.
40 
Direct liability may also be imposed on the corporation by decision of the 
court. Essentially, the court chooses to disregard the separate legal existence of 
the subsidiary effectively voiding its legal existence. As a result, the parent 
company is directly liable for the acts of the subsidiary. This legal operation is 
known by the term “piercing the corporate veil”. However the doctrine of 
corporate veil piercing is extremely confused both in theory and in practice. 
Part of this confusion results from the fact that several different legal questions 
are all subsumed in the question whether the veil should be pierced. For 
example, the separate existence of the subsidiary may be ignored as to taxation 
questions, as to the debts of the corporation (which then are passed on to the 
shareholders!) or as to the torts and contracts of the subsidiary. In fact, several 
different questions are all subsumed under the heading "piercing the corporate 
veil." Namely: who is liable? Directors? Officers? Employees? Shareholders? 
Of course a descending scale of liability from those who exercise the most de 
facto control over the company (directors and officers) to those who exercise 
the least de facto authority (employees and shareholders) would be logical as a 
                                                 
38  Carbonella & Desarbo, Inc. v. Dealer's Quest, Inc. et al. 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1539, 11* (2003) (Superior Court, Connecticut, unreported) (Court should not pierce 
corporate veil only under exceptional circumstances) 
39  Water, Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1998). 
40  Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148, 799 A.2d 298, 
cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911, 806 A.2d 49 (2002).  
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functional determinant of whether to ignore the corporate fiction. Such, along 
with the question whether the injury is bodily or merely proprietary, may even 
be a rough guide to actual court practice. However the law does not – officially 
– take that perspective. Veil piercing also does not consciously address the 
questions: to whom is liability owed (customers, employees, shareholders), and 
what duty is owed? (A duty under contract, or tort?). Thus the multiple tests 
and doctrinal confusion appear to be the result of a failure to frame the ques-
tion systematically. Since a systematic formal approach has not been taken up 
by the courts this article does not propose one – it would have no legal 
authority on which to stand. However such a systemization of this field of law 
would be desirable to dispell the needless confusions in law which result in 
legal uncertainty, increased transaction costs, and anomalous and unequal deci-
sions. Here we will be looking at two questions: The liability of a corporation 
for the torts of its subsidiary with particular regard to the liability of the parent 
corporation to the employees of the (overseas) subsidiary. 
This much is clear: Parent corporations generally have no duty to control 
the acts of their subsidiaries.
41 However, this general rule can be overcome by 
piercing the corporate veil and treating the two entities as one.
42 There are 
several different theories which can be the basis of an argument that the cor-
porations existence should be ignored which we now examine. 
1.  The Alter Ego Theory
43 
The alter-ego theory imposes direct liability on the parent on the theory that 
the two enterprises are in fact one.
44 The alter ego theory of piercing does not 
require a showing of fraud.
45 
                                                 
41  Abdel-Fattah v. Pepsico, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1997). 
42  Abdel-Fattah v. Pepsico, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1997). 
Mid-Missouri Telephone Co. v. Alma Telephone Co., 18 S.W.3d 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 
W.D. 2000). 
43  Fisser v International Bank 282 F2d 231 (2d. Cir., 1960). 
44  Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' Nat. Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 
212 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2000). 
45  Milgo Electronic Corp. v United Business Communications, 623 F2d 645, cert den 
(1980) 449 US 1066, 66 L Ed 2d 610, 101 S Ct 794.  
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2.  The Identity Theory
46 
Under the identity theory the unity of interest and ownership of the parent and 
subsidiary is so great that the subsidiary company is considered to legally have 
never existed or to have ceased to exist.
47 The person seeking to deny the 
corporate existence of the subsidiary must: 
“show that there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the 
independence of the corporation had in effect ceased or had never  begun, 
[such that] an adherence to the fiction of separate identity would serve 
only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to 
escape liability arising out of an operation conducted by one corporation 
for the benefit of the whole enterprise.”
48 
3.  The Instrumentality Theory
49 
Under the instrumentality theory the corporate veil is pierced where the 
dominant corporation essentially so dominated the subsidiary corporation that 
the latter became a mere instrument of its will. The test for piercing the 
corporate veil raises factors balanced in other tests for veil piercing. It has been 
summarized by the court as follows: 
"The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency, 
proof of three elements: (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock 
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and 
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the cor-
porate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will 
or existence of its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the 
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statu-
tory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contraven-
tion of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach 
of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of."
50 
Like all piercing cases, this is a theory of direct liability, not imputed liability, 
for the law simply does not recognize the existence of the dominated company. 
Thus liability could not be imputed. 
                                                 
46  Divco-Wayne Sales Financial Corp. v Martin Vehicle Sales, 45 Ill App 2d 192, 195 
NE2d 287 (Ill. App. 1963). 
47  Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., 73 Conn. App. 78, 87, 807 A.2d 1009 (Conn. App. 2002). 
48  Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 210; 413 A.2d 843 (1979). 
49  See, e.g., Brown v Margrande Compania Naviera, S.A. (Dist. Ct. Va. 1968). 
50  Tomasso v. Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 447 A.2d 406 (1982).  
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4.  Fraud as the Basis for Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Corporations can also be held liable for the acts of their subsidiaries where the 
corporation is engaging in fraud, or where the subsidary is used to perpetrate a 
fraud.
51 Again, this can create confusion since some corporate irregularities 
sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil are also fraudulent and thus an 
independent basis of liability. A claim of fraud may thus be either one element 
in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil or an independent basis for 
a cause of action or both. Again, this is a fact-intensive practical inquiry which 
will vary from case to case: Thus the level of fraud which must be shown to 
justify corporate veil piercing will also vary from case to case.
52 
5.  Piercing the Corporate Veil under a Theory of Agency
53 
One court holds that to pierce the corporate veil on a theory of agency "the 
corporation must be a sham and exist for no other purpose than as a vehicle for 
fraud."
54 In contrast however, the Delaware Chancery court disagrees and 
states that "Under the agency theory, the issue of liability rests on the amount 
of control the parent corporation exercises over the actions of the subsidiary."
55 
Thus, under the agency theory, "The parent corporation will be held liable for 
the activities of the subsidiary only if the parent dominates those activities."
56 
This apparent split between “dominance” and “sham” (i.e. sole purpose vs. 
multiple purposes) is one example of the doctrinal confusion resulting from not 
carefully distinguishing direct liability from imputed liability. If the corporate 
veil is pierced, then there is no subsidiary so liability must be direct. If how-
ever liability is imputed for the parent corporation on a theory that the subsi-
diary corporation acted as its agent then the legal existence of the subsidiary 
corporation is still recognized and thus liability is imputed on a theory of agen-
cy. In the second case there is in fact no piercing of the corporate veil. 
Multiple theories and practical overlap due to similar fact patterns explain 
the confusion in imputed and direct liability of corporate parents vis-à-vis sub-
sidiariess. This confusion is exacerbated by courts’ ignorance of the different-
ces in the tests. The courts themselves acknowledge the confusion: 
                                                 
51  Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v Oppenstein 335 F2d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). 
52  Corrigan & Schirott, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Dispelling the Mists of Metaphor, 
17 Tr Law Guide 121. 
53 See,  e.g.  New York Trust Co. v Carpenter (Ohio, Ct. App.) 250 F 668. 
54  Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch., 1999). 
55  Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1061, 1084 (D. Del. 1978). 
56  Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1061, 1084 (D. Del. 1978).  
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"In many instances, the courts profess to apply one such theory but in fact 
rely upon evidence or authorities proper to another. An example is 
Advance Coating Technology v. LEP Chemical (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 142 
F.R.D. 91, where the court says it is addressing the plaintiffs' alter ego 
argument but then proceeds to rely upon what seems to be agency 
principles."
57 
Again, the different rules can be decoded first by asking whether the liability to 
be imposed is direct (liability for the act of the parent corporation itself) or 
imputed (vicarious liability imposed on one actor for the act of another due to 
the control of the second actor by the first). Confusion can also be dispelled by 
recognizing that each of these theories ultimately relies on a fact intensive 
investigation of practical realities of the case at bar. Thus it is not surprising 
that courts often resort to balancing tests to resolve conflicting factors. Because 
of theoretical confusion and practical factual overlap the only way out of the 
morass – short of legislative reform (the corporate veil doctrine is judge-made 
law) – seems through the use of multi-factor interest balancing tests. 
6. Balancing  Tests 
Despite the doctrinal confusion and multiple theories of veil piercing, one 
element may be common to the tests (agency, instrumentality, alter-ego, identi-
ty): balancing of competing factors and interests to determine whether the 
corporate veil may be pierced. Courts do in fact – consciously
58 or not – use 
multi-factor balancing tests to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil. 
Balancing tests are the hallmark of contemporary legal decision making: they 
consider several different factors in their context: No one fact in isolation will 
result in a court choosing to disregard the corporate fiction. Instead, courts 
must look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether the corpora-
tions should be considered joined.
59 Having determined relevant factors to be 
considered courts must then assign different “weights” to each of the interests 
                                                 
57  Sonora Diamond Corp., v. The Superior Court of Tuolumne County, 2000 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 695,*21;83 Cal. App. 4th 523; 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824;2000 Cal. Daily Op. 
Service 7375 (Cal. App., 2000). 
58 See,  e.g.,  Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994) (courts balance eight 
factors: 
(1) undercapitalization,  (2) absence  of  corporate records, (3)  fraudulent representa-
tions, (4) use of the corporation to promote fraud, (5) payments made by the corpora-
tion, (6) commingling of funds and business, (7) failure to observe corporate formali-
ties, and (8) shareholder acts ignoring, controlling or manipulating the corporate form. 
59  Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App. Austin 2000).  
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and compare them (i.e. “balancing” the competing interests of all parties – not 
just plaintiff and defendant) to make the decision. 
Factors to be considered in determining the balance of interests in piercing the 
corporate veil include: 
•  Stock ownership
60 – the fact that the parent owns a majority or even all 
the stock of the subsidiary alone is not sufficient to warrant holding the 
parent corporation liable for the contracts or torts of the subsidiary. 
•  Interlocking boards of directors and/or officers and employees. while 
common employees, officers, or shareholders may be evidence of no 
factual separation of corporate interests these are alone insufficient and 
there are cases where despite such factors no liability was found.
61 If the 
two companies have overlapping boards of directors and/or officers and 
employees the moving party must nevertheless show that in fact the the 
domination and control of the subsidiary by the parent was complete: 
interlocking boards of directors and officers and stock ownership are 
alone insufficient to justify disregarding the separate legal existence of 
the subsidiary. They are however one factor to be considered.
62 
•  Commingling of funds,
63 or other financial irregularities such as one-
sided contracts which favor one of the companies at the expense of the 
other,
64 (e.g. sale of goods at or below costs). Common tax returns, 
common addresses, parent’s use of  subsidiary’s property as if it were its 
own.
65 All of these factors can be evidence of fraud and/or abuse of the 
law. Where the practical effect of such legal gymnastics results in sub-
stantive injustice to victims of negligent torts the court will disregard the 
corporate separation. 
•  Whether the companies hold themselves out as separate entities to third 
parties. 
•  Undercapitalization: One critical factor in determining whether the court 
will disregard the corporate fiction is the under-capitalization of the 
                                                 
60  Martin v Development Co. of America 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1917). 
61  Davis v John R. Thompson Co. 239 Ill App 469 (1926). 
62  Townley v. Emerson Elec. Co., 178 Misc. 2d 740, 681 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
63  Absent fraud, commingling, failure to observe corporate formalities and/or inadequate 
capitaliztion corporate veil would not be pierced. In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. 19 
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997). 
64  Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App. Austin 2000). 
65  American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Development Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 
1997).  
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subsidiary.
66 This is all the more true where undercapitalization is a 
deliberate corporate policy designed precisely to evade responsibility for 
wrongs of the corporate group.
67 
All these questions can only be answered by looking to the actual facts to 
determine the actual degree of control exercised by the parent over the subsi-
diary.
68 
Thus the doctrinal confusion may be clarified not only by dogmatically 
distinguishing direct and imputed liability from each other and by properly 
recognizing and distinguishing the various theories of veil piercing (agency, 
instrumentality, alter-ego, identity)  from each other but also by acknowleding 
the common factors underlying each of these tests. By evaluating the problem 
in toto using a balancing test the advocate may have a better practical grasp on 
how to properly advise her clients. 
7.  Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil 
To add to the confusion noted there is also a theory of “reverse piercing” of the 
corporate veil. Thankfully, this is in fact quite simple. In “reverse piercing” the 
debts or wrongful acts of individuals (shareholders, or directors or even offi-
cers and employees) are attributed to the company rather than the usual pierc-
ing situation where the acts of the company are attributed to its shareholders.
69 
Further, the same rules in traditional veil piercing apply to reverse veil-pierc-
ing
70 Since reverse veil-piercing usually involves seeking to reach corporate 
assets for debts rather than torts we do not address it further here. 
D. Independent  Contractors/Subcontractors 
We have just analyzed the liability of corporate parent and subsidiary. Can the 
corporation avoid liability by resorting to sub-contractors? Not necessarily. 
                                                 
66  See, for example, Henderson v Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. (DC Ark) 99 F Supp 
376; Fish v East 114 F2d 177 (Colo. Ct. App. 1940). 
67  This often happens in taxi-cab companies which are artificially split into several 
companies. See, e.g. Wallace v Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 178 Okla 15, 
61 P2d 645 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1936). 
68  Scandinavian Satellite System, AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
69  Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293, 321 
(S.D. N.Y. 1999); San-Dar Associates v. MDO Development Corp., N.Y.L.J., July 22, 
1997, at 22, col. 4 (Sup. Ct., Bronx County 1997); State of New York v. Easton, 169 
Misc. 2d 282, 288-289 (Sup. Ct., Albany County 1995). 
70  Securities Investor Protection Corp., supra, at 321; San-Dar Associates, supra; State of 
New York v. Easton, supra, at 288-90.  
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Liability for the act of a supposed independant contractor will be imputed to 
the contracting party where both the sub-contractor and the contractor have the 
same offices, and where all finances of both companies are handled by one of 
them and where losses of the subsidiary are accounted to and paid by the 
parent.
71 Whether a franchisee is an independent contractor or an agent of the 
franchisor is a question of fact.
72 Thus where franchisor does not completely 
dominate and control franchisee it was no error of law to find that the fran-
chisee was an independent contractor and not an agent thus barring vicarious 
liability.
73 Again, a fact intensive inquiry similar to the questions examined in 
piercing the corporate veil will be undertaken to determine whether it is 
equitable to hold the contracting party liable for the torts of their subcontractor. 
E. RICO 
In theory, systematic abuses of labor in a foreign subsidiary or by a foreign 
sub-contractor might lead to liability under the Racketeering Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act. However there are numerous procedural obstacles 
which limit in practice the application of RICO.
74 The author has addressed 
this topic extensively elsewhere, so other than noting that RICO could be a 
basis of liability of the parent company for the subsidiary or subcontractor the 
reader is referred to the literature.
75 
                                                 
71  Joseph R. Foard Co. v Maryland  219 F 827 (Ct. App. Md. 1914). 
72  Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp. 21 Cal.App.3d 541, 547, 98 Cal.Rptr. 588 (1971). 
73  Cislaw v Southland Corp. 4 Cal App 4th 1284, 6 Cal Rptr 2d 386, 92 CDOS 2631, 92 
Daily Journal DAR 4136 (1992, Cal. App.). 
74  See, e.g., PT UNITED CAN COMPANY LTD. v.CROWN CORK & SEAL 
COMPANY, 138 F.3d 65 (U.S. Ct. App. 2d Cir., 1998). (Indonesian corporation 
brought suit against minority shareholder, a Pennsylvania corporation, and individual 
employees of shareholder, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act – claim dismissed 
against individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed claims 
against minority shareholder on forum non conveniens grounds). 
75  See, e.g. Eric Engle, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Can Rico Protect Human Rights? A 
Computer Analysis of a Semi-Determinate Legal Question. 3 J. High Tech. L. 1 
(2004).  
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III.  Piercing the Corporate Veil in the EU: Liability of a Parent Company 
in the EU for the Tortious Act of a Subsidiary
76 
Is the situation in the European Union similar to that in America? Essentially, 
yes: corporate forms can be ignored where domination and control of a 
corporation is complete but will ordinarily be respected. However one possible 
theory that may meet more success in Europe than the United States is that the 
company that exploits the labour of the third world worker not only violates 
international human rights law but also obtains thereby an unfair competitive 
advantage. Thus where a corporate subsidiary employs slave labour, or perhaps 
even child labour in contravention of the ILO provisions, or where it pays 
women workers less than men doing the same work we could fairly say that 
there is a tort. This tort however benefits the parent company in Europe, and is 
a detriment to its competitors which do not employ slave labour, child labour, 
or underpaid women’s labour. Thus the tort also would constitute an unfair 
competitive advantage under Article  81 of the EC Treaty. Article  81 states 
that: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market (emphasis added). 
Clearly, an agreement between a parent company and a third world subsidiary 
or subcontractor to profit from slave labour, child labour, or unequal women’s 
pay would affect trade within the Union and distort competition by favouring 
the predatory exploitative company at the expense of companies which obey 
international law. The company’s only argument would be that Article 1 § 3 
permits an exception in cases where such an agreement “contributes to im-
proving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit”. However this argument would likely fail because the consumer does 
not in fact have a fair share of the benefit from an anti-competitive agreement 
or operation which is based on labour exploitation for they are in fact profiting 
therefrom. Further, slave labour and sweatshops are hardly “economic pro-
                                                 
76  This analysis is based on an unpublished lecture by Prof. Olivier De Schutter, Uni-
versité Catholique de Louvain given at the European University Institute, Florence 17-
28 June 2002. The author wishes to thank Prof. De Schutter for his creative insights 
and the EUI for its research facilities.  
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gress” or improvements in the production or distribution of goods. Thus, if the 
agreement or enterprise is found to be anti-competitive as profiting from slave 
labour, illegal child labour, or the underpaid illegal labour of women then the 
exception would be unlikely to apply. 
As to imputed liability in Europe as in America the torts of a wholly owned 
subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company. To impute the tort to the 
parent company the court must first “pierce the corporate veil” and look at the 
ownership and control of the subsidiary by the parent.
77 The easiest case is the 
wholly owned subsidiary with unity of management in both parent and 
subsidiary. A case which would be almost as easy would be that of the parent 
company with a wholly owned subsidiary that however has a different board of 
directors. As the independence of the subsidiary grows, the likelihood of 
proving actual control decreases, and with it the likelihood of being able to 
impute legal responsibility to the parent company for the acts of a subsidiary. 
Ownership and control is of course reflected in stock ownership. It would be 
unlikely that the ECJ would impute control of a subsidiarity to a parent 
company which owns the largest bloc of stock in a subsidiarity but which bloc 
is a minority share of all shares. 
The most difficult case is of, again, the independent subcontractor. In such 
a case there is no ownership or control (at least theoretically…) but there is a 
contract. Knowing that freedom of contract is a general principle of law it 
would be very difficult to show that the contract should be ignored. However 
fraudulent contracts do exist. It could be argued that where the European com-
pany knew or should have known that the contract it obtained was so favorable 
due to exploitative labor practices that that would constitute an unfair trading 
advantage. That does nothing to compensate the unfair labour practices in the 
third world but it would discourage EU companies from profiting thereby. 
Once the corporate veil is pierced, obtaining jurisdiction under COM 
44/2001 would be relatively easy. Thus, at least in theory, it would be possible 
to impute tort liability to a parent company either for a tort committed by a 
wholly owned subsidiary. Alternatively, a company might be fined for viola-
tions of human rights which also constitute anti-competitive behaviour. Thus, 
briefly, similar principles of law can be found in Europe to impose liability on 
corporations for the acts of their subsidiary in the third world. 
                                                 
77 See,  Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB C-286/98 (16 November 2000).  
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Conclusion: The Transnational Corporate Group in International Law 
Transnational corporate groups are increasingly influential
78 in world poli-
tics.
79 Some have gone so far as to propose that corporations are or should be 
subjects of international law.
80 In fact, corporations,
81 like other non-state 
actors,
82 do have directly applicable duties and rights under international law.
83 
Corporations may have duties under the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
                                                 
78  “Economic globalisation has been accompanied by a marked increase in the influence 
of international financial markets and transnational institutions, including corpora-
tions, in determining national policies and priorities.” Dinah Shelton, Protecting 
Human Rights in a Globalized World 25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 273, 276. (2002) 
available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/06_TXT.htm  
supra note 34. 
79  See Id. at 104. 
80 Daniel  Thürer,  Modernes Volkerrecht Ein System im Wandel und Wachstum – 
Gerechtigkeitsgedanke als Kraft der Veränderung 60 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht at 557, 587 (2000). 
81  The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 'every 
individual and every organ of society shall shall strive …to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and… to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction ' human rights. Corporations are creations 
of the state and thus are addressees of this norm because of that and also because the 
preamble states “universal”observance i.e. observance by all actors in all times and 
places. UDHR, Preamble available at:    
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/universal_decl.html 
82  "International law is increasingly regulating non-state behavior directly." Dinah Shel-
ton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. Int'l. Comp. L.Rev. 
273, 301-302 (2002) available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/06_TXT.htm 
supra note 34. 
83  Para. 42 of General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (Article 12), 4 July 2000, U.N. Doc: E/C.12/1999/5,CESCR, states: “While 
only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance 
with it, all members of society – individuals, including health professionals, families, 
local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, civil soci-
ety organisations, as well as the private business sector – have responsibilities regard-
ing the realisation of the right to health. State parties should therefore provide an 
environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities.” Available at:  
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.1999.5,+CESCR+General+comme
nt+12.En?OpenDocument and at: http://www.fao.org/Legal/rtf/cescr-e.htm  
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All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
84 the UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief,
85  the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development
86 and 
other international conventions. These conventions state explicitly or implicitly 
that “private actors have both negative and positive duties in respect of socio-
economic rights.”
87 and recognise the limited international legal personality of 
multinational corporations
88 Implying that human rights can be enforced 
against corporations.
89 Thus to that extent corporations
90 may
91 be said to have 
                                                 
84  Adopted on 20 November 1963 by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1904 (XVIII). 
Article 2(1) states that, “No State, institution, group or individual shall make any 
discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the treatment of persons, groups of persons or institutions on the ground of race, 
colour or ethnic origin.” CERD, Art. 2(1), available at:    
http://www.unesco.org/human_rights/dcb.htm 
85  "No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, 
or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs." Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of Resolu-
tion 36/55 1981 United Nations available at:    
http://www.church-of-the-lukumi.org/Resolution%2036-02.htm 
86  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/ 26 (Vol. I) available at:    
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm 
87  Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Obligations of non-state actors in relation to economic, 
social and cultural rights under the South African Constitution, Socio-Economic 
Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape (2002) 
available at:    
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/ docs_2002/Researchseries1.doc 
88  Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States states that: "multi-
nationals are not to interfere with the internal affairs of a host country." This implicitly 
recognises the (limited) international legal personality of multinational corporations. 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted 12/12/1974 A/RES/3281 
(XXIX). 
89  Claire Moore Dickerson supra note 122 at 1458 (noting that individuals have rights 
under international law in cases of violations of jus cogens). 
90  "’Every individual’ includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of 
society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal 
Declaration applies to them all." 
Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 
25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1, 25 (1999). 
91  Of course the majority view is that transnational corporations do not enjoy any form 
of legal personality. However that view is criticised for the practical reason that if 
transnational corporations have no international legal personality then they would 
escape international human rights obligations. International Council on Human Rights  
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limited international legal personality.
92 Corporations do not however have a 
constitutive power in the formation of international law. Yet corporations, and 
international financial institutions such as the world bank
93 can contribute to 
the formation of customary international law
94 by aiding in the process of 
elaborating norms
95 even if sometimes only as observers
96 and commentators. 
Just as we have seen the law evolve from an enlightenment principle of 
individual responsibility for definite acts to socially contextualized diffuse 
                                                                                                                                                      
Policy, Whither the State of Human Rights Protection? (New ways to hold non-state 
actors accountable) (1998) available at:    
http://www.humanrights.ch/bildungarbeit/seminare/pdf/000303_danailov_clapham.pd
f 
92 Robert  McCorquodale,  Feeling the Heat of Human Rights Branding: Bringing Trans-
national Corporations within the International Human Rights Fence, 1 Human Rights 
& Human Welfare 21, 27 (2001) available at:   
http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2001/1-4/mccorquodale-addo.pdf 
93  “At the World Bank, NGOs or groups of individuals may request an Inspection Panel 
to investigate claims of injury arising out of an act or omission of the Bank resulting 
from its failure to follow operational policies and procedures with respect to the 
design, appraisal, and/or implementation of a Bank project organisations apply the 
law.” Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae 
and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty 25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 235, 
244. Available at:   
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm. 
94  However non-state actors do play a marginal role in the formation of customary 
international law. “Looking at the activities of individuals, and more specifically 
NGOs, one finds evidence of an influence both in the formation and the application of 
international law, albeit one that is qualitatively and quantitatively less than that of 
states and international organisations.” Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public 
International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty 
25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 235, 244 (2002). Available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm, 
supra note 1. 
95  For example, in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 
8–14, 1993, arts. 14–15, 32 I.L.M. 1482 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC] permits private 
parties to petition the NAAEC Secretariat where those petitions are aimed at “enforce-
ment rather than at harassing industry.” The Secretariat may request a government to 
respond to the allegations, and in cases where two of the three states’ representatives 
agree, prepare a factual record and release it to the public. NAAEC arts. 14(2), 15. 
96 Duncan  B.  Hollis,  Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the 
Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty 25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 235, 244 
(2002). Available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm  
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responsibility with relaxed causation requirements so also are we seeing the 
rise of a transnational corporate governance. Corporate counsel can regard 
these facts with incomprehension, fear and distrust. Alternatively, they can 
understand the underlying long-term cyclical movements and flow with them. 
By developing rational responsible forms of transnational corporate govern-
ance corporate counsel can help their clients to pursue enlightened self interest, 
to improve the good-will of their clients by showing their company to be a 
“good neighbor” and even improve the voice of the corporation as a contribu-
tor to international law.  
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Chapter IV 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):  
Market Based Remedies  
for International Human Rights Violations? * 
Abstract: 
The article examine market based remedies to corporate abuse of human rights. 
It concludes that while market based remedies alone are inadequate to remedy 
corporate abuse of human rights in the third world such measures may help 
shield corporation officers and employees. Further such measures are a step in 
the right direction. Various market based incentives and disincentives to 
corporate action are discussed and some reforms are proposed which show that 
corporate self interest and human rights are not necessarily anti-thetical 
concepts. The paper concludes however that international human rights law is 
not an example of a modern “lex mercatoria” precisely because non-market 
remedies in tort and crime also exist to prevent and remedy abuse of human 
rights. 
 
* This article appeared under this title in 40 Willamette Law Review 103 (2004).  
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Introduction 
The problem of poverty presents the opportunity of labour exploitation. Oppor-
tunities to profit
1 out of the misery of others occur in a variety of domains,
2 
including flowers,
3 textiles,
4 oil,
5 and diamonds.
6 Multinational companies can 
make a killing on their investments – literally.
7 Often, as in the case of conflict 
diamonds, the source of the commodity resulting from exploitation cannot be 
traced.
8 
Not only are labour exploitation patterns recurrent in a several industries, 
human rights violations occur throughout the third world in places as diverse 
                                                 
1  Brad J. Kieserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate 
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 881, 881 
(1999) (Global capital is highly mobile and follows profit, not human need). 
2 Comment,  Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 2025 to  114 Harv. L. Rev. 2025, 2025 (2001). 
3  “The International Labour Organisation (ILO) calculates the number of working 
children in the world to be in the ‘hundreds of millions.’” Nicole J. Krug, Exploiting 
Child Labour: Corporate Responsibility and the Role of Corporate Codes of Conduct, 
14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 651, 651-652 (1998). 
4  See, e.g., Deborah J. Karet, Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment Industry?, 
48 Buff. L. Rev. 1047, 1061-69 (2000); See also, “Clean Clothes Campaign” at: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/. 
5  The most famous examples are Unocal in Burma and  Shell and Mobil in Nigeria. 
Kenneth Rodman, Nonstate Actors and Human Rights Sanctions: A Challenge to the 
State Centric Model?, 12 Ethics and International Affairs” 19, at 33-34 and  37 
respectively (1988). It is worth noting that “no Western oil company was willing to 
abandon its access to crude because of political risk in the west. …Second, these 
pressures did not deter new energy investments. … while most MNCs stayed away 
from Nigeria, oil companies increased their investments.” Rodman at 37. 
6  Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross 
Violations of Human Rights, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 327, 327-330 (2001); 
International Council on Human Rights Policy "Beyond Voluntarism", 128; 145-146 
at  http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/beyond_voluntarism.pdf (2002). 
7  “When the Ogoni Nine were sentenced to death, Shell was asked by NGOs such as 
Amnesty International to use its influence to win clemency. Shells response was...  “It 
is not for a commercial organisation to interfere with the legal processes of a 
sovereign state.”, Rodman supra note 506 at 35. 
8 Blaine  Harden,  Africa's Gems: Warfare's Best Friend, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2000, at 
A1. See Amman, supra note X at 330.  
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as Saipan,
9 Ecuador,
10 Papua New Guinea,
11 Indonesia,
12 Myanmar (former 
Burma), and Nigeria
13 and often implicate first world multinational corpora-
tions.
14 
The violations of human rights are just as wide ranging. Indentured servi-
tude,
15 child labour
16 and slave labour
17 are typical violations, though atypical-
ly even charges of murder or genocide are alleged. Quite simply the fact is 
consumers want cheap goods – and third world labour generally and child and 
slave labour in particular are cheap. Companies exploit third world labour
18 
because exploitation is profitable.
19 
                                                 
9  Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalisation, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 705, 762 (2002); First-Ever Lawsuits Filed 
Charging Sweatshop Conspiracy Between Major U.S. Clothing Designers, Retailers, 
Foreign Textile Producers, Sweatshop Watch,    
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/lawsuit.html;  
William Branigin, “Top Clothing Retailers Labeled Labour Abusers Sweatshops 
Allegedly Run On U.S. Territory”, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1999. 
10  Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1998). 
11 Elizabeth  Amon,  Coming to America: Alien Tort Claims Act Provides a Legal Forum 
for the World, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at A1. 
12  Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999) 
13 Jason  Hoppin,  Chevron Hit with Human Rights Claim, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 24, 2000, at 
B1; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000). 
14  Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human 
Rights Violations, 3 (1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (trial) Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13327. (9
th Cir., 2002) 
(appeal currently being re-heard en banc). 
15  Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Corporate Responsibility Now: Profit at the Expense of 
Human Rights With Exemption From Liability? 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 191, 226 
(1999). (Describing poor quality working conditions in the third world). 
16 Nicole  J.  Krug,  Exploiting Child Labour: Corporate Responsibility and the Role of 
Corporate Codes of Conduct 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 651, 651 (1998), supra note 
564. 
17 Maria  Ellinikos,  American Mncs Continue to Profit from the Use of Forced And Slave 
Labour Begging The Question: Should America Take A Cue from Germany?, 35 
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 1 (2001). 
18  Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The 
Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labour Rights through Private 
Initiatives,  30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 111, 112-113 (1998) (Outsourcing to take 
advantage of cheap unregulated third world labour). 
19 Krug  supra note 564 at 658.  
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These facts and the instability of local governments
20 often put corporations 
doing business in the third world into questionable positions. Usually these 
ethical problems are resolved quickly – by looking to whether profit is hin-
dered or aided.
21 While we may expect a corporation to behave ethically where 
it costs nothing, when behaving ethically will reduce profits we should realis-
tically expect the corporation to maximise its profits.
22 This is partly because if 
the company does not do so it will become less competitive against other 
businesses which do not renounce exploitative profits. The fact that compe-
tition, whether among corporations or states, can lead to sub-optimal outcomes 
explains why law rightly imposes limits on market transactions. 
In this article we will explore market forces which may contribute to con-
trolling corporate behaviour and the internal regulatory structure of the cor-
poration. We will particularly look at non-binding regulation of the corporation 
via codes of conduct and guidelines established by the company itself, Indus-
try,
23 pressure groups, the state or by international organisations
24 such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
25 and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
26 The corporate social responsibility 
                                                 
20  “[Shell’s]  general manager explained the irrelevance of human right ot the economic 
opportunities in blunt terms: “For a commercial company trying to make investments, 
you need a stable environment. Dictatorships can give you that.” Rodman supra note 
506 at 35. 
21  David P. Forsythe The Political Economy of Human Rights: Transnational Corpora-
tions ISA-Chicago (February, 2001). 
22 Erin  Elizabeth  Macek,  Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations have no 
Incentive to Define Human Right, 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 101, 117 (2002). 
23  Thus, "The World Diamond Congress, meeting in 2000 in Antwerp, proposed the 
creation of an international diamond council made up of producers, manufacturers, 
traders, governments, and international organisations to oversee a new system to 
verify the provenance of rough diamonds." This is one more example of non-state 
actors taking over the role of states! Namely proposing new international norms, the 
very core of the distinction between “object” and “subject” of international law. Dinah 
Shelton, Protecting Human Rights In A Globalized World, 25 B.C. Int'l. Comp. L.Rev. 
273, 314 (2002) available at:   
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/06_TXT.htm 
supra note 34. 
24  Erin Elizabeth Macek, supra note 583 at 107-109. 
25  Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Special 
Policy,17 Int’l Legal Materials 422 (1978), at:    
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm 
26 E.g.  OECD,   Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises; United Nations Global Com-
pact.  See: Michael Anderson,  Transnational Corporations and Environmental  
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movement seeks to directly or indirectly influence or control corporate behavi-
our through a combination of 1) marketplace activism (influence over or via 
capital structure and sales of the corporation), 2) internal self regulation (codes 
of conduct), and 3) shareholder activism. Accordingly, our inquiry will exa-
mine i) indirect influence via market forces affecting capital and sales and ii) 
direct control or influence via a) the corporation’s internal organisation first 
through codes of conduct then b) through shareholder activism. 
Individually the soft law norms explored here are generally not very effect-
tive. However in concert with other regimes they can encourage improved hu-
man rights protection. Thus, though the state still plays a key role at the center 
of the spectrum of international legal entities, it is increasingly supplanted by 
sub-state and supra-state normative regimes. 
A.  The International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors 
1. Multinational  Corporations 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are increasingly influential on the world 
stage
27 and are only one of several non-state actors challenging the role of the 
state in international law. MNCs are extremely influential in world politics.
28 
They are loyal only to profit and engage in business activity on several con-
tinents. Multinational corporations undermine the hermetic model of Westpha-
lian sovereignty which saw states as isolated from each other and as the prin-
ciple object of loyalty of their subjects. Capital mobility also undermines the 
state as primary and ultimate object of power and loyalty on the international 
stage because it defies the power of the state to regulate its own currency and 
interest rates.
29 It is hardly surprising that some have gone so far as to ask 
                                                                                                                                                      
Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer? Washburn Law Journal Volume 41, No. 3 (Spring 
2002)  http://washburnlaw.edu/wlj/41-3/articles/ande.pdf, supra note 38. 
27  “Economic globalisation has been accompanied by a marked increase in the influence 
of international financial markets and transnational institutions, including corpora-
tions, in determining national policies and priorities.” Dinah Shelton, Protecting 
Human Rights in a Globalized World 25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 273, 276. (2002) 
Available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/06_TXT.htm,  
supra note 34. 
28  See id. at 104. 
29  See Hans Corell, supra note 24 at 8.  
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whether multinationals are or should be subjects of jus gentium.
30 In fact, 
corporations,
31 like other non-state actors,
32 do have directly applicable duties 
and rights under international law.
33 Thus to that extent corporations
34 may
35  
be said to have limited international legal.
36 
                                                 
30 Daniel  Thürer,  Modernes Volkerrecht Ein System Im Wandel und Wachstum - 
Gerechtigkeitsgedanke als Kraft der Veränderung 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht at 557, 587 (2000). 
31  The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 'every 
individual and every organ of society shall shall strive …to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and… to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction ' human rights. Corporations are creations 
of the state and thus are addressees of this norm because of that and also because the 
preamble states “universal”observance i.e. observance by all actors in all times and 
places. UDHR, Preamble available at:    
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/universal_decl.html !!!***!!!XXX YYY  
32  "International law is increasingly regulating non-state behavior directly."  Dinah 
Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. Int'l. Comp. L.Rev. 
273, 301-302 (2002) available at:   
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/06_TXT.htm  
supra note 34. 
33  Para. 42 of General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (Article 12), 4 July 2000, U.N. Doc: E/C.12/1999/5,CESCR, states: “While 
only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance 
with it, all members of society – individuals, including health professionals, families, 
local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, civil 
society organisations, as well as the private business sector – have responsibilities 
regarding the realisation of the right to health. State parties should therefore provide 
an environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities.” Available at:  
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.1999.5,+CESCR+General+comme
nt+12.En?OpenDocument and at: http://www.fao.org/Legal/rtf/cescr-e.htm,   
supra note 210. 
34  "’Every individual’ includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of 
society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal 
Declaration applies to them all." 
Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 
25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1, 25 (1999). 
35  Of course the majority view is that transnational corporations do not enjoy any form 
of legal personality. However that view is criticised for the practical reason that if 
transnational corporations have no international legal personality then they would 
escape international human rights obligations.  
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2. Individuals 
Individuals, also increasingly have human rights and duties both under national 
law and international treaties. Evidence of the limited international legal per-
sonality of non-state actors includes the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
37 the UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief,
38  the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development
39 inter alia.  
These conventions state explicitly or implicitly that “private actors have both 
negative and positive duties in respect of socio-economic rights.”
40 and recog-
                                                                                                                                                      
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Whither the State of Human Rights 
Protection? (New ways to hold non-state actors accountable) (1998) available at:  
http://www.humanrights.ch/bildungarbeit/seminare/pdf/000303_danailov_clapham.pd
f 
36 Robert  McCorquodale,  Feeling the Heat  of Human Rights Branding: Bringing 
Transnational Corporations within the International Human Rights Fence, 1 Human 
Rights & Human Welfare 21, 27 (2001) available at: 
http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2001/1-4/mccorquodale-addo.pdf 
37  Adopted on 20 November 1963 by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1904 (XVIII). 
Article 2(1)  states that, “No State, institution, group or individual shall make any 
discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the treatment of persons, groups of persons or institutions on the ground of race, 
colour or ethnic origin.” CERD, Art. 2(1), available at:    
http://www.unesco.org/human_rights/dcb.htm 
supra note 203. 
38  "No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, 
or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs." Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of Resolu-
tion 36/55 1981 United Nations available at:    
http://www.church-of-the-lukumi.org/Resolution%2036-02.htm 
39  Rio Declaration On Environment And Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) available at:    
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm 
40  Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Obligations of non-state actors in relation to economic, 
social and cultural rights under the South African Constitution, Socio-Economic 
Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape (2002) 
available at:    
www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/ docs_2002/Researchseries1.doc  
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nise the limited international legal personality of multinational corporations.
41 
Thus human rights can be enforced against corporations.
42 
3.  Limits on the International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors 
There are however limits on the international legal personality of non-state 
actors. Although corporations certainly have great de facto influence in inter-
national relations they do not have a constitutive power in the formation of 
international law. Non-state actors such as individuals, corporations, and the 
world bank
43 can however contribute to the formation of customary internatio-
nal law
44 by aiding in the process of elaborating norms
45 even if sometimes 
only as observers.
46 
                                                 
41  Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States states that: "multi-
nationals are not to interfere with the internal affairs of a host country." This implicitly 
recognises the (limited) international legal personality of multinational corporations. 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted 12/12/1974 A/RES/3281 
(XXIX). 
42  Claire Moore Dickerson supra note 169 at 1458 (noting that individuals have rights 
under international law in cases of violations of jus cogens). 
43  “At the World Bank, NGOs or groups of individuals may request an Inspection Panel 
to investigate claims of injury arising out of an act or omission of the Bank resulting 
from its failure to follow operational policies and procedures with respect to the 
design, appraisal, and/or implementation of a Bank project organisations apply the 
law.” Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae 
and the Case for tThe Retention Of State Sovereignty  25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 
235, 244. Available at:  
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm,  
supra note 1. 
44  However non-state actors do play a marginal role in the formation of customary 
international law. “Looking at the activities of individuals, and more specifically 
NGOs, one finds evidence of an influence both in the formation and the application of 
international law, albeit one that is qualitatively and quantitatively less than that of 
states and international organisations.” Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public 
International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty  
25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 235, 244 (2002). Available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm,  
supra note 1. 
45  For example, in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 
8–14, 1993, arts. 14–15, 32 I.L.M. 1482 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC] permits private 
parties to petition the NAAEC Secretariat where those petitions are aimed at 
“enforcement rather than at harassing industry.” The Secretariat may request a 
government to respond to the allegations, and in cases where two of the three states’  
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4. Conclusion 
As ordinary as directly enforceable rights and duties held by non-state actors 
under international law may seem today, that is a radical
47 departure from the 
Westphalian system. The increasingly common imputation of rights and duties 
to non-state actors under international law is partly because of the integration 
of world trade and capital mobility, i.e. globalisation.
48 This shift of rights and 
duties from states to non-state and super-state actors defines one aspect of the 
transformation of the Westphalian state system. 
B. Market Based Remedies 
Market forces encourage corporations to exploit third world labour. Is there 
any way to harness those same forces to encourage corporations to work for 
better labour standards in the third world? The answer to this question is a 
qualified “yes”: market forces alone will probably not suffice to improve 
human rights. But when market forces are linked to legal regimes they may 
encourage improved working conditions for third world labour. We reach this 
conclusion by examining incentives and disincentives for corporate action both 
in capital and consumer markets. 
1.  Disincentives for Unethical Action 
To control behaviour in capitalism law seeks to make the undesirable unpro-
fitable and the desirable profitable. We thus examine disincentives and incen-
tives in capital markets and sales in order to determine where pressure can be 
successfully brought to influence corporate behaviour. 
When we look at capital markets it is noteworthy that churches, pensions, 
universities and foundations oppose human rights abuse in principle and have 
funds which they invest in companies. Corporate behaviour can thus be influ-
                                                                                                                                                      
representatives agree, prepare a factual record and release it to the public. NAAEC 
arts. 14(2), 15. 
46 Duncan  B.  Hollis,  Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the 
Casef for the Retention Of State Sovereignty  25 B. C. Int. Comp. L. Rev. 235, 244 
(2002). Available at:    
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_2/04_TXT.htm 
47  John King Gamble, Teresa A. Bailey, Jared S. Hawk, Erin E. McCurdy, supra note 41 
at 33  (2001) (Argues that the second half of the 20
th century was propicious for 
human rights). 
48  See Elisa Westfield, supra note 36 at 1108.  
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enced by threatening to disinvest these funds.
49 The change in corporate be-
haviour is induced indirectly by the threat that investors will disinvest and that 
institutional lenders will make loans contingent on the corporation changing its 
behaviour to better respect human rights or even stop lending entirely. Acti-
vists can thus seek to reduce the credit rating of corporations by demonstrating 
their poor human rights records.
50 Bankers are prudent and may be more 
reluctant to invest in companies which tolerate or even encourage human rights 
abuses because the violation of human rights generates political instability, 
increases the risk of war (with attendant property destruction) and risks natio-
nalisation of the investment.
51 
As to their sales, corporations which violate or tolerate violation of human 
rights risk not only capital flight as individual and institutional investors 
(usually in equities and debt instruments respectively) disinvest. Corporations 
which violate human rights also risk consumer boycott
52 protests
53 or being 
denied local or national procurement contracts.
54 It may be counterintuitive, 
but market based remedies may have some effect at changing corporate beha-
viour – a business with no capital and no sales has no future. 
2.  Incentives to Act Ethically 
Not only are negative disincentives possible to discourage human rights abuse, 
there are positive incentives as well to encourage companies to behave ethical-
ly. In capital markets, there is a segment of investors more interested in invest-
ing ethically than in maximising the profitability of investments. Ethical in-
vestment funds exist to serve this market.
55 One possible reform proposes to 
create an ethical stock index.
56 As to consumer markets, Just as there are ethi-
cal investors so are there ethical consumers. Some consumers prefer ethically 
                                                 
49 Id. at 21. 
50  “It is generally agreed that the most damaging source of external economic pressure 
on Pretoria was the private credit boycott.” Id. at 23. 
51  John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations 
Strike Out, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 463, 472 (2000). 
52 Rodman  supra note 506 at 20; John Christopher Anderson, supra note 590 at 472. 
53  John Anderson, supra note 587 at 472. 
54  Id., at 34. 
55  See, e.g., Mary O'Hara  Counting the cost of social responsibility The Guardian, (July 
27, 2002). 
56  See, e.g., Social Investment Organisation, Socially Responsible Stock Index Launched 
in Canada, at (October, 2002) at: http://www.socialinvestment.ca/Forfeb00.pdf  
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manufactured goods and are willing to pay higher prices for them.
57 Product 
labelling is thus another practical remedy to encourage companies to act ethic-
ally by making it profitable to do so. Labelling consists of affixing a mark to a 
product so that the user knows that the product was manufactured or produced 
according to certain norms of labour. For example “Rugmark” indicates that 
luxurious rugs from the Indian subcontinent were not produced with child 
labour.
58 Similarly the FIFA mark indicates that child labour has not been used 
in the manufacture of soccer balls.
59 
Thus there are some market based incentives and disincentives both in the 
capital and consumer markets which should encourage corporations to act 
ethically. Though market based remedies alone will probably not solve the 
problem of human rights, in combination with binding measures they may help 
to improve the standard of living of all humans. What legal remedies are there 
to discourage corporate misfeasance and encourage good corporate citizen-
ship? 
C. Corporate  Governance 
Market based remedies will probably not alone solve the problem of human 
rights. However if we look at the internal structure of the corporation we may 
be able to discover other ways to discourage corporate misfeasance and en-
courage good corporate citizenship. One way to change corporate behaviour is 
through the internal governance structures of the corporation. This line of 
attack would argue that if you want the corporations behaviour to change, take 
control of the corporation. Corporate behaviour can be changed by non-bind-
ing codes of conduct, shareholder resolutions, and proxy contests. Corporate 
governance may also be influenced by changing securities regulation laws and 
by including, either voluntarily or mandatorily, a section in the corporations 
annual report addressing the corporation’s human rights obligations and 
actions. 
1.  Non-Binding Codes of Conduct 
A code of conduct is an internal or external guide generally adopted by the 
corporation as a guide to its managers and employees. The corporate social 
                                                 
57  John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations 
Strike Out, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 463, 472 (2000) supra note 590. 
58  Lance Compa, Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere Enforcing International Labour Rights 
through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 663, 673 (1995). 
59 Liubicic  supra note 580 at 130.  
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responsibility movement seeks to persuade corporations to internalise human 
rights standards by inciting the corporation to adopt voluntary non-binding 
codes of good conduct.
60 Essentially the hope is, that by establishing standards 
the corporation will be encouraged to meet them. Codes of conduct may be 
created by a corporation itself, an industry, national administrative organs or 
international organisations. 
a.  Advantages of Codes of Conduct 
Codes of conduct may seem only to be a propaganda exercise. However, even 
where not obeyed, and only existing on paper, codes can be used to embarrass 
and shame the corporation and even as evidence of action ultra vires if the 
corporation violates its own code or bylaws. Further such violations may be 
presented as evidence against the corporation in the event of lawsuits against 
the company. If a corporation has, on paper, stated that it will obey human 
rights, even in a voluntary and non-binding code of conduct, when it does not 
do so it will have greater difficulty defending itself credibly in court.
61 
b.  Disadvantages of Codes of Conduct 
While codes of conduct are thus not completely useless, believing that corpo-
rate self regulation alone will prevent human rights abuses in the name of 
profits requires either naiveté or disingenuity. Corporate social responsibility is 
usually nothing other than a public relations exercise, at best intended to im-
prove the image of the corporation and at worst to whitewash corporate exploi-
tation and delay the establishment of binding legal norms.
62 Corporate social 
responsibility is not always merely a smokescreen however. Sometimes, as in 
the case of generic drugs used to hinder HIV, pressuring corporations to act 
                                                 
60  For a summary of the opposing viewpoints see Bennet Freedman, Human Rights and 
Corporate Responsibility, 171 American Forum for Global Education 4, available at 
http://www.globaled.org/issues/171.pdf  (2001-2002). 
61  For example, Unocal has a code of good conduct - which came back to haunt that 
company when it was sued for human rights violations. Unocal’s code is available at  
http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/code_of_conduct/  
62 R.  Howitt,  Explanatory Statement to the Motion for Resolution adopted by the 
Committee on Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament on EU 
Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a 
European Code of Conduct (A 4-0508/98) (17 December 1998) (Describing labour 
abuse in the third world, noting that some companies which abuse third world labour 
have non-binding codes of good conduct which they ignore).  
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ethically works – although such victories are clearly the exception:
63 empirical 
studies have shown that codes of conduct generally do not influence corporate 
behaviour.
64 For example, the non-binding and voluntary Sullivan Code of 
Conduct
65 in South Africa touted
66 during apartheid era South Africa and the 
MacBride principles in Eire
67 had only limited and uncertain impact on their 
target.
68 Empirical studies have also shown that there is a weak correlation or 
no correlation at all between profitability and social responsibility
69 – though 
no study has shown that social responsibility decreases profit.
70 
For these reasons codes of conduct should be viewed with scepticism. Cor-
porations will not regulate themselves into competitive disadvantage. Codes of 
conduct are not however the only corporate governance remedy for human 
rights violations. The shareholder activism model seeks to influence corporate 
behaviour by influencing the corporation or its shareholders to renounce profit-
able exploitation. 
2.  Shareholder Activism through Shareholder Proposals 
The principle legal vehicle of shareholder activism is shareholder’s proposals 
(also known as shareholder resolutions) which are introduced into proxy state-
ments and placed before the shareholders for approval or disapproval.
71 Share-
                                                 
63  “Initially, the multinationals ignored developing- country workers, they paid bribes, 
and they charged the same high price for HIV/AIDS drugs worldwide. Then, at least 
as regards working conditions and anti-HIV/AIDS drugs, the multinationals changed 
their behavior when confronted by collective outrage emanating from a community far 
broader than the corporate world. This community pressure is new, and it did force the 
multinationals' management to take into account constituencies beyond the sharehol-
ders.” Claire Moore Dickerson supra note 169 at 1441. 
64  Erin Elizabeth Macek, supra note 583 at 117 (2002). 
65  Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal Liabilities for Violations of 
International Law, 34 GW Int'l L. Rev. 401, 428 (2002). 
66  For a more laudatory view of Sullivan see: Henry J. Richardson, Reverend Leon Sulli-
van's Principles, Race, and International Law: A Comment 15 Temp. Int'l & Comp. 
L.J. 55, 80 (2001). 
67 MacBride  Principles,  available at,    
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/macbride.html 
68 Beth  Stephens,  The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights, 22 Berkeley Jnl. Int'l. Law 45, 80 (2002). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71  The shareholder’s resolution in the U.S. is based on SEC Rule 14a-8 SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8.  
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holder proposals seek to induce corporate change from within by proposing 
and implementing resolutions which will prohibit the company from abusing 
human rights.
72 A shareholder proposal is a “recommendation or requirement 
that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to 
present at a meeting of the company's shareholders.”
73 Shareholder resolutions 
can be used to amend a corporations bylaws,
74 and to propose action for the 
corporation to take or forego. Shareholder resolutions can be used like a ple-
biscite recommending policies to management or like a referendum presenting 
actions which management must undertake. Ideally, a shareholder resolution 
will influence management to change its practice and even may result in the 
selection of at least one member of the corporate board of directors who will 
represent the interests of the activists. 
Shareholder resolutions and proxy contests to cause, for example, disinvest-
ment can sometimes (but not always)
75 generate results. Rodman demonstrates 
this fact and documents in detail the exact intricacies of bank and corporate 
disinvestment in South Africa – which led and did not follow governmental 
initiatives.
76 He then compares that practice with failed activism in Burma/ 
Myanmar and Nigeria. Successful shareholder resolutions to cause corporate 
change are the exception. Other empirical studies have also concluded that, 
like codes of conduct, shareholder activism is generally not very effective at 
encouraging corporate social responsibility.
77 
                                                 
72 See,  e.g.,  Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 
229, 432 F.2d 659, 662 (1970) (shareholder proposal to stop sale of napalm in part 
because of use in Vietnam) 
73  SEC Rule 14a-8 available at: http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/rule14a-8.html  
74  E.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Coulter, 2002 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 144*. 
75  “Disinvestment, however, had only a minor impact on the South African economy. 
Almost all the departing firms sold their equity stakes... and maintained an ongoing 
licensing relationship… The new firms were no longer bound by their former parent’s 
obligations such as the Sullivan principles.” Id., 28. 
76 Id. at 23-29. 
77 Roberta  Romano,  Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valuable Mechanism 
of Corporate Governance, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, 
Working Paper 12/01 p. 125 (2001) available at:    
http://cerp.unito.it/Pubblicazioni/archivio/WP_CeRP/wp_12.pdf  
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Another remedy against the corporation which violates the principles of 
human rights is to seek revocation of its corporate charter
78 – in the common 
law via the writ of quo warranto
79 or via a proxy contest in which the insurgent 
activists present a resolution for adoption or rejection by other shareholders 
(and note here that the activists would have to be shareholders to wage the 
proxy contest). At least under U.S. law, shareholders must be provided with a 
list of shareholders or the corporation must mail the proxy for them.
80 If the 
shareholders win the proxy contest their costs will be reimbursed.
81 If the 
resolution is adopted by a majority of the shareholders then the management 
has to implement it. Finally, it is worth pointing out that writing binding 
ethical norms into the corporation’s structure could be used as an anti-takeover 
strategy. Socially conscious clauses inserted into the articles of incorporation 
of a company could be used as a “poison pill”
82 to make the corporation less 
attractive to hostile takeover. 
Of course corporate governance remedies do face a serious practical 
difficulty: shareholders and directors have a common cause to enjoy the (ill-
gotten) profits of labour exploitation. So corporate governance as a remedy to 
exploitation alone will not solve the problem of labour exploitation in the third 
world. 
3.  Prohibition of Deceptive Trade Practices 
Another potential remedy of corporate misconduct is to sue the offending 
corporation for deceptive trade practices when it pretends not to exploit 
labour.
83 Both the EU and the US have statutes against deceptive trade prac-
tices. For example, in Kasky v. Nike
84 a shareholder activist sued Nike for de-
ceptive trading practices, essentially alleging that Nike was pretending not to 
exploit third world labour. Securities regulation also punishes fraudulent state-
ments and deceptive omissions. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
78  Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross 
Violations of Human Rights, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 327  (2001). 
79 Ralph  Steinhardt,  Litigating Corporate Responsibility Global Dimensions at:    
http://www.globaldimensions.net/articles/cr/steinhardt.html (2001).  
80  S.E.C. Rule 14a-7. 
81  S.E.C. Rule 14a-8. 
82  For the issue of poison pills in the context of shareholder activism see, e.g., Internatio-
nal Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund. v. Fleming Companies, Inc. No. CIV-96-1650-A, 
1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2980 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24 1997). 
83  Kasky V. Nike, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 259; 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002). 
84 Id.  
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Commission makes false statements in proxy statements
85 and in stock sales
86 
punishable either in tort or by criminal prosecution. Any award resulting from 
such a suit however would go to the first world plaintiffs and not to the third 
world worker – but it would still deter the first world company from violating 
human rights. 
4. Reform  Proposals 
Some reforms have been proposed to increase corporate respect for human 
rights in the fields of taxation, securities regulation, and annual reporting 
requirements of the corporation. These are: 
a. Taxation 
Reforms to encourage respect of human rights could include preferential tax 
treatment
87 or investment credits
88 for ethical companies and penalties for com-
panies which act unethically which already exist in some jurisdictions and are 
even a potential source of revenues for the state. 
b. Securities  Regulations 
Reform proposals also look to national securities regulation for relief. For 
example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires com-
panies to make some information regarding their human rights practices avail-
able to shareholders.
89 Proposals have been made to strengthen disclosure 
requirements, for example by increasing the amount of non-financial informa-
tion about the company which must be disclosed in the annual report or 
proxys.
90 That is hardly radical: U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis advo-
cated increasing non-financial disclosure requirements.
91 Further, full disclo-
                                                 
85  SEC Rule 14a-9. 
86  SEC Rule 10b-5. 
87 See  Howitt,  supra note 601 (Preferential tax status for socially beneficial companies 
in Australia). 
88  Id. (Supplementary export credits for socially responsible Swedish companies). 
89  See, Jane Lampman "Human rights groups gain ‘disclosure’ victory on Wall", 
Christian Science Monitor, at   
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/05/17/fp14s1-csm.shtml (May 17, 2001). 
90 Note,  Should The SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1433, 1455 (2002). There is controversy as to whether SEC disclosure require-
ments are obligatory. 
91 Cynthia  A.  Williams,  The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1311  (1999) (arguing that SEC has the power  
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sure will increase economic information to investors
92 which makes good eco-
nomic sense, because it reduces transaction costs by enabling buyers and 
sellers to make correct decisions based on complete information. Most efforts 
before the SEC have focused not on financial disclosure but – and with some 
success – on shareholders’ rights to propose resolutions for adoption by the 
company.
 93 
c.  Annual Reporting Requirements / Social Audits 
In addition to reforms of the tax system and securities disclosure requirements 
another law reform would be to require corporations to perform an annual 
social audit along with the ordinary annual report to outline the companies 
human rights policy and record.
94 Social audits could be included in a com-
panies annual report at little cost and would provide investors valuable infor-
mation about the moral practices of the company: A company which acts un-
ethically outside of U.S. territory is likelier to behave unethically at home and 
one which respects human rights is more likely to be a secure long term 
investment. 
In sum, there are a variety of market incentives which can be introduced 
into national law to discourage unethical corporate behaviour. Such laws, 
coupled with universal jurisdiction,
95 would be an effective method of improv-
ing business practices and possibly profitability as well. 
                                                                                                                                                      
and that it is economical to require full disclosure, quoting Justice Brandeis: "Publicity 
is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.") id. at 1212). 
92  Id. 
93  Jim Schiro, CEO, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, “United States Securities & Exchange 
Commission Hearing on Auditor Independence”, available at    
http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/audmin3.htm  
(September 20, 2000) (Today, unlike ten years ago, investors want to know intangible 
assets of companies). 
94  Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper – Promoting a European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (COM (2001) 366 Final, 18/7/2001) 
(Increasing se of social and environmental checklists by financial institutions to 
evaluate loans to and investments; Social responsabiltiy can have financial advan-
tages). 
95  See, e.g. Larry D. Newman, Rico and the Russian Mafia: Toward a New Universal 
Principle under International Law, Excerpt from:  9 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 225, 
225 (1998). Also note that transnational crime is yet another challenge to the West-
phalian order.  
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C. Lex  Mercatoria 
We have seen that the regulation of corporations either under civil or criminal 
theories is far from perfect. However we have also noted that there are several 
market incentives that can be taken advantage of in practice. This has led some 
to suggest that we are witnessing the rise of a new lex mercatoria (Steinhardt,
96 
Gessner).
97 
Unfortunately attempts to analogise corporate liability for violations of 
human Rights law to medieval lex mercatoria are ill founded. This is because 
the analogy is factually incorrect, theoretically inapposite, and not practically 
workable. 
Medieval  lex mercatoria featured specialised courts which served the 
interests of merchants (not consumers).
98 It was fundamentally a private law of 
contract and arbitration. This is very different from contemporary human rights 
law. While there has been a revolution in human rights since 1945
99 as a result 
of the transformation of the Westphalian state system it cannot realistically be 
compared to lex mercatoria. Lex mercatoria concerned only private parties, 
was binding and was a result of voluntary agreement. None of that is true of 
contemporary human rights law. Though the corporate social responsibility 
movement proposes codes of conduct to govern private behavior but these 
codes are voluntary non-binding. The human rights system also features bind-
ing norms, however those norms are imposed by states or international organi-
sations not due to voluntary agreement.For these reasons the analogy between 
contemporary human rights law and lex mercatoria is inexact. Further corpora-
tions are not the leading force of protection of human rights. We need only 
                                                 
96  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Litigating Corporate Responsibility, Global Dimensions (2001) 
at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/seminars/humanRightsAndCorpor
ateResponsibility/steinhardtTranscript.htm,  
supra note 618. 
97  See, e.g. Volkmar Gessner & Ali Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Stu-
dies on the Globalisation of Law (1998). However Prof. Gessner does not go so far as 
to say that the emerging global private law regime necessarily protects human rights. 
98  See Professor Chinkin’s critique of the theory that modern human rights law be 
analagous to lex mercatoria in Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights, Global 
Dimensions seminar at the United Nations New York 1st June 2001 at    
http://www.globaldimensions.net/articles/cr/summary.html#lex 
99 Douglass  Cassel,  Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1963, 1984 (1996) (Argues that second half of XXth century wit-
nessed a second human rights revolution).  
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look at the facts in Doe v. Unocal
100 or Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell
101 to recog-
nise that corporations can and do profit from exploiting third world labour. To 
expect them to do otherwise in the absence of state sanction is naive or dis-
ingenuous. 
Not only is the analogy between lex mercatoria and the corporate social 
responsibility movement factually incorrect it is also theoretically inapt. 
Market mechanisms based on alienable property rights cannot logically be the 
foundation of a system of protection of inalienable human rights. 
Another practical objection to the comparison of modern human rights and 
medieval lex mercatoria is that human rights guarantees are not necessary to 
maintain a functioning market. Since market rights are neither in theory nor in 
practice the cause of human rights, attempts to ground, model or analogise 
human rights and market rights are inapt. There is a correlation between 
economic development and human rights but human rights arise out of eco-
nomic development, not market transactions. It is all to easy to imagine fascist 
dictatorships with nicely functioning markets. The correlation between human 
rights and market rights is weak or even non-existent. 
Though human rights and property rights may coexist they are not neces-
sarily mutually reinforcing. After all it is the property right of first world 
corporations which impels them to violate the human rights of workers and 
consumers in the third world. 
For all of these reasons the analogy between modern human rights law and 
medieval lex mercatoria is inapt. There are some market remedies available to 
human rights law. But those must be seen as the carrot in a carrot and stick 
approach which will require active state sanctions in order to function. Lex 
mercatoria in contrast concerned voluntary transactions between private 
persons. 
Conclusion 
Codes of conduct alone are not the best way to prevent human rights abuse in 
the third world because voluntary codes of good conduct can be used as 
camouflage to delay, confuse and conceal real reform, and because expecting 
corporations to self regulate is realistic only when it links ethical conduct and 
profitability. However codes of good conduct, in combination with binding 
rules – either in civil or criminal law – can be used to promote higher standards 
                                                 
100  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13327 (9
th Cir., 2002). 
101  226 F.3d 88, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23274.  
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while the binding rules will guaranty at least minimum standards.
102 The cor-
porate social responsibility movement is not necessarily merely a smokescreen 
but alone will not prevent human rights abuses because such abuses are profit-
able. To some limited extent investor, consumer, and corporate self interest can 
be harnessed to serve human rights, for example via shareholder activism.
103 
Codes of good conduct and labelling schemes are just one of several efforts to 
link profitability and social responsibility.
104 Combined with the international 
law instruments discussed in the first part of the thesis they may be a way to 
encourage higher standards while the positive law guarantees at least bare 
minimum standards. Here, as in human rights conventions, “hard” law guaran-
tee minimum standards minima and voluntary codes (or conventions) encou-
rage higher standards. The fact that the corporation has long since escaped 
regulation within the Westphalian model explains why that model is trans-
forming into a “spectrum” of actors and a system of global governance. Cor-
porate social responsibility and shareholder activism will increasingly feature 
as one element of this new system. 
                                                 
102 EU,  supra note 558. 
103  Prof. Ralph Steinhardt distinguishes between a market based regime, domestic 
regulation, international regulation, and civil liability. Ralph Steinhardt, Litigating 
Corporate Responsibility, Global Dimensions (June, 2001) at:    
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/seminars/humanRightsAndCorpor
ateResponsibility/steinhardtTranscript.htm,  
supra note 618. 
104  Liubicic, supra note 580 at 117.  
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Chapter V 
Alien Torts in Europe? 
Human Rights and Tort in European Law 
Abstract: 
Human rights are universally recognized. Their enforcement, however, often 
requires the action of particular states. This paper examines private law reme-
dies in tort in several Member states of the European Union to remedy human 
rights violations occurring outside the European Union. It concludes that the 
laws examined are examples of universal jurisdiction and rights and duties of 
private persons under international law, which are two key elements of the 
post-Westphalian state system.
  
                                                 
This Chapter appeared as Discussion Paper 1/2005 of the Center for European Law and 
Policy (ZERP) at the University of Bremen. 
I wish to thank all persons at the ZERP for the opportunity to present these ideas here. I 
particularly wish to thank Dr. Josef Falke for his painstaking and tireless revision of my 
work and Mrs. Antje Kautz for her patience and meticulous editing.  
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Part I:  Private Law Protection of Human Rights in various Member 
States of the European Union 
Introduction 
One of the principle remedies in U.S. law for violations of human rights is the 
private law of torts. In fact, torts appear in practice to be the almost exclusive 
remedy to extraterritorial torts which violate human rights in U.S. law.
1 This is 
not to say that there is no possibility of penal sanction for human rights viola-
tions in U.S. law. Indeed, there is a torture statute in U.S. federal criminal law.
2 
However, that statute is rarely if ever invoked. Similarly, as in Britain, a 
federal statute outlaws hostage taking under a theory of universal jurisdiction.
3 
Again, that statute is only rarely invoked.
4 
In Europe, in contrast, the principal remedy for violations of basic human 
right is penal law. But though penal law is the principal remedy for human 
rights violations in Europe tort also plays a role as a remedy for human rights 
violations both overseas and in Europe. Various national laws and even, to a 
lesser extent, European and international law offer limited but significant 
secondary private law remedies. Thus, in terms of remedies, European and 
American law are each others’ mirrors. However, both legal systems, though 
using different legal methods, are ultimately seeking to deter and punish simi-
lar fact patterns. This raises the question whether human rights violations are 
best seen as torts, crimes, or both. In fact, the two systems of control can and 
should be mutually reinforcing and complementary. This is because tort 
                                                 
*  All URLs in footnotes were last visited February 1, 2005. 
1  “[T]here are no significant criminal cases for torture and crimes against humanity in 
the United States despite the legality of such prosecutions. Pursuant to the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” 
Beth van Schaack, In Defence of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human 
Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 Harv. 
Int’l. L. J. 141, 148-149 (Winter, 2001). 
2  The statute states: “Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit 
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if 
death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished 
by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340a (1994). 
3  The Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). (Universal jurisdiction over indi-
viduals who, “whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and 
threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a 
third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act”). 
4 See,  e.g.,  United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (jurisdiction over 
accused hijacker proper under Hostage-Taking Act).  
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remedies have certain advantages over penal remedies: one of tort's principal 
strengths is that it preserves the limited resources of the state’s prosecutor. Tort 
remedies also allow complaints to be made even where such complaints are – 
generally for economic reasons – politically unpopular. At the same time, how-
ever, some wrongful acts deserve not merely economic sanction but also depri-
vation of liberty. Thus there clearly is a place for criminal law in the regulation 
of the most extreme violations of human rights. Both penal and civil law have 
advantages and disadvantages as remedies and should operate in conjunction 
as complements to each other. Both U.S. and European law would be impro-
ved by a careful consideration of each others’ legal remedies. Such a compari-
son would also improve the state of human rights globally. If ever there were a 
sense and purpose of comparative law and global governance that is it. 
The normative recommendation of this work is that both Europe and Ame-
rica should extend and expand their protection of victims of tortuous violation 
of basic human rights wherever violations of those rights occur. Many victims 
of violations of fundamental human rights live in the third world. Many third 
world countries suffer from corrupt governments and overburdened courts. The 
economic and political inequalities between, say, poor peasants on the one 
hand and wealthy multinational companies and/or governments on the other 
explain why, practically speaking, there is often no remedy for basic violations 
of human rights in the third world. Even if there were no corruption in any 
third world country the fact that systematic violations of human rights can be 
very profitable explains why such rights must be protected in the first world. 
After all, it is the first world which profits from unfair and in fact predatory 
labour practices in the third world. While the U.S. and Europe are already 
making efforts in the direction of global human rights governance the tempo of 
global governance in the interest of human rights will be increased as each of 
the transatlantic partners perceives the benefits of objective comparative legal 
analysis on legal policy making. 
Our analysis of remedies in tort for individuals in European law will first 
consider the law of the Member States then European law. This is because: 
1) The principal remedies are in fact in national law, though complementary 
remedies do exist at the EU as well. 2) The principle of subsidiarity places 
primacy on the laws of the Member States. 3) The law of the European Union 
incorporates the general principles of law of the Member States into its own 
general principles. After we conclude our consideration of the laws of the 
Member States we will then consider the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  
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I.  The Common Law: Tort Remedies to Human Rights  
Violations in Britain 
Our analysis begins with the common law where we use Britain as the examp-
le. This methodological approach might at first appear erroneous: There are 
few common law jurisdictions in the EU. Of countries in the EU only Britain, 
Ireland, Malta and perhaps Cyprus can claim to be common law jurisdictions. 
We begin with British law because judicial review of domestic laws against the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) via the British Human Rights 
Act will almost certainly result in the importation of constitutional law doctri-
nes from the U.S. to the U.K.; where they may in turn find themselves drawn 
on for interpreting community law. 
Just as U.S. law draws on British and other common law jurisdictions as 
persuasive evidence of the common law, so also do British courts draw on U.S. 
as persuasive evidence of British common law. This can be seen clearly just by 
examining the Pinochet cases. For example, in the final Pinochet decision on 
the merits
5, the House of Lords cited literally a half dozen U.S. cases as per-
suasive evidence of British law or of how British law should be interpreted.
6 
The original Pinochet case was even more generous in its citation of U.S. 
authority. It is not merely the raw quantity of cases that are cited by the British 
courts that explain the importance of U.S. law for Europe, however. It is also 
the fact that many legal concepts exist in both British and U.S. law and that 
these doctrines are the same or so nearly similar as to explain the extensive 
citation of U.S. cases by British courts and lawyers. Similarly, U.S. courts also 
cite British cases as persuasive evidence of what the law is or how it should be 
                                                 
5  Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No.  3) (24 March, 1999) 1 A.C. 147 (House of Lords, 2000) 
(hereafter Pinochet 3). 
6  The cases cited by the court were: Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corporation (1989) 109 S. Ct. 683; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky (1985) 603 F. Supp. 1468; 
776 F.2d 571; Jimenez v. Aristeguieta (1962) 311 F.2d 547; Lafontant v. Aristide (1994) 
844 F. Supp. 128; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 26 F.3d 1166; Saltany v. 
Reagan (1988) 702 F. Supp. 319; Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F. 
Supp. 1108; Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon (1812) 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116; Siderman 
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992) 965 F.2d 699; and United States of America v. 
Noriega (1990) 746 F. Supp. 1506; (1997) 117 F.3d 1206. This is not considering cases 
cited by the litigants nor U.S. cases cited in the other Pinochet cases!  
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interpreted.
7 This should be hardly surprising as the common law is one legal 
system with common sources and methods of finding and interpreting law. 
A.  Common Law Doctrines Common to both British and U.S. Law in 
Transnational Law 
1. Immunity 
The British State Immunity Act
8 and the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, are one example where even U.S. and British legislation run in parallel. In 
fact, in Pinochet 3, the House of Lords cited an interpretation of the U.S. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities act (enacted in 1976) as evidence of the correct 
interpretation of the British State Immunity Act of 1978.
9 The House of Lords, 
like the U.S. courts, noted the bifurcation of immunity into commercial acts 
(acto jure gestiones) and sovereign acts (acto jure imperii) which is of course 
also the position of international law.
10 There are also parallels between the 
Hostage Taking Acts in U.S. and British law. These are far from the only 
statutory similarities. These similarities track similarities in customary law, 
constitutional law, sources of law and legal methods and doctrines. Let us 
examine some doctrines of law that illustrate that the British and American law 
parallel each other as they are common law jurisdictions. 
2.  Act of State Doctrine 
The Act of State doctrine is essentially the same in British law as in American. 
”[C]ourts will not sit in judgment on the act of a foreign sovereign performed 
within the territories of that sovereign”
11 – which is in fact just about word for 
word the same formulation found in U.S. law. The House of Lords in Pinochet 
3 again cites U.S. authority in its elucidation of the meaning of the Act of State 
doctrine, noting that though the two doctrines are distinct in English law, in 
                                                 
7 See,  e.g.  Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (June 26, 2003), available at:  
<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/26jun20031200/www.supremecourtus.gov/opi
nions/02pdf/02-102.pdf and at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html>. 
8  UK State Immunities Act, 20th July 1978, available at:  
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID%20Documents/rp04
038.html>. 
9  Pinochet 3, at161. 
10  Id. The court again cites U.S. case law, namely Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 88 I.L.R. 189. 
11  Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1848) 2 H.L.Cas. 1.  
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U.S. law they have not always been treated as separate from each other.
12 More 
significantly, the House of Lords in Pinochet 3 also cites to Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala
13 as evidence to justify its rejection of the notion that the Act of State 
doctrine bars proceedings against an individual for acts of torture:
14 This 
citation of U.S. authority as persuasive evidence of British law is hardly 
idiosyncratic: Citation to U.S. cases occurs extensively in the initial vacated 
Pinochet decision.
15 That decision was vacated not due to any substantive error 
but rather due to a procedural error of form: Lord Hoffman’s did not disclose 
his wife's ties to Amnesty International. Substantively, as to the Act of State 
doctrine in English law, Lord Slynn of Hadley noted that “the position is much 
the same as it was in the earlier statements of the United States courts”.
16 
3. Comity 
Comity exists in British law just as it does in American law. Again, its mean-
ing is nearly exactly the same: The rules of comity are “the accepted rules of 
mutual conduct as between state and state which each state adopts in relation 
to other states and expects other states to adopt in relation to each other”.
17 In 
the context of jurisdiction, “[t]he rules of comity require that the United 
Kingdom does not assert or assist in the assertion of jurisdiction over the 
internal acts of a foreign state”.
18  
                                                 
12  Pinochet 3, at 159, citing Kirkpatrick & Co. Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics 
Corporation International (1990) 110 S. Ct. 701; 493 U.S. 400, 405. 
13  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876; 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16111 (2d. Cir., 1980) 
(hereafter Filartiga). The House of Lords also cites Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (1994) 25 
F.3d 1467 and Liu v. Republic of China (1989) 892 F.2d 1419 for the proposition that the 
Act of State doctrine will not bar proceedings against individuals for acts of torture and 
that neither doctrine bars inquiry into conduct that violates fundamental human rights. 
14  Pinochet 3, at 159, citing Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. (unrepor-
ted), 29 July 1998; Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucarera Nacional 
S.A. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 and Letelier v. Republic of Chile (1980) 488 F. Supp. 
665. Again, note that the British court is citing U.S. law as authority for the legal 
position of the common law. 
15  Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 61, 85 (House of Lords, 25 Nov. 1998 – judgement vacated 
for rehearing) (hereafter Pinochet 1). 
16  Id. 
17  Buck v. The Attorney General [1965] 1 Ch. 745, [1965] 1 All ER 882 at 770. 
18  Pinochet 3, at 172, citing I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 A.C. 244; Buck v. Attorney-
General [1965] Ch. 745.  
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4.  Forum non conveniens 
Forum non conveniens in British law is, again, very similar to comity in U.S. 
law. In discussing forum non conveniens in British law the House of Lords has 
stated: 
“Where a plaintiff sues a defendant as of right in the English court and the 
defendant applies to stay the proceedings on grounds of forum non conveni-
ens, the principles to be applied by the English court in deciding that appli-
cation in any case not governed by Article 2 of the Brussels Convention are 
not in doubt. They derive from the judgment of Lord Kinnear in Sim v. Robi-
now (1892) 19 R. 665 at 668 where he said: ‘the plea can never be sustained 
unless the court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having competent 
jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of 
all the parties and for the ends of justice.’”
19 
However, though the court looks to the interest of the plaintiff and defendant 
as well as the ends of justice it does not, unlike U.S. courts, consider public 
interest or public policy.
20 Thus, while both the U.S. and British courts engage 
in a balancing of several different factors to determine whether the forum is 
inconvenient, the number of factors in the British formulation of forum non 
conveniens is more limited than is the case in the U.S. 
5.  International Law and the Common Law 
Just as in the U.S., customary international law is an integral part of British 
common law. In the final Pinochet decision on the merits of extradition the 
House of Lords held: “The English courts are open to the concept of consulting 
customary international law, as it has evolved over time, as a basis for the 
common law.”
21 However, though customary international law is a part of the 
common law Britain, like the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions,
22 is a 
                                                 
19  Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] UKHL 41; [2000] 4 All 
ER 268; [2000] WLR 1545 (20th July, 2000), available at: <http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/41.html&query=%22forum+non+ 
conveniens%22&method=all>. 
20  Id. 
21  Pinochet 3, at 161, citing Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria 
[1977] Q.B.529, 551-554, 576-579; I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 A.C. 244, 261 
and Littrell v. United States of America (No. 2) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 82. 
22  “While Australia, as a common-law country, operates the general dualist approach to 
the domestic effect of international agreements, it does not appear from the judgments 
of the High Court that Australian law replicates that rule with anything quite like the 
constitutional rigour with which it is embodied in article 26 section 6 of the  
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dualist legal system as to treaty law. That is, treaties must be incorporated into 
domestic law via an enabling act and are not presumed to have direct domestic 
effect until Parliament (or Congress) passes legislation giving the treaty such 
effect.
23 The two legal systems are very similar, at times congruent, and 
mutually referencing in their evolution not only as to their sources of law, 
hierarchisation of norms, but also as to their inferential and interpretive 
methods, even as to positive statute law. Thus U.S. law has a certain indirect 
relevance to Europe. 
B.  Extraterritorial Human RightsProtection in Domestic 
British Law: The Pinochet Cases 
Pinochet, former dictator of Chile, was accused by prosecutors in Spain of 
committing murder and conspiracy to murder as well as of conspiring to com-
mit acts of torture.
24 The result of the case may seem unsatisfactory: Pinochet 
was ultimately allowed to retire in comfort due to ill health.
25 However, the 
legal issues determined in the case present some hopeful indicators for the 
future of human rights. 
The issue to be decided in Pinochet was whether Pinochet could be extra-
dited for crimes he was accused which took place in Chile, Spain and in other 
countries or whether Pinochet enjoyed immunity as a head of state and thus 
could not be extradited. Thus the central issue in Pinochet, the extent of the 
immunity of a former head of state, was essentially the same issue seen in 
                                                                                                                                                      
Constitution”, Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] IESC 11 (Supreme 
Ct. Eire, 01 March 2002), para 25. 
23  “Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is 
not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by 
legislation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res inter alios acta from which 
they cannot derive rights and by which they cannot be deprived of rights or subjected 
to obligations; and it is outside the purview of the court not only because it is made in 
the conduct of foreign relations, which are a prerogative of the Crown, but also 
because, as a source of rights and obligations, it is irrelevant.” Lord Oliver of 
Aylmerton in J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry 
(the 'International Tin Council case') [1990] 2 AC 418, 500. 
24  Pinochet 1, at, 85 (House of Lords, 25 Nov. 1998 – judgement vacated for rehearing). 
25  R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte The Kingdom of Belgium; 
R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amnesty International 
Limited and others, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/236/2000, 
CO/238/2000, (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (15 February 2000).  
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Congo v. Belgium
26 and Ariel Sharon’s case. The House of Lords ruled that it 
is clearly
27 the case that a former head of state is immune for official acts 
during his term of office even after that office has expired.
28 Similarly it is 
almost as clear that any criminalacts undertaken for the personal benefit of the 
head of state are not subject to immunity. The court had no difficulty 
concluding that “[a] former head of state cannot have immunity for acts of 
murder committed outside his own territory”.
29 
The difficult factual question in Pinochet is whether the acts of torture 
undertaken by Pinochet’s government were official acts of the state or rather 
were personal acts of Pinochet. Pinochet did not personally torture or murder – 
rather he ordered his subordinates to do so for him. Were his motives sadistic? 
Such motives, if present, would be evidence of an act undertaken for personal 
benefit and thus not subject to immunity. This question was considered in the 
initial court decision. That decision was, however, vacated due to a procedural 
impropriety – Lord Hoffmann ought to have excused himself, or at least 
disclose the fact that he
30 and his spouse did charitable work for one branch of 
Amnesty International. The question was not as to any improper bias on the 
part of Lord Hoffmann
31 but rather as to any appearance of impropriety. The 
court rightly vacated the original judgment because it is “of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done.”
32 
The difficult legal issue in Pinochet was whether a head of state can be 
liable for acts of torture (and, by extension, other acts in violation of jus 
cogens) after the expiry of his or her term of office. The court reasoned that: 
the prohibition of torture internationally is jus cogens; that any act in violation 
                                                 
26  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), ICJ 14/II/2002, 2000 I.C.J. 121, 18 (Feb. 14), available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_toc.htm. 
27  “The immunity of an existing head of state for acts performed in his governmental 
capacity is well recognised.” Pinochet 3, at 173. 
28  “A former head of state only has immunity with regard to his acts as a head of state 
but not with regard to acts which fall outside his role as head of state.” Id., at 154. 
29  Id. 
30  Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte. 
Pinochet [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (House of Lords, 1999) (hereafter Pinochet 2), at 129. 
31  Id., at 132 and 146. 
32  Id., at 135 citing Rex v. Susex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924], 1 K.B. 256, 259.  
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of jus cogens cannot be immunized
33; and that as a consequence no act of 
torture can be immunized. The court reaches this conclusion because: “Certain 
crimes are deemed so odious that no reticence in involving the United King-
dom in the internal disputes of foreign states would be shown in relation to 
them.”
34 The court thus rejected the argument that head of state immunity 
would prevent prosecution (and thus extradition) for perfectly logical reasons 
because international law does not command a state to accord immunity to a 
former head of state for acts which are prohibited under international law, a 
fortiori where such crimes result in individual liability.
35 Simply put: “Neither 
a former head of state nor a current head of state can have immunity from 
criminal proceedings in respect of acts which constitute crimes under 
international law.”
36 Any other view would be illogical and frustrate the 
purpose of the Convention Against Torture (CAT). As we shall see, however, 
this holding may be in conflict with the case of Congo v. Belgium which was 
later decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (infra). 
Could Pinochet have argued that he should not be extradited on the grounds 
of comity? Probably not. This is because of the international maxim “aut 
dedere aut adjudicare” – states must either extradite or prosecute those who 
commit international crimes.
37 This maxim of international customary law has 
direct effect in Britain since customary international law is part of the common 
law.
38 Further, immunity should be distinguished from comity. Comity, 
whether in British or U.S. law, is a courtesy extended by one state to another in 
mutual respect and may be withdrawn unilaterally. In contrast, while American 
courts regard head of state immunity of de facto states as a privilege extended 
and not a right (e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic. Karadzic;),
39 other courts appear to 
consider state immunity as a corollary to sovereign equality and the head of 
state and diplomatic immunities as emanations thereof, and thus a duty. The 
importance of the distinction can be seen in Congo v. Belgium and Pinochet 3. 
In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ seems to think that the principle of immunity 
                                                 
33  “International law recognises crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention 
says that no circumstances can be invoked as justification for torture. Therefore it 
cannot be a part of the function of a head of state under international law to commit 
those crimes.” Pinochet 3, at 154. 
34  Id., at 155. 
35  Id. 
36  Id., at 160. 
37  Pinochet 3, at 154. 
38  Pinochet 3, at 154. 
39  70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S 1005 (1996).  
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arises out of the principle of sovereign equality and thus may be non-
derogable. In contrast, in Pinochet 3, the rule of non-intervention, which also 
arises out of the sovereign equality of states was not regarded as a jus cogens 
rule because the duty of non-intervention increasingly admits of exceptions.
40 
That is a logical contradiction. 
The view of the court in Pinochet 3 is the better view because it reflects 
actual state practice and serves the goal of protecting human rights, a good 
common to all persons. States are legal fictions created by people to provide 
the citizen with, in Aristotle’s words, the means to the good life.
41 Thus where 
we see a conflict between a legal fiction and an actual reprehensible act we 
should be willing to construct the interpretation of the legal fiction as a 
function of the end that it serves – which is another argument that in fact the 
norm against torture should be hierarchically superior to the norm of sovereign 
equality. All states are subject to the norm against torture and thus their 
sovereign equality is respected even when that sovereignty is limited by 
universal obligations of all states to each other and/or the international system. 
In Pinochet 3 the court determined that if there were any customary inter-
national law against conspiracy to commit torture then Pinochet could be cri-
minally liable for his acts prior to becoming Chile’s head of state. The court 
also ruled that Pinochet could be held liable for actions committed after Chile’s 
accession to the Convention Against Torture in 1984 despite the fact that Chile 
had granted amnesty to all state criminals.
42 So the difficult issue is whether he 
could also be liable for acts of torture committed while head of state. Of 
course, to determine the extradition issue the court did not actually need to ans-
wer this question: having found extraditable crimes prior to and after the term 
                                                 
40  “[D]uring the course of the century the treatment by a state of its own citizens, at least 
in certain areas of fundamental importance, has ceased to be regarded as a matter of 
internal affairs. The violation of a norm of jus cogens certainly is not so regarded.” 
Pinochet 3, at 186. 
41 Aristotle,  Politics, Book I, Part II, Para. 9: “When several villages are united in a 
single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state 
comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence 
for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so 
is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each 
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a 
horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be 
self-sufficing is the end and the best.” available at:    
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.mb.txt> (translation by Benjamin Jowett). 
42  Pinochet 3, at 158.  
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of office of Pinochet he would be able to be extradited. The logic of the court, 
however, would compel a conclusion that Pinochet should even be liable for 
those crimes committed during his tenure as head of state because “Internatio-
nal law recognizes crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention says 
that no circumstances can be invoked as justification for torture. Therefore it 
cannot be a part of the function of a head of state under international law to 
commit those crimes.”
43 The court considers it “inconceivable” that the Torture 
Convention would somehow exempt those who order mass murder from 
liability.
44 The court notes that the universal jurisdiction against torturers is 
consistent with international law stating that: “Article 8(4) [of the Convention 
Against Torture] combined with Article 5 amounts to an acknowledgment that 
offences of torture committed in one state can be regarded as having taken 
place in the state of which the victim is a national.”
45 
The court in Pinochet 3 ultimately ruled that Pinochet would enjoy immu-
nity for acts prior to Chile’s signature of the convention against torture. This is 
not, however, because the court determined the difficult factual issue – whe-
ther the acts of torture were official or personal acts. Nor did the court deter-
mine the difficult legal issue – whether the norm against torture is hierarchi-
cally superior to the norm of sovereign equality. Instead the court determined 
that it did not need to answer these questions because in any event the 
conspiracy, torture, and murders were not at the time of their occurrence 
violations of British law and thus did not meet the standard of double 
actionability and thus were not extraditable offences. However, the court also 
states: 
“Crimes against humanity are crimes not against a state but against individu-
als and are triable anywhere. Until recently there were almost no international 
tribunals so international crimes could be tried only before a national court. 
Even in 1946 the concept of territoriality of jurisdiction for crimes against 
humanity was not really in issue.”
46 
In further justification of its decision, the court notes that Chilean domestic law 
has outlawed torture and that Chile has acceded to the Convention Against 
Torture and thus that the case is not one of a state forcing its laws on another 
but of punishing behaviour which is universally accepted as abhorrent and 
                                                 
43 Id.,  at 154. 
44  Id. 
45 Id. 
46  Id., at 157.  
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criminal.
47 Though the great majority of the claims against Pinochet would not 
have been punishable offences in Britain some were and thus, in theory, Pino-
chet was liable to extradition. In fact, however, he was not due to his advanced 
age and supposed infirmity. 
What are we to make of this decision? The legal conclusions in Pinochet 3 
are, perhaps surprisingly, very favourable to human rights despite the fact that 
Pinochet remains unpunished. Practically speaking though, Pinochet’s case, 
like that of Congo v. Belgium or France v. Khaddafy
48 or Sharon’s cases
49 or 
Habré’s case,
50 is evidence of the great reluctance of states to subject the lea-
ders of other states to personal liability for crimes against the law of nations. 
However, the efforts made by the dissenting Lords in Pinochet 1 to distinguish 
the “special jurisdiction” of international criminal tribunals as somehow “ex-
cepional” and thus limit human rights claims to international tribunals ring hol-
low. Lord Slynn in Pinochet 1 states: 
“There is thus no doubt that states have been moving towards the recognition 
of some crimes as those which should not be covered by claims of state or 
head of state or other official or diplomatic immunity when charges are 
brought before international tribunals. 
… 
It has to be said, however, at this stage of the development of international 
law that some of those statements read as aspirations, as embryonic. It does 
not seem to me that it has been shown that there is any state practice or 
general consensus let alone a widely supported convention that all crimes 
against international law should be justifiable in national courts on the basis of 
the universality of jurisdiction. Nor is there any jus cogens in respect of such 
breaches of international law which require that a claim of state or head of 
state immunity, itself a well-established principle of international law, should 
                                                 
47  Id., at 159. 
48  Arrêt du 13 mars 2001, no 1414, relatif aux poursuites engagées contre le colonel 
Kadhaffi (hereafter Kadhaffi). 
49  Sharon, Ariel, Yaron, Amos et Autres, Arrêt de la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, 
26/6/2002  available at: <http://www.sabra-shatila.be/documents/arrest020626.pdf>; 
Belgium Supreme Court, 22 February 2001; Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 12 Fevrier, 
2003 unofficial English translation available at:  
<http://www.indictsharon.net/12feb2003dectrans.pdf>; Procureur contre Ariel Sharon 
et Consorts, Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 24/9/2003, available at:   
<http://www.coeicl.de/dokumente/sharon_judgement_240903_juris_cass_a1.pdf>. 
50  Arrêt n' 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000); 
Arrêt n' 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal (Cour de Cassation, 2001).  
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be overridden. 
That international law crimes should be tried before international tribunals or 
in the perpetrator's own state is one thing; that they should be impleaded 
without regard to a long-established customary international law rule in the 
courts of other states is another. It is significant that in respect of serious 
breaches of “intransgressible principles of international customary law” when 
tribunals have been set up it is with carefully defined powers and 
jurisdictionas accorded by the states involved; that the Genocide Convention 
provides only for jurisdiction before an international tribunal or the courts of 
the state where the crime is committed, that the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court lays down jurisdiction for crimes in very specific 
terms but limits its jurisdiction to future acts.”
51 
But this ignores one question and several facts: from where do international 
tribunals derive their legitimacy? It also ignores that the norms against geno-
cide, torture and similar international crimes are themselves jus cogens. Thus 
we are faced with a conflict between the norms of non-intervention and 
sovereign equality – both of which increasingly admit of exceptions on the one 
hand, and the norms against genocide, war crimes and torture on the other. 
Hierarchically each of these norms may at first appear equivalent because they 
are all jus cogens. However, practically it is clear that the doctrine of sovereign 
equality and immunity increasingly admits exceptions and thus logically is not 
in fact jus cogens. In contrast, the norms against genocide, war crimes, and 
torture appear to admit of no exception. Finally, morally, there is no contest: 
international crimes are reprehensible, as are the artificial legal constructs 
which shield them. 
In fact international criminal tribunals’ jurisdictional power has always 
been justified not on historical practice but on the fact that the crimes adjudi-
cated are so grievous as to be obviously universally reprehensible and thus uni-
versally punishable. That is of course a jus naturale argument, though no one 
wants to admit it.
52 Asserting that international criminal tribunals somehow are 
exceptional and not expressive of valid rules of international law (why?) is not 
only legally questionable it also renders the legitimacy of international crimi-
nal tribunals even more questionable giving rise to accusations that such tribu-
                                                 
51  Pinochet 1. 
52  “Where… neither treaty nor customary international law is available or applicable, the 
appeal to higher legal norms must be phrased as an appeal to natural law; and of 
course the conceptual and jurisprudential boundaries between customary jus cogens 
norms and natural law norms are notoriously vague.” Eric Posner, Transitional Justice 
As Ordinary Justice, Harv. L. Rev. 117 HVLR 761, 794 (January, 2004).  
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nals are nothing other than “victors’ justice”. 
Synthesis 
For all its similarities to U.S. law Britain appears, on first glance, to offer 
fewer remedies for extra-territorial violations of human rights. We have just 
seen, however, that there are at least criminal law remedies in British domestic 
law for overseas violations of jus cogens norms. But there seems to be no 
equivalent to the Alien Tort Statute
53 or Torture Victims Protection Act
54 in 
British law. Does this mean that alien tort claims cannot be litigated in the 
U.K.? Hardly. There are three ways an alien tort claim could be litigated: first, 
by relying on customary international law; second, by relying on the ordinary 
rules of domestic British tort law; third, based on the Human Rights Act and 
ECHR. The arguments based on the ECHR are considered in the next chapter. 
We will look at the first two arguments in detail here as they are remedies 
within national law. 
1.  Arguments for Torts in the Common Law Based on Crimes in  
Customary International Law 
As to the argument on customary international law it runs as follows: Inter-
national law recognizes the existence of crimes and torts with appurtenant indi-
vidual liability. Customary international law is an integral part of the common 
law. While customary international law – like custom generally in the common 
law – can be overruled by statute it also requires no enabling act to be enfor-
ced. International custom does, however, require the ordinary elements of cus-
tom: practice over a long period of time and opinio juris. For every common 
law crime there is a corresponding common law intentional tort. Thus, all cri-
mes under customary international law entail corresponding torts in common 
law. 
To argue that the above logic is invalid because international law supposed-
ly only binds states ignores long standing state practice. Even in classical inter-
national law piracy
55 and slave trading were crimes and torts in violation of the 
law of nations. International law also recognizes individual tort liability in the 
case of capture of enemy ships during time of war, i.e. the “prize” jurisdiction 
                                                 
53  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
54  Pub. L. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73. 
55  In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586.  
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of admiralty courts.
56 In contemporary international law a host of further cri-
mes against peace, war crimes, genocidal acts and torture have been added to 
the list of acts which inculpate individuals in tort and crime.
57 
The clear trend in the last half century has been toward recognition of rights 
and duties held directly by individuals arising out of international law. Torts 
and crimes in violation of the law of nations almost always benefit from uni-
versal jurisdiction, even universal jurisdiction in absentia, which explains the 
advantage of this theory for plaintiffs. 
Returning then to the argument that international crimes imply correspond-
ing common law torts we can see the logic of this argument through two 
syllogisms: 
SYLLOGISM 1: 
Major premise:  
There are a number of internationally recognized crimes which are customary 
international law. 
Minor premise: 
Just as in U.S. law, customary international law is an integral part of British 
common law. 
Conclusion: 
Thus, customary international crimes such as piracy, slave trading, and now 
the various war crimes and crimes against humanity are an integral part of the 
common law. 
The logic of the above syllogism seems fairly compelling. Each of the pre-
mises is true, the syllogism is well formed so the conclusion seems inescapa-
ble. Let us now consider a second syllogism. The first major premise of the 
second syllogism is the conclusion of the first syllogism: 
SYLLOGISM 2: 
Major premise: 
Customary international crimes such as piracy, slave trading, and now the vari-
                                                 
56  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 67 (facsimile of 1st ed. 
1765-1769, Univ. of Chi. ed., 1979). 
57  Eugene Davidson, The Trials of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty Two 
Defendants Before the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, 19 (1966).  
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ous war crimes and crimes against humanity are an integral part of the com-
mon law. 
Minor premise: 
For each common law crime there is a corresponding common law intentional 
tort. 
Conclusion: 
Thus, international crimes have corresponding common law intentional torts. 
This argument may seem somewhat surprising unless we understand that 
customary international law is an integral part of the common law. Once we 
recognize that proposition, the implications lead to the conclusion there exists 
a corresponding tort for each of the customary crimes under international law – 
and thus one can make a claim in torts such as torture in the common law even 
without an Alien Tort Statute. 
The deductive argument, that international crimes imply corresponding 
common law torts, can also be proven inductively. The inductive arguments 
look to the practice of other states – which is of course one element of cus-
tomary international law. Several other nations also allow private law domestic 
actions for crimes against international law. The best and most well known 
examples are the Alien Tort Statute
58 and Torture Victim Protection Act.
59 We 
shall later see that in French Civil law as well as in Belgium and Senegal that 
one may combine tort claims with criminal claims via the action civile. Just as 
in the common law, customary international law in French civil law is an inte-
gral part of French law. Thus, even without an alien tort statute it is in theory 
possible to bring a tort claim for a violation of the law of nations in French law 
and those countries which are influenced by French law such as Belgium, 
Senegal, and literally dozens of other countries. In arguing that international 
torts exist or that international crimes give rise to corresponding common law 
torts, the Alien Tort Statute, as well as the writings of Blackstone and Coke, 
are persuasive evidence of the common law, and also as evidence of customary 
international practice in support of the existence of “torts in violation of the 
law of nations”. Substantively, no one can argue against allowing tort compen-
sation in terms of transactional justice: The purpose of justice is to right 
wrongs and law serves justice. 
                                                 
58  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
59  Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) 
[hereinafter TVPA].  
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As to jurisdiction, it is logical to presume that if universal jurisdiction exists 
as to the substantive crime which is the basis of the intentional tort claim then 
it would logically also exist as to the corresponding common law tort. If the 
law permits the greater punishments of imprisonment or execution it also per-
mits a lesser punishment of restitution. 
2.  Human Rights Protection through the Ordinary Common Law Tort 
Regime 
Tort claims of individuals for wrongs committed overseas can of course also 
be brought as ordinary torts under British law. Customary common law torts 
such as wrongful imprisonment, battery, conversion, or action on the case 
could be applied to extra-territorial human rights violations, subject, however, 
to the ordinary rules of conflicts of law and without the benefit of universal 
jurisdiction which would exist in the case of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, crimes against peace, piracy and slave trading. 
In sum, human rights violations can be remedied in domestic British law 
through torts in violation of the law of nations, ordinary domestic torts and the 
Human Rights Act which essentially enables ECHR claims to be made in Bri-
tish courts. Remedies under the ordinary domestic tort regime are conditioned, 
as in the United States, by jurisdiction, immunity, and a number of domestic 
prudential concepts. 
II.  Tort Remedies to Human Rights Violations in Civil Code Countries 
A. France 
Our examination of civil law countries is divided into two parts: Francophone 
and German civil law countries. We consider French civil law first among civil 
law countries because French law has had a marked influence on the construc-
tion of the European Communities and Union. To this must be added the 
extensive influence of the French civil code throughout the world. The French 
legal system is, like the British, a model for that of many other countries, 
notably in Africa but also in Québec. 
The French legal system is also on its own terms sufficiently interesting to 
merit extensive consideration. As we have seen, American and British com-
mon law presume that treaties are not self executing and require ratification to 
have domestic effect. This is not the case in France. France is a monist re- 
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gime.
60 Treaties, like international law generally in French law,
61 are an inte-
gral part of French law. Treaties are thus presumed to be self executing and 
require no parliamentary enabling act to have domestic effect. In fact, treaty 
law is hierarchically superior to French domestic law.
62 French treaties do re-
quire ratification, however.
63 Further, though self executing, they do not neces-
sarily have “effet direct” (direct effect). That is, though we may presume that a 
French treaty generally creates individually enforceable rights and duties that 
presumption can be overcome.
64 In order to be directly enforceable by an indi-
vidual a treaty in French law must at least be sufficiently precise (neither ambi-
guous nor vague) to permit objective decision
65 and must also not require on its 
own terms the necessity of creating domestic measures of enforcement.
66 The 
most conservative view also argues that the intention of the parties must have 
been to create directly enforceable rights on the part of individuals,
67 though 
one can argue that such is presumptively the case of all legal instruments. 
Our discussion of French law will proceed from the most theoretical 
abstraction and move with greater refinement to actual legal practice. Such a 
method is chosen as it reflects the deductive reasoning so characteristic of 
French law, which reasons from general principles of law embodied in statutes 
to individual cases rulings which, in theory, only concern the actual parties to 
                                                 
60  « Une claire option moniste paraît a priori résulter du texte de l'article 55 de la Con-
stitution du 4 octobre 1958, lequel déclare que ‘les traités ou accords régulièrement 
ratifiés ou approuvés ont dès leur publication une autorité supérieure à celle des lois’ ». 
(“A clear monist option appears to result a priori from Art. 55 of the French Constitution 
of October 4, 1958 which declares that ‘treaties or agreements regularly ratified or 
approved have on publication an authority superior to that of laws’”.) Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Droit International Public, Paris 2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 404 (author’s 
translation). 
61  « le 14° alinéa du Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946 auquel on sait que 
le Préambule de la Constitution de 1958 fait un renvoi exprès, proclame l'attachement 
de la République « aux règles du droit public international » (“Line 14 of the preamble 
of the constitution of October 27, 1946, to which the preamble of the constitution of 
1958 makes direct reference, declares the attachment of the republic ‘to the rules of 
public international law’”). Id. at 408 (author’s translation). 
62  Constitution Française de 1958. 
63 Pierre-Marie  Dupuy,  Droit International Public, Paris 2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 
404. 
64  Id., at 398. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Id.  
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the case. 
1. Customary  Law 
Though it is true that French treaties are self executing and thus require no 
parliamentary enabling act to have domestic effect, and as such are an integral 
part of French law
68, that is true only of ordinary legislation. The situation is 
less clear as to customary international law.
69 In all events, however, if cus-
tomary international law is to be given direct effect within the French domestic 
legal order then the custom must be sufficiently clear so that it can be applied 
objectively.
70 That fact can obviate some disputes but not all. What of the case 
where customary law is in fact perfectly clear, say as to the jus cogens norm 
prohibiting torture? There the situation is more complex. The French courts of 
general jurisdiction (Tribunaux de Grand Instance, Cours d’Appel, and Cour 
de Cassation) recognize the superiority of customary international law to 
French legislation.
71 For example, where French domestic law would hold a 
foreign head of state liable for crimes, the international custom of immunity 
for heads of state during their term of office prevented suit of the foreign head 
of state.
72 In contrast, disconcertingly,
73 the administrative courts, including the 
French constitutional court (Conseil Constitutionnel)
74 do not consider 
                                                 
68  Constitution Francaise de 1958, Art. 55. 
69 Moncef  Kdhir,  Juge Francais et Droit International non Ecrit, 6 Revue du Droit 
Public, Novembre-Décembre 2003, 1581, 1582 (herafter Kdhir). 
70 Pierre-Marie  Dupuy,  Droit International Public, Paris2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 398. 
71  « Les juridictions judiciaires ne manifestent aucune réticence à invoquer la coutume 
internationale à l'appui de leurs décisions. Dans un arrêt rendu le 6 avril 1826, la Cour 
de cassation se référait déjà à la ‘coutume devenue une maxime incontestable du droit 
des gens’ ou de ‘règle absolue du droit international’. » Kdhir, at 1584. 
72  ‘la coutume internationale s'oppose à ce que les chefs d'État en exercise puissent, en 
l'absence de dispositions internationales communes s'imposant aux parties concernées, 
faire l'objet de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d'un État étranger’ (Author’s 
translation: international custom prevents making the head of state in office an object 
of the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state, at least absent general international 
dispositions [to the contrary]) Kadhaffi. This is but one example where the cross-
currents of the ”war on terrorism” and human rights lead to the surprising result of 
mutually reinforcing each other and extending the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for torts. 
73  Kdhir, at 1585-1586. 
74  «  La jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel accorde peu de place au droit 
international non écrit. » Id. at, 1582.  
  153
customary international law when interpreting administrative acts.
75 This is 
also true of the general principles of international law which, in French 
administrative courts, do not over-ride French administrative acts.
76 However, 
the fact is French courts of general jurisdiction take the opposite view both to 
custom and to general principles of law. French courts of general jurisdiction 
regard general principles of international law as hierarchically superior to and 
an integral part of French domestic law.
77 Thus in the case of Barbie 
(Argoud)
78 the Cour d’Appel de Lyon recognized that the crimes alleged were 
not merely crimes against French law but also against international law
79 and 
thus actionable in France. The court in Argoud also recognized the primacy of 
the general principles of international law as a part of international law.
80 
While the split between the executive and legislature on this point seems 
problematic, claims for torts in violation of the law of nations would be 
ordinarily brought before a court of general jurisdiction (Tribunal de Grand 
Instance) which regards not only treaty law but also customary law as an 
integral part of the French domestic legal order. Consequently, French courts 
could recognize the possibility of an action civile in conjunction with a case 
prosecuting a crime under customary international law. Accordingly, we now 
turn our attention to the action civile in French law. 
2. Statute  Law 
a)  A Hybrid of Tort and Crime: Action Civile 
In principle and practice victims of crime in France have the right to compen-
sation in tort through an action civile.
81 One very interesting point of the action 
civile is that it can be initiated by the victim of the crime.
82 Historically the 
common law also permitted private persons to initiate prosecutions of crimes 
                                                 
75  « ni 1'article 55 de la Constitution ni aucune autre disposition de valeur 
constitutionnelle ne prescrit ni n'implique que le juge administratif fasse prévaloir la 
coutume internationale sur la loi en cas de conflit entre ces deux normes. » Id. at 1584. 
76  Id., at 1593. 
77  Id. 
78  Cass. Crim., 4 juin l964, Argoud, Bull, p. 410. 
79  Kdhir, at 1585. 
80  Id. 
81 Stefan  Gewaltig,  Die action civile im französischen Strafverfahren, Frankfurt am 
Main 1990: Peter Lang, page 6 (hereafter Gewaltig). 
82  Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: 
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 
Cal. L. Rev. 542, 669 (1990).  
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in order to conserve very limited judicial resources. That is no longer the case 
in the U.S. However, the same conduct may give rise to a proceeding in tort or 
in criminal law. Nevertheless, U.S. common law does not offer a procedure 
similar to the action civile even in the civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana
83 – 
though the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
84 
does permit a combination of civil and criminal claims in cases combating 
organized crime. 
In the action civile criminal and tort procedures are combined. That com-
bination offers a certain judicial economy by reducing the number of court 
proceedings. Article 2 of the French Penal Code
85 provides that: 
“all who have personally suffered a damage directly caused by the crime have 
a right to reparation of that damage by a civil cause of action. [‘action civile’]. 
Renunciation of the civil cause of action in no way suspends or stops the pub-
lic prosecution, subject to the exceptions provided for in line 3 of article 6.”
86 
Article 418, paragraph 2 “On the constitution and effects of the civil party” of 
the French Code of Criminal Procedure further states that: 
“All persons who, in conformity with Article 2, claim to have been injured by 
a wrong can, if they have not yet done so, move to be considered a civil party 
in the case. No lawyer is required to make this motion before the court. The 
civil party can, in support of their cause of action, ask for damages correspon-
ding to the damages which they have suffered.”
87 
                                                 
83  “In France, by virtue of the procedure of la partie civile, the civil action may be brought 
along with the penal proceedings but such is not the case in Louisiana or the United 
States.” William E. Crawford, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Tort Law, § 3.1. (2000). 
84  18 U.S.C. § 1962 
85  Ordonnance nº 58-1296 du 23 décembre 1958 art. 1, Journal Officiel du 24 décembre 
1958 en vigueur le 2 mars 1959. available at:  
<http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/titre_preliminaire.htm>. 
86  Author’s translation. The original text reads: «  L'action civile en réparation du 
dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention appartient à tous ceux qui 
ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l'infraction. La 
renonciation à l'action civile ne peut arrêter ni suspendre l'exercice de l'action 
publique, sous réserve des cas visés à l'alinéa 3 de l'article 6. » Ordonnance nº 58-
1296 du 23 décembre 1958 art. 1 Journal Officiel du 24 décembre 1958 en vigueur le 
2 mars 1959. available at: <http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/titre_preliminaire.htm>. 
87  Article 418, French Code of Criminal Procedure (author’s translation). The original 
text states: « Toute personne qui, conformément à l'article 2, prétend avoir été lésée 
par un délit, peut, si elle ne l'a déjà fait, se constituer partie civile à l'audience même. 
Le ministère d'un avocat n'est pas obligatoire. La partie civile peut, à l'appui de sa  
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Thus all persons who are directly injured through the criminal act have the 
right to compensation for the damages resulting there from.
88 However, the 
claim for damages must be made at trial, and may not be first made on 
appeal.
89 Interestingly, civil parties are disqualified from being witnesses in the 
criminal action.
90 
An action civile is not only of interest before French courts. The resulting 
compensation from damages to parties civiles may be enforced anywhere the 
defendant's assets can be found – even before common law courts, where fami-
liar procedures for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are well 
established.
91 
The action civile is further evidence for the proposition that criminal lia-
bility generally creates tort liability. The action civile exists in at least French, 
Belgian, and Senegalese civil law and almost certainly in other jurisdictions 
which model their domestic law on French law. It is the author’s hypothesis 
that a further examination of other civil law jurisdictions would reveal the 
action civile, or a homologue, exists in most civilian jurisdictions. A similar 
cause of action, the Adhäsionsverfahren, also exists in German civil law, 
though it is apparently less often resorted too. Civilian legal systems recognize 
1) the actionability of international crimes in domestic proceedings and 2) the 
possibility that an injured plaintiff may sue the defendant criminal tortfeasor. 
This empirical evidence proves that in the Alien Tort StatuteiAlien Tort 
Claims Act; is not idiosyncratic. 
b)  Article 689 French Code of Criminal Procedure  
(Code de Procédure Pénale) 
Article 689 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure (Code du Procédure 
Pénale), provides that: 
“[t]he authors or accomplices of offences committed outside the territory of 
the Republic can be sued in the French courts and judged by them ... when-
                                                                                                                                                      
constitution, demander des dommages-intérêts correspondant au préjudice qui lui a été 
causé. », available at:  
http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/constitution_de_partie_civile_tc.htm. 
88  Art. 2 Code de Procédure Pénale (C.P.P.); Gewaltig, at 8. 
89  Crim. 5.3.1964, J.C.P. 1964.ll.13689; Crim. 25.10.1966, J.C.P. 1966, 1, page 9. 
90  Article 422 French Code of Criminal Procedure, available at:  
<http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/constitution_de_partie_civile_tc.htm>. 
91 See,  e.g.,  Raulin v. Fischer [1911] 2 K.B. 93 (Eng.).  
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ever an international convention grants jurisdiction to the French courts.”
92 
Thus, if the suspect is in France then Universal jurisdiction exists for the 
wrongs listed in these conventions. According to Stern, Art. 689 applies to 
conventions that, according to their terms, are not self-executing such as Art. 5 
of the Torture Convention.
93 
3. Case  Law 
We have already discussed briefly the case of Klaus Barbie (Argoud)
  94 and 
also France v. Khaddafy.
95 Here we will look in greater detail at two claims 
litigated in France due to genocide in Rwanda where the plaintiffs made 
motions as parties civiles for an action civile. 
a)  In Re Munyeshyaka96 
W. Munyeshyaka, a Rwandan national, was charged in France with crimes 
against humanity and genocide. The aggrieved parties also made a claim for 
compensation in tort via the action civile. The lower court ruled that there was 
no jurisdiction in this case because the acts were committed outside of France 
and the victims and perpetrators were not French nationals. The French Cour 
de Cassation partially affirmed and remanded the case on the basis that while 
there was no universal jurisdiction as to genocide there would be universal 
jurisdiction for torture under Article 689-2 of the Code of Penal Procedure. 
This decision might seem odd at first: after all, genocide is clearly a crime 
under international law. What was the courts reasoning in Munyeshyaka? 
The court notes that the crimes of genocide and complicity thereto are 
defined in Art. 211-1 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure and by the 
Convention Against Torture. However, in domestic French law the crime of 
genocide requires action in concert to execute a plan. In contrast, the crime of 
                                                 
92 Brigitte  Stern,  Universal Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity under French 
Law-Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949-Genocide-Torture-Human 
Rights Violations in Bosnia and Rwanda, 93 Am. J. Int’l. L. 525, 528 (April, 1999) 
(translation by Brigitte Stern; hereafter Stern). 
93  Id. 
94  Cass. Crim., 4 juin l964, Argoud, Bull, p. 410. 
95 Kadhaffi. 
96  In Re Munyeshyaka 1998 Bull. crim., No. 2, at 3., Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 6 
janvier 1998 (n° de pourvoi: 96-82491) available at:    
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX
1998X01X06X00002X000.>  
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torture (a crime codified in Art. 222 of the French Penal Code) requires no 
such concert of action or plan. Further, the Genocide Convention of 1948 does 
not contain in its own terms any rule of universal jurisdiction. It merely 
authorizes state parties to adjudicate genocidal acts on their own territory or to 
constitute international tribunals to adjudicate such claims. The court thus 
implies that 1) there may have been no concerted plan of action of the 
Rwandan genocide; 2) even if there were, the French courts would not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim under international law absent some 
positive act of the French legislator. 
The court also considered claims of violations of international humanitarian 
law under the Geneva Convention. According to §§ 1 and 2 of Article 112-2, 
French Code of Criminal Procedure,
97 criminal principals and accomplices to 
serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, those who 
violate the laws and customs of warfare, and those who commit crimes against 
humanity can, if found in France, be judged before French courts and that as a 
result claims against the defendant on the basis of torture would be able to be 
litigated in France even where victim and perpetrator were not French natio-
nals provided the perpetrator be present in France. Having determined that on 
the basis of the facts and allegations that the complaint on the basis of 
genocide was ill founded, but that a claim against torture would be well 
founded the court partially annulled the earlier proceedings and remanded the 
case to the lower court for determination. 
b)  In Re Javor
98 
The case of Procureur v. Javor
99 involved a criminal prosecution of Javor for 
torture of the Yugoslavian claimants who also brought tort claims using the 
action civile. The court noted that according to Art. 689-1 and Art. 689-2 of 
the French Code of Criminal Procedure all persons who, outside of French 
territory, have committed acts of torture as defined in the CAT, can be 
prosecuted and judged by France if found in France. In Javor, however, there 
was no indication at all that the defendants were on French territory. Whether 
                                                 
97  Law of 22 May, 1996, n° 96-432. 
98  In Re Javor, 1996 Bull. crim., No. 132, at 379. French Cour de cassation, Criminal 
Chamber, March 26, 1996. (Cour de Cassation (Chambre criminelle) Arrêt 26 mars 
1996 (Javor) N°: 95-81527) available at:  
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX
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99  Id.  
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the accused is in France must be determined by the prosecutor not the victim. 
Since the defendant was not proven by the prosecutor to be in France claims on 
the basis of Art. 689-1 and Art. 689-2 could not succeed. 
The court did recognize that “all persons who are victims of a crime in 
contravention of the New York Convention [Against Torture of 1984] have a 
right to bring a tort claim [lit. action civile] against the criminal tortfeasor”
100 
and that “denial of this right constitutes denial of an equitable trial as guaran-
teed by the European Convention on Human Rights”.
101 However, while true 
in theory in practice the defendant was not in France and thus no claim could 
be made on the basis of the CAT. 
The claims under the CAT could not be heard because of jurisdiction. How-
ever, plaintiffs also made claims on the basis of the four Geneva conventions 
which entered into force for France on 28 December 1951. There the court 
noted that state parties agree to make the necessary legislative measures to 
suppress via adequate sanctions grave violations of the terms of those conven-
tions. However, the court also noted: 1) the obligations of those conventions 
only bind states, and 2) the conventions are not directly applicable in domestic 
law, and implies the reason therefore is that that particular convention is only 
binding states. Explicitly, the court also notes that the rights guaranteed by the 
four conventions are too general and ambiguous to be directly applicable. 
Art. 689 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure defining allowable cases of 
universal jurisdiction in France did not apply to the case because the four 
Geneva conventions are not directly applicable. Thus plaintiff had no claim on 
the basis of the Geneva conventions. 
Though no claim was possible in this case on the basis of the Geneva 
conventions the court did make clear that all treaties are nonetheless an integral 
part of French law implying that on other facts a claim based on the Geneva 
conventions might succeed. The court states: 
“An international convention which is sufficiently precise and does not there-
fore require particular measures prior to its application is directly applicable. 
Such a convention [i.e. one sufficiently precise to require no enabling 
legislation to have effect in domestic law] creates rights which benefit indivi-
duals”.
102 
As we know, treaties in French law are self executing though they may in 
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certain circumstance not grant directly enforceable rights to individuals. 
It would be unwise to regard the French concept of “effet direct” as 
equivalent to Drittwirkung or “self execution”: the French court, though it does 
speak of “effet direct” does not use the term Drittwirkung. A functionalist 
analysis of effet direct looks not at the artificial theoretical constructs created 
by lawyers and judges but rather at the practical effects those constructs have. 
If we look at effet direct on its own terms and as a representative of the French 
legal system rather than trying to force it to fit foreign legal abstract concepts 
either from the common law (self executing treaties) or German law 
(Drittwirkung) we avoid doctrinal confusion since the overlap of these 
concepts is not perfect. Conceptual abstraction permits explanation of a variety 
of different cases – but complex concepts whether adapted, adopted or used as 
metaphors or analogies almost always create at least some confusion when 
transposed into international law or when subsumed into other similar foreign 
legal concepts. Those problems can be avoided simply by considering not the 
abstraction but the concrete cases to which the abstract concept refers. This is 
the advantage of empiric induction. It does not lead to sweeping (or overbroad) 
conclusions but does resolve problems as they arise. 
In any event, the court in Javor does not speak in terms of “self executing 
treaties”. Rather it seems to assume that all treaties are self executing, but that 
some treaties cannot vest rights in individuals without enabling legislation 
simply because of their ambiguity. 
Thus, the case against Javor was rejected not because there could be no 
claim under the Geneva conventions but rather because such a claim would 
have to be founded on some positive aspect of domestic French law. 
The court in Javor does not address the issue whether the claim could have 
been made under customary law. Here there would be room for creative 
lawyering. If, as in Javor, there is no French domestic law on which to base the 
claim then the plaintiffs could argue that the facts constitute a violation of 
customary international law and that customary international law is an integral 
part of French domestic law. Just as in the common law, custom is an integral 
part of French law and the ordinary regime of droit commun could be applied 
to international torts, including those torts which are also violations of custom-
ary international law. 
On this point, whether and how jurisdiction may be obtained for inter-
national torts and crimes in French law, Brigitte Stern notes that: 
“These cases [Javor and Munyeshyaka] illustrate the reluctance of the French  
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courts to assert universal jurisdiction. This attitude is not a French exception, 
but is quite widespread. According to Kenneth Randall, ‘[t]he universality 
principle remains under-utilized in the struggle to eliminate the most heinous 
crimes of the modern world.’ This explains why in France the cases brought 
against Pinochet did not rely on universal jurisdiction but on passive persona-
lity jurisdiction.”
103 
Just as we see that states are reluctant to lift the veil of immunity, so also are 
states hesitant to exercise universal jurisdiction. In fact, however, a compelling 
argument can be made that universal jurisdiction exists to all international 
crimes which are also violations of jus cogens first by looking at the fact that 
universal jurisdiction exists as to pirates and slave traders and also by looking 
at the teleology of the more modern international crimes which represent such 
heinous acts as to be of mutual concern of all nations and thus liable to 
universal jurisdiction. In any event, immunity and jurisdiction appear to be the 
two greatest limitations to liability, whether in crime or in torts, for severe 
violations of human rights. 
B. Belgium 
Belgium had offered universal jurisdiction in absentia without regard to the 
nationality of the victim or criminal, perhaps the most wide ranging exercise of 
jurisdiction over human rights in the world, certainly in Europe until 2003. 
However, the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium determined that one case prosecuted 
under this statute was a violation of the principle of immunity of acting rank-
ing ministers and could not proceed. This fact, and enormous U.S. pressure, 
caused Belgium to modify its wide ranging law on universal jurisdiction in 
2003.
104 The general interpretation is that the new legislation has severely cur-
tailed Belgian extra-territorial jurisdiction. While it is true that now victims 
must be Belgian or legal residents of Belgium at the time of the crime as we 
will see the statute remains very extensive and in some areas has actually 
expanded its protections. 
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1.  The New Legislation 
The new legislation entirely removes the old legislation and in its place 
modifies several sections of the Belgian Criminal Code. The principal new and 
modified sections of the Penal Code are summarized as follows: 
* Art. 1bis of the Penal Code appears to be a reaction to Congo v. Belgium and 
provides that “In conformity with international law, prosecutions are 
prohibited against: heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers 
of foreign affairs during their term of office as well as other persons recog-
nized as enjoying immunity under international law.”
105 Note, however, that 
this limitation leaves open the possibility of suing those enjoying immunity 
after termination of their term of office. 
* Art. 6 of the Belgian Penal Code was amended so that “all Belgians” now 
includes “all Belgians or any other person having their principal residence in 
Belgium”. 
*  Art.  10 of the Belgian Penal Code now provides that foreigners can be 
prosecuted in Belgium for violations of human rights protected in Book II, 
Title 1 of the Belgian Penal Code if the victim was a Belgian national or 
resident or a person who, since at least three years in effect resides in Belgium 
habitually and legally.
106 
* Art. 12 of the Belgian Penal Code was extended so that not only international 
conventions but also international custom could be the basis of a claim.
107 
* Art. 136 was newly created and extensively defines a wide range of criminal 
activities and is extremely generous to victims. Crimes against international 
law under Art.  136 includes, for example, apartheid, destruction of historic 
monuments, and forced resettlements.
108 Such crimes can be heard by Belgian 
courts and punished under Belgian law (Art. 43 quarter, § 1, a Belgian Penal 
Code). 
We can conclude from this that while Belgium has limited the claimants to 
Belgian citizens and legal residents at the time of the crimes it has also broa-
dened its protections to acts such as apartheid and forced resettlements. Fur-
ther, claims may be made not only on the basis of international statute but also 
                                                 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id.  
  162
on the basis of customary law. Thus, the new legislation stands on surer 
ground. Of course it would be desirable if the protections of the Belgian law 
were extended at least to the citizens of other EU Member States and if the 
inquiry was not whether the claimant was a legal resident of Belgium at the 
time of the crime but rather at the time of prosecution. That being said, if the 
jurisdictional limits can be overcome plaintiffs would be able to combine their 
actions with claims as parties civiles. We now look at the Belgian law on 
action civile. 
2.  The Action Civile in Belgium 
Belgian civil law, like French civil law, recognizes the existence of an action 
civile for damages in cases of crimes. It is worth noting that accomplices may 
be held liable for acts of principals. Accomplice liability in Belgian law is very 
extensive: The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant accomplice intended 
to aid the criminal principal to achieve the criminal object.
109 Plaintiffs need 
not prove fraudulent intention of accomplices to defraud
110 or criminal in-
tent.
111 Further, all defendants, accomplices, and principals are liable jointly 
and severally for all damages resulting from the criminal tort, even absent any 
overt action or agreement to act in concert.
112 
                                                 
109  «Pour être coauteur ou complice, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’il y ait eu intention criminelle 
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Having examined the Belgian statutory law we can now examine the cases 
litigated under those laws and their predecessor law to suppress grave breaches 
of international humanitarian law. 
3. Case  Law 
How have the statutes worked in practice? The Belgian criminal laws, though 
curtailed as to victims who may sue, have in fact been substantively extended 
as outlined above. Though Belgium has procedurally limited access to its 
courts Belgium could legally extend its protection not merely to residents at 
the time of the crime but also to those who have become Belgian residents 
since the crime and even to other residents and citizens of EU Member States. 
The earlier Belgian legislation was not illegal, but rather impractical; the courts 
were somewhat overwhelmed with claimants, and some claims were not 
meritorious. Most importantly, the Belgian legislation angered the United 
States and Israel. But these political problems do not go to the legality of the 
statute rather to its political practicality. With that thought we now look at 
some litigated Belgian cases. 
a)  The Ariel Sharon Cases 
A claim in tort was brought in Belgium against the head of state of Israel, Ariel 
Sharon, as well as several other Israeli defendants for massacres of Palestinian 
civilians at the Sabra and Shattila refugee camps which occurred prior to 
Sharon’s term of office as head of state. The case was initially determined 
inadmissible as to all defendants. However, on appeal that decision was parti-
ally reversed. The Belgian appeals court ruled that the case against Sharon 
would not be considered as he was an acting head of state entitled to immunity 
for all acts, even those occurring prior to his term of office. However, the other 
defendants did not enjoy immunity and the jurisdiction was valid.
113 As to 
them the case was allowed to go forward even in absentia.
114 The Belgian Su-
preme Court consequently affirmed this decision.
115 However, in the interim 
                                                                                                                                                      
participation in the common crime, and even if among the condemned there was no 
agreement prior to the crime nor any unity of action. 
113  Sharon, Ariel, Yaron, Amos et Autres, Arrêt de la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, 
26/6/2002, available at: <http://www.sabra-shatila.be/documents/arrest020626.pdf>. 
114 Alain  Winants,  The Yerodia Ruling of the International Court off Justice and the 
1993/1999 Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction, 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 508 (October, 2003). 
115  Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 12 Fevrier, 2003. Unofficial English translation available 
at: <http://www.indictsharon.net/12feb2003dectrans.pdf>.  
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the ICJ at the case of Congo v. Belgium ruled that head of state immunity 
extended also to ranking ministers thus sowing confusion and injustice in the 
Belgian laws. This, and enormous pressure from the United States, caused Bel-
gium to modify its law on universal jurisdiction. Consequently, in a second 
decision by the Belgian Supreme Court the case was dismissed in its entire-
ty.
116 Let us then look at Congo v. Belgium to see exactly how procedural 
issues blunted substantive justice. 
b)  Belgium v. Congo 
The ICJ case Congo v. Belgium appears to have been crucial in the hobbling of 
the Belgian law. We examine that decision to understand its limits in order to 
see what might still be done to the Belgian legislation to make it more 
effective. We conclude that the Belgian legislation could at least offer a cause 
of action to persons who are Belgian citizens or residents or EU citizens or 
residents at the time of the lawsuit. We also conclude that jurisdiction in 
absentia remains a possibility though the issue of whether and when non-
Belgian victims may bring a cause of action is actually more important. Finally 
we conclude that the decision of the ICJ is morally indefensible and suffers 
from flawed logic. 
i. Immunity 
The Belgian law of universal jurisdiction in absentia, as applied in a Belgian 
case, was adjudicated by the International Court of Justice and found incom-
patible with international law in the case Congo v. Belgium. In Congo v. 
Belgium
117 the ICJ distinguishes between absolute and relative universal 
jurisdiction. In that case Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Congolese minister 
of foreign affairs, was indicted by Belgium for war crimes during his term of 
office. During the court proceedings the term of the minister’s office ended. 
The minister raised as a defence that at the time of indictment he enjoyed 
ministerial immunity. The defence was upheld. However, the court’s determi-
nation that ministers enjoy immunity during their term of office appears to rest 
on fiat of the court and appears to have no authority of custom or treaty under-
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117  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), ICJ 
14/II/2002, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/  
icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_toc.htm.  
  165
lying it. The court’s finding that official acts which constitute war crimes, cri-
mes against humanity, and crimes against the peace may, indeed must, enjoy 
immunity as to heads of state and ranking ministers is simply illogical and 
indefensible. 
The international court did not rule against Belgium on the theory that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia was invalid per se. A majority of 
the judges clearly think that universal jurisdiction in absentia can be valid
118. 
Instead the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium ruled against Belgium on the basis of im-
munity. According to the ICJ, government Ministers are analogous to heads of 
state and thus are immune as to official acts during their term of office even 
after expiry of their term. One can rightly ask, however, where this analogy 
comes from, for it seems to be purely an invention of the court. Congo v. Bel-
gium is a rather shocking decision actually; the crimes of which the former 
minister was accused were clearly in violation of jus cogens yet the court is 
arguing that they must be granted immunity. Applying this logic several pro-
secutions at the Nuremburg or Tokyo tribunals should have been rejected. 
Unsurprisingly, the decision is severely criticized. We will consider that 
decision and its critique in order to see the limits international law places on 
exercise of jurisdiction and the rules it imposes on immunity of government 
officials. 
The ICJ decision reached the conclusion that it is a firmly established rule 
of international law that high ranking government official enjoy immunity as 
to their official acts both in civil and criminal cases arising out of customary 
international law – even in cases where those acts are violations of jus co-
gens!
119 The ICJ attempted to defend the indefensible offering the trite and 
unsatisfying rhyme that ‘immunity’ does not mean ‘impunity’. The court notes 
that Ministers who are also international criminals can be prosecuted “(i) in 
their own country; (ii) in other states, if the state they represent waives 
immunity; (iii) after they cease holding office; and (iv) before an international 
court.”
120 Obviously in practice none of these prosecutions will ever happen so 
the argument rings hollow. For example, acts committed during the term of 
office, so long as they are official acts, will be immune to prosecution even 
after the termination of the term of office. Thus, only acts undertaken for per-
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sonal benefit and not in the service of the state will no longer be immunized 
after expiration of the term of office.
121 Winants rightly criticizes the ICJ’s 
argument, calling potential prosecution “hypothetical” at best. He also 
criticizes the argument from analogy that a high ranking minister is like a head 
of state or diplomat which he also sees as a weak one. He also points out that 
the court ignores recent developments in international law.
122 Thus, Winants 
states that the ruling of the ICJ on immunities is: “very doctrinal and narrow-
minded” and is “likely… to lead to a de facto total impunity of high ranking 
office holders”.
123 He points out rightly that some crimes can only be com-
mitted with the state as their instrumentality and reiterates Lord Steyn’s argu-
ment in Pinochet 1, that if immunity applies to official acts of state then “when 
Hitler ordered the ‘final solution’ his act must be regarded as an official act 
deriving from the exercise of his functions as Head of State’”.
124 It is simply 
absurd to offer immunity to mass murderers in the interests of “order”. Wi-
nants concludes that: “It may well be that the Belgian approach is foolhardy, 
but in contrast to this the ruling of the ICJ is lacking in courage”
125 which 
seems to me a polite way to call someone a coward. Winants critique is in all 
events well founded. The ICJ has taken one step backward to excusing the 
worst acts of barbarism in the interest of elevating “order” above “justice”. The 
ICJ’s rationale is based on a flawed assumption of international law that order 
is the primary concern of international law since order is a precondition to jus-
tice. That presumption is false – ultimately, justice creates order and injustice 
creates disorder – and is increasingly rejected as sovereignty evolves from an 
absolute hermetic Westphalian conception to relativised and increasingly 
integrated view due to globalisation of communication, production, and trade. 
ii.  Relative and Absolute Universal Jurisdiction 
If the court decision in Congo v. Belgium is basically substantively indefensi-
ble is there anything to be salvaged from the erroneous decision which ignores 
basic principles of morality and justice? The more interesting portion of Congo 
v. Belgium concerns a distinction made by several judges in their separate 
opinions between “absolute” and “relative” universal jurisdiction 
(“compétence universelle” and “compétence universelle par défaut”). Again, 
                                                 
121  Id.  
122  Id.  
123  Id.  
124  Id., at 499. 
125  Id.   
  167
the court seems to be struggling to invent new terms to cope with the new legal 
reality resulting from globalisation. The ideas of “absolute” and “relative” 
universal jurisdiction, though conceptually defensible, do not appear to have 
been a part of international discourse prior to Congo v. Belgium. That can be 
seen in the fact that the terms in French and English are different. “Universal 
jurisdiction by default” would be a better translation of “compétence 
universelle par défaut” than absolute jurisdiction. Similarly the term 
“relativisé” appears nowhere in the term “compétence universelle” which then 
would also translate as – universal jurisdiction! 
According to the separate opinions of several judges in Congo v. Belgium, 
absolute universal jurisdiction (compétence universelle par défaut) is asserted 
when the state exercising jurisdiction to prescribe has no link to the act over 
which jurisdiction is asserted.
126 For example, where a defendant is not on the 
territory of the state and where the act did not occur on the territory of the state 
or involved any of its nationals there is a “défaut” (absence, default) of the 
defendant and any exercise of jurisdiction is universal in the widest sense of 
the term i.e. “absolute”. In contrast, where there is some connection between 
the act over which jurisdiction is exercised and the territory or nationals of the 
state exercising jurisdiction to proscribe we can speak of relative universal 
jurisdiction or “compétence universelle” – for there is no absent defendant or 
absent act.
127 
The ICJ in Congo v. Belgium implies that relative universal jurisdiction is 
permissible under international law
128 and draws a distinction between absolute 
universal jurisdiction and relative universal jurisdiction.
129 It does not determine 
when or whether absolute universal jurisdiction is permissible, though the histo-
ric example of pirates indicates that in some instances absolute jurisdiction is 
admissible under international law. Pirates are hostes humani generis,
130 ene-
mies of all mankind, and as such are subject to universal jurisdiction. War crimi-
nals, mass murderers and those who torture are also enemies of mankind and 
                                                 
126 Antonio  Cassese,  When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? 
Some Comments on The Congo v. Belgium Case, European Journal of International 
Law, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 853 available at: <http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr31-
03.html#31-3> (hereafter Cassese). 
127 See,  Congo v. Belgium, opinion of President Guillaume and opinion of Judge Higgins, 
Kooigmans and Buergenthal. 
128  Id. 
129 Cassese. 
130 See,  e.g.,  U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153; 5 L. Ed. 57; 1820 U.S. LEXIS 250; 5 Wheat. 153 
(1820).  
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should also be subject to absolute universal jurisdiction.
131 Relative universal 
jurisdiction is, however, a lesser infringement on another state’s sovereignty 
than absolute universal jurisdiction. An exercise of relative jurisdiction would 
therefore be more likely to be seen as consistent with a state’s international 
obligations. 
Congo v. Belgium does not address the issue of the permissibility of abso-
lute universal jurisdiction.
132 However, state practice is increasingly admitting 
universal jurisdiction, including absolute universal jurisdiction.
133 Thus, rea-
soning  a maiore ad minus, relative universal jurisdiction is probably valid 
under customary international law. 
Absolute universal jurisdiction is somewhat controversial, particularly in 
criminal cases. Yet in some cases, for example piracy, and probably war cri-
mes as well, absolute criminal jurisdiction is clearly permissible under inter-
national law. States may legally exercise their power to prescribe outside of 
their territory under: 1) a theory of passive personality, wherein a state can pro-
secute crimes against its nationals, 2) a theory of active personality, wherein it 
prosecutes its criminal nationals or 3) under the protective principle which 
permits a state to defend emanations of its sovereignty outside its own territory 
such as its currency against counterfeiters.
134 These are not the only theories 
under which jurisdiction to prescribe may be legally exercised. But these are 
the main theories. Absolute universal jurisdiction is less problematic in civil 
cases
135 because there is no question of the state exercising power over a life or 
liberty interest but merely over a property right. 
In sum, the court in Congo v. Belgium admits at least that Ministerial im-
munity is not an absolute right and can be at least waived if not derogated 
from. Further the court did not rule that jurisdiction in absentia was per se 
                                                 
131  „Folterer, Mörder und Kriegsverbrecher sollten wie früher Piraten und Sklavenhändler 
als Feinde des Menschengeschlechts behandelt werden.“ (author’s translation: “Those 
who torture and commit war crimes should, like the pirate and slave handler of yore, 
be handled as common enemies of all humanity”). Thomas Giegerich, „Extraterri-
torialer Menschenrechtsschutz durch U.S. Gerichte: Sachwalterschaft für die Inter-
nationale Gemeinschaft oder judizieller Imperialismus?“, in: Eckart Klein, Christoph 
Menke (eds.), Menschheit und Menschenrechte: Probleme der Universalisierung und 
Institutionalisierung (2001) p. 163. Also see: Filartiga. 
132 Cassese. 
133 Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Id.  
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illegal. Still, the argument that a Minister can be immune for acts which are 
violations of jus cogens due to immunity simply runs contrary to the trend of 
international law since Nuremberg. Consequently, it is possible that the 
customary practice of states will outpace the court which they created and that 
the authors of the majority opinions in Congo v. Belgium will one day feel 
embarrassed, if not ashamed, at their failure to protect the innocent victims of 
failed states. After all, it is the practice of states which makes international 
customary law, the ICJ merely confirms it. Legal decisions in international law 
are only persuasive evidence of customary international law.
136 
C.  Senegal – The Habré Cases 
It might seem odd to look at the law of a developing country to determine how 
to protect human rights globally via private tort law. However, the third world 
is where most human rights abuses occur. Further Senegal, a former French 
colony, is an ACP.; Member and its legal system is modelled on that of France. 
Like France and Belgium, Senegal is a civil law country signatory to the New 
York Convention Against Torture of 1984 (CAT) offering its plaintiffs 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in a very limited number of cases and also offering 
victims of crimes the possibility of constituting themselves as parties to the 
case in action civile. A famous case against Chad’s former dictator, Hissène 
Habré was litigated in Senegal which we now examine to see the extent and 
limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a developing third world country. 
The relevant cases we will briefly examine are Ministère Public et François 
                                                 
136  “With respect to the International Court of Justice, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute 
expressly states that '[t]he decision[s] of the Court ha[ve] no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.' ICJ Statute, June 26, 1945, 
art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993. With respect to the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Court is only empowered to ‘interpret[ ]’ and ‘appl[y]’ the rules set forth in 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 
(‘European Convention’) – an instrument applicable only to its regional States parties-
-not to create new rules of customary international law. See European Convention art. 
32 (stating that the Court's jurisdiction ‘extend[s] to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention’); see also ICJ Statute art. 38 (listing 
judicial decisions as ‘subsidiary,’ rather than primary, sources of customary 
international law). Accordingly, the international tribunal decisions cited by plaintiffs 
are not primary sources of customary international law. …these decisions may 
constitute subsidiary or secondary sources”, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. 
343 F.3d 140, 169-170, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 741, (2nd Cir., Aug 29, 2003) (also 
explaining that ECHR decisions are at most a secondary source of international law.  
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Diouf v. Hissène Habré
137 and Souleymane Guengueng et autres v. Hissène 
Habré
138. The aforementioned appellate decision determined that an action 
civile and criminal prosecution against former Chadien dictator Hissène Habré 
was not admissible in Senegalese domestic law because “Senegalese positive 
law does not at present include a cause of action for crimes against huma-
nity”.
139 Art. 295-1 of the Senegalese Penal Code does provide for a cause of 
action for torture, thus meeting Senegal’s treaty obligations under Art. 4 of the 
Convention Against Torture. However, Art.  669 of the Senegalese Code of 
Criminal Procedure only admits universal jurisdiction under an express num-
ber of limited cases, namely for crimes and torts which threaten the security of 
the state (as opposed to the security of its citizens) and for counterfeiting.
140 
The court notes the fact that a crime is universally punishable does not neces-
sarily mean that a particular court has jurisdiction to punish,
141 i.e. it reiterates 
that while states have a duty not to commit acts in violation of jus cogens they 
do not have a duty to remedy other state’s violations of jus cogens.
142 The 
court in Ministère Public et François Diouf v. Hissène Habré interprets the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction enumerated in Art. 699 Code of Criminal Procedure 
as an exhaustive list of all possible jurisdiction. That is probably the better. 
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that the Convention Against Torture 
displaces Art. 699, again likely correctly.
143 
In its own terms then the decision seems to conclude that Senegal does not 
recognize the jurisdiction of its own courts to punish crimes against customary 
international law absent a Senegalese statute transposing those crimes into 
domestic law as domestic crimes or through explicit mention in the Senegalese 
Penal Code as crimes over which extraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised 
and possibly both. While the decision has been criticized as being the product 
of executive intervention,
144 there are some points for hope within its terms. 
                                                 
137  Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000). 
138  Arrêt n° 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal (Cour de Cassation, 2001). 
139  Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000). 
140  Ministère Public Et François Diouf Contre Hissene Habré, Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-
2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000), Point 3°, decision on the 
merits ( «  sur le fond  ») available at: <http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-
decision.html> (hereafter Habré). 
141  Id., Point 3°, decision on the merits ( « sur le fond »). 
142  Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F.Supp. 1108. 
143  Id. 
144  Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of Hissein Habré, 
16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 147 169-170 (Spring, 2003); Reed Brody, The Prosecution Of  
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Though a court in Senegal may not consider itself properly seized to adjudicate 
the case of Habré, because its statute on extraterritorial jurisdiction does not go 
far enough, the court does recognize the principle “aut dedere, aut judicare”.
145 
The court also recognizes that Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention prohibits a 
state from interposing its domestic law to excuse its non-observance of a treaty 
obligation.
146 Consequently, in the face of an extradition request, the court 
implies that Senegal would be compelled to deliver Habré to a state which was 
willing to prosecute him. 
Interestingly, the Senegalese appellate court (Cour d’appel) cites French 
law. It notes that, after France enacted Art. 221-1 of the French Penal Code, 
which criminalized torture it then enacted the Law of 16 December 1992, 
(entry into force, 1 March 1994), which introduced Art. 689 into the French 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Art.  689 permits universal jurisdiction over a 
number of crimes including torture. Thus, the Senegalese court seems to accept 
the decision of the French court – that the court requires the enactment of a 
special law granting jurisdiction over crimes of torture – as persuasive 
evidence as to Senegalese. The results are of course unfavourable for human 
rights but internal logic is not wholly absent from the court’s argument. 
This case was appealed to the Senegalese Supreme Court (Cour de Cassa-
tion) which affirmed the results of the Appellate court (Cour d’appel) for 
essentially the same reason, noting, however, that Habré was under house 
arrest and again implying that he could be extradited to another country if so 
accused.
147 Since these cases were litigated an action has been brought against 
Habré in Belgium.
148 This may be the best hope for justice in this case, so it 
may not yet be over.
149 
                                                                                                                                                      
Hissène Habré – An "African Pinochet", 35 N. Engl. L. Rev. 321, 331-332 (Winter, 
2001). 
145 Habré, Point 3°, decision on the merits (« sur le fond ») available at:    
<http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-decision.html>. 
146  Id. 
147  Souleymane Guengueng et Autres c. Hissène Habré, Arrêt n° 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal 
(Cour de Cassation, 2001), available at:    
<http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-cour_de_cass.html>. 
148  The complaint in the Belgian case is available at:  
<http://www.hrw.org/french/press/2003/tchad0603.htm>. 
149  Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of Hissein Habré, 
16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 147 170-171 (Spring, 2003).  
  172
D. Germany 
The final European Member State whose law we shall examine is Germany. 
We are looking at German law last because the majority of civil law countries 
in Europe more closely follow French civil law. However, as German civil law 
has some basic differences – notably, a greater emphasis on case law and less 
emphasis on deduction of rules of law from general principles as well as less 
doctrinal influence on the substantive law it certainly merits investigation. 
German civil law is more recent and thus seen as more modern and has 
successfully been exported to countries throughout the Far East and Eastern 
Europe. Further, the German doctrine of Drittwirkung strongly influences the 
question of individual rights both with respect to the state and among private 
persons inter se. Since our discussion of third party effect (Drittwirkung) im-
mediately follows this chapter it seems appropriate to close this chapter with a 
brief examination of German law. We will see, however, that though there are 
some differences between German and French civil law that they are more 
similar than different as to the question of whether and when individuals have 
directly enforceable rights before national courts for claims arising out of inter-
national law. 
1.  German Statute Law 
a) Adhäsionsverfahren 
The Adhäsionsverfahren is the German homologue to the action civile. Essen-
tially, like the action civile, it permits the incorporation of tort claims in a 
criminal trial in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments and for rea-
sons of judicial economy. 
According to §  403 para  1 line  1 Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) 
injured parties can make claims for monetary compensation in criminal trials. 
The right to compensation is covered in §  823 para  2 German Civil Code 
(BGB) in connection with § 266 German Criminal Code (StGB). Thus, at least 
in theory, it would be possible to bring an Adhäsionsverfahren so that a 
criminal prosecution would also result in compensation to claimants. Such 
procedures are, however, in practice rare. There are several possible reasons 
for this: The plaintiff must know that they have the right; the plaintiff must 
take the initiative and ask for the application of the right; plaintiffs may prefer 
to go before the civil courts; the Adhäsionsverfahren is obscure and 
complicates the proceedings; and, finally, the penal judge may be 
uncomfortable determining the existence and extent of tort damages. Despite  
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these reservations, the Adhäsionsverfahren, like the action civile and Alien 
Tort Statute, is evidence of the general principle of law that ordinarily crimes 
imply corresponding torts which can be the basis of a claim under customary 
international law in those states where customary international law is an 
integral part of the domestic legal order – the case of France, Britain, and the 
United States. 
b)  § 7 German Criminal Code (StGB) 
German law applies the passive personality extraterritorial jurisdiction in § 7 
of the German Penal Code which states: 
“(1) German penal law applies to acts which in foreign countries are directed 
against Germans when the act at the place where the action occurred is 
sanctioned by punishment or the place of the act is under no sovereign’s penal 
law. 
(2) For other acts which occur in foreign countries German penal law applies 
when the deed at the place of the act is sanctioned by punishment or the place 
of the act is under no sovereign’s penal law and the actor 
1. at that time was a German or since the occurrence of the act has 
acquired German nationality or 
2. at the time of the act was a foreigner and is in Germany and, although 
the extradition law permits his extradition according he has not been 
extradited because no extradition request was placed or the extradition 
request was denied or the extradition is not executable.”
150  
                                                 
150 Author’s  translation.  
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Thus, for example, where a German citizen sexually abuses a minor child citi-
zen of Kazakhstan and then returns to Germany and such sexual abuse is 
punishable both under the law of Kazakhstan and in German law the criminal 
act may be punished in Germany despite the passage of the statute of limita-
tions
151 since (like RICO) § 7 StGB looks not at procedural aspects of foreign 
law but rather only to the substance of the law. It seems that Germany has a 
doctrine similar to British double actionability which requires that extraterri-
torial crime be punishable both in the domestic and foreign legal system. 
2.  German Case Law 
a) Malenkovic 
In the Malenkovic
152 (Varvarin bridge) case the Yugoslavian survivors and 
relatives of a NATO air-strike against a bridge in Yugoslavia sued Germany in 
German courts for a violation of the Geneva conventions arguing that the 
bridge attacked was a civilian target. The facts of this case are thus very 
similar to those of Bankovic.
153 Unfortunately, the result was also similar: no 
liability was found. 
The German trial court (1
st Civil Chamber, Landgericht Bonn) determined 
that the case was admissible jurisdictionally as founded on § 18 Civil Process 
Ordinance (ZPO).
154 However, the substantive claim was determined to be 
without merit.
155 The plaintiff was required to pay the defendant’s costs, which 
is the ordinary rule in Europe, unlike the U.S. On the merits, the court 
                                                 
151  BGH 3 StR 437/99 – Beschluss v. 08. März 2000 (LG Hannover). 
152 Malenkovic, Beschluss v. 10 Oktober 2003 (LG Bonn), Az.: 1 O 361/02 available at: 
<http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden/themen/NATO-Krieg/varvarin-urteil.html>; 
<http://www.justiz.nrw.de/RB/nrwe/lgs/bonn/lg_bonn/j2003/1_O_361_02urteil20031
210.html>. 
153  Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic and Others v Belgium et al., App. No. 52207/99, 
12.12.2001, (2002) 41 ILM 517, available at:  
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=bankovic&sessionid=709433&skin=hudoc-en. 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D
3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=6223&sessionId=709433&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true. 
154  Beschluss v. 10 Oktober 2003 (LG Bonn), Az.: 1 O 361/02, available at:    
<http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden/themen/NATO-Krieg/varvarin-urteil.html>; 
<http://www.justiz.nrw.de/RB/nrwe/lgs/bonn/lg_bonn/j2003/1_O_361_02urteil20031
210.html>. 
155  Id.  
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determined that the plaintiff had no cause of action either in German domestic 
law or in international law and rejected the argument that Art.  25 of the 
German Constitution (Grundgesetz) would allow a remedy under international 
law for even if Art.  25 applied the court determined that no violation of 
international law existed. 
Though the court admits that torts in violation of the law of nations can 
exist it ascribes the right of remedy not to the individual injured but to their 
state relying on the rule that, generally, individuals have no legal personality in 
international law. This erroneous view merits a probing analysis in order to 
demonstrate why it is also a dangerous view. 
It may have been true in 1940 that, aside from the exceptions of piracy and 
slave-trading, individuals had no directly enforceable rights under international 
law. Today, however, that principle admits of many more exceptions, and 
those exceptions are growing. As recently as 1970 torture may not have been 
banned under customary international law. Today it clearly is. 
The court in Malenkovic attempts to explain away the many exceptions to 
the increasingly anachronistic and outdated rule by attributing the enforcement 
of individual rights under international law to states. The court even goes so far 
as to try to argue that individual rights arise not from custom – despite plenty 
of state practice to the contrary – and attempts, unpersuasively, to argue that 
individual rights arise under international law only out of conventions and 
treaties. The court at best is unintelligent, at worst dishonest. Obviously all 
rights are enforced by states! Taking the courts logic to its conclusion no 
individual anywhere has any right – for they must depend on the state for the 
defence of that right. And that reveals the danger of the courts reasoning: it 
elevates the state above the people who constitute it. If people do not have 
rights, except as mediated by states, then all freedoms are enjoyed only at the 
grace of the state. Any totalitarian would be pleased with the courts reasoning. 
However, the court exactly reverses the roles of the people who constitute the 
state in order to protect their rights. One can justifiably call the decision in 
Malenkovic reactionary. The same result could have been reached on other 
more defensible grounds. In any event, the Declaration des Droits de 
l’Homme, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and countless 
constitutions all echo one commonality: States do not create human rights. 
They recognize them. States, constituted by persons, are compelled to 
recognize human rights because they are inherent to the human condition. The 
fact that states do not always recognize human rights does not change the fact 
of their existence. It is exactly because human rights are of universal validity  
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that they can be enforced against outlaw and pariah regimes. Human rights are 
inherent to the human condition and thus inalienable, and states ignore this fact 
at their own peril: international law admits a right of self determination and to 
democracy. Essentially, though the court may not realize it, it is arguing that 
human rights are a mere creation of the state and can thus be destroyed at will, 
which is the essence of totalitarianism. The court thus elevates a legal fiction 
above reality. Further, if we examine the national and international instruments 
it is clear that human rights are not conceived by other states or the 
international system as anything other than an inherent and thus inalienable 
part of the human condition. Finally, the court’s reasoning is tautological: all 
legal rights are enforced by states. So arguing that human rights are something 
other than inherent and inalienable (an argument which would please any 
fascist) because those rights are protected (or not) by states ignores the real 
question: whether, and why, per the court, human rights are alienable. The 
court does not answer that question because it cannot, at least not defensibly 
within a liberal legal order. 
How does the court’s flawed tautological argument play out? Legally 
speaking, the court’s argument, which fundamentally opposes human rights, 
ignores the role of jus cogens and also natural law in shaping individual human 
rights in international law. As Justinian, Cicero,
156 Aquinas, and Aristotle
157 
argue, immoral laws are not law at all but at most a perversion of the law. As 
we saw in the case of Eichmann, some conduct is so heinous as to escape the 
ordinary procedural safeguards of non-retroactivity because it is wrong in all 
places and at all times. The allegations in Eichmann, if true, were so heinous 
that any person should naturally have recoiled in horror. The court's argument, 
like so many erroneous positivist arguments of the last bloody century ignores 
                                                 
156  Aquinas's famous maxim is “Lex Mala, Lex Nulla” – a bad law is no law at all. 
Aquinas echos earlier statements by Justinian and Cicero, for example: “What of the 
many deadly, the many pestilential statutes which nations put in force? These no more 
deserve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers might pass in their 
assembly.... [T]herefore Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in 
agreement with that primal and most ancient of all things, Nature; and in conformity 
to Nature's standard are framed those human laws which inflict punishment upon the 
wicked but defend and protect the good.” See, Cicero, “Laws” in: Clarence Morris, 
(ed.), Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings in Jurisprudence 51 (1997). 
157  “If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, 
and insist on its greater equity and justice.” Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, “Rhetoric”, page 1374 (1941). For Aristotle customary law and natural law 
appear to have been identical.  
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entirely the subordination of law to morality which must exist in any just legal 
order. 
Returning to Malenkovic, the court acknowledged that the European Con-
vention on Human Rights in Art. 5 (5) creates a directly enforceable individual 
right via Art. 34 ECHR. However, the court applies the same logic as Ban-
kovic, that the ECHR does not apply, because the bombardment took place 
outside of the jurisdiction of any contracting state party and thus does not meet 
the jurisdictional requirement of Art. 1 ECHR.
158 Just as in Bankovic, this ig-
nores that the planes flew from NATO basis under orders from state parties to 
the ECHR. The court thus presents us with a fine piece of formalism in the 
service of inhumanity. 
Arguments by the plaintiffs were also made on the basis of the Hague con-
vention on land warfare. The court rejects the argument that the Hague 
convention on land warfare only applies between state parties and any right of 
compensation therein is the right of the state and not the individual.
159 
Similarly the court ruled that the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civi-
lians in War and its optional protocol only applies to the relations of state 
parties and not to their citizens stating that while civilians “enjoy protection” 
under Art. 51 of that convention that does not give rise to a corresponding right 
legally enforceable by an individual. Even Art. 51’s provisions for liability do 
not create rights enforceable by individuals according to the court noting that 
the Convention and its Protocol do not establish any procedure for individuals 
to make claims. 
The court also rejects plaintiff’s argument that the complainants right stems 
from the law of German state liability. The court admits that the individual 
may have guaranties in national law more extensive than those in international 
law, but in Malenkovic holds that such is not the case. The plaintiffs’ attempt 
to rely on the general liability principles of German tort law embodied in § 823 
                                                 
158  Malenkovic, citing ECHR case 12.12.2001, EuGRZ 2002, 133. 
159  Art. 2-3 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, 18 October 1907 (Art. 2 HLKO). The 
court also refers the reader to the Distomo case, German Supreme Court (BGH), 
judgement of 26 June 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/98, published in NJW 2003, 3488 et seq., 
available at:  
<http://www.jurathek.de/showdocument.php3?session=0&ID=6052&referrer=446> 
(hereafter BGH, 26.6.2003). For more details see German Supreme Court decision of 
13.6.1996, (BGH Az.: III ZR 40/95, in NJW 1996, 3208 f).  
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of the German Civil Code (BGB) also fails
160 because German state-liability 
for torts does not exist in the case of armed conflicts. Rather, such cases are 
governed by international humanitarian law
161 and, essentially, the German 
court sees the state-liability regime as “suspended” in time of war leaving only 
the province of international law – which as we saw earlier the court believed, 
erroneously, did not directly give rights (or duties) to individuals. For similar 
reasons the court rejected the liability of the Civil Service.
162 
What is surprising about the Malenkovic decision is not that liability was 
not found, but rather the reasons for which it was not found. Plaintiffs in both 
Bankovic and Malenkovic argued that the aircraft flew from bases in Europe 
and were directed to do so by European states. Consequently it could be 
logically argued that while the targets were not under jurisdiction for Art. 1 of 
the ECHR the tortfeasor was. The courts also completely ignore that sending 
the bombers was an exercise of jurisdiction – jurisdiction to enforce. Ignoring 
that, even if one accepted the courts’ decision as to Art. 1 ECHR that still 
leaves the fact that the plaintiffs may have had tort claims under customary 
international law. The court in Malenkovic essentially ignores any possibility 
that the plaintiffs might, as individuals, have rights against the tortfeasors, say 
for air-piracy or state terrorism. The court could of course have reached the 
same result merely by arguing that the actions of the pilots were acto jure 
imperii and that as such they were subject to immunity. Instead it takes a con-
servative, even reactionary, approach and ignores the trend toward recognizing 
that individuals do in fact have directly enforceable rights and duties under 
international law and the existence of customary international law to that 
effect. To add insult to injury the court requires the plaintiffs, who have lost 
their relatives to a possibly illegal aerial bombardment, to pay compensation of 
the defendants’ court costs. 
b)  The Distomo Case 
In the Distomo case,
163 Greek plaintiffs sued the German government for com-
pensation for a massacre of 300 Greek nationals in 1944. Though the case had 
                                                 
160  German Supreme Court decision of 13.6.1996, (BGH Az: III ZR 40/95, in NJW 1996, 
3208 f). 
161 BGH,  26.6.2003. 
162  § 839 German Civil Code in connection with Art. 34 German Constitution. 
163 BGH,  26.6.2003.  
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been heard by the highest Greek court (finding for plaintiff),
164 the German 
Supreme Court did not give res judicata effect to that decision for procedural 
reasons.
165 On the merits, the German Supreme Court (BGH) determined that 
the act, though illegal, was nonetheless subject to state immunity
166 because 
individuals in 1944 had no directly enforceable individual rights under inter-
national law, and thus a claim made now for an act in violation of international 
law in 1944 does not result in a right to compensation.
167 The court also argues 
that only states had directly enforceable rights under international law at the 
time of the crime.
168 
The court also determined that the appeals court was correct in finding that 
the Federal Law for Compensation of Victims of national-socialist persecu-
tion
169 did not apply. The court did agree, however, that it could hear the claim 
as an ordinary tort claim. Though Art. 5 (2) of the London Convention
170 had 
held such claims in suspension until a final settlement of the peace the “two 
plus four treaty”
171 operated in fact as the necessary final settlement of the 
war.
172 However, once again, state immunity prevented any valid substantive 
claim. 
The court also noted that there was no liability of the civil service under 
§ 839 German Civil Code – just as in Malenkovic. This raises the issue of 
parallels and divergences between Distomo and Malenkovic. 
Though Malenkovic was decided by the absence of jurisdiction and not by 
reason of state-immunity, Distomo and Malenkovic are parallel in that Distomo 
holds that in a war-zone ordinary rules of liability are largely suspended and 
that individuals do not generally have directly enforceable rights under inter-
national law. However, Distomo is a better decision because 1) the court in 
Distomo recognizes the evolution toward directly enforceable individual rights 
                                                 
164  Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No 11/2000, Judgment of 
4 May 2000, Greek Areopag. Note however that a later decision refused to enforce the 
judgment against German assets in Greece on the basis of internal Greek law 
rendering the decision essentially symbolic. 
165  Distomo, BGH, NJW 2003, pp. 3488-3489. 
166  Id. 
167  Id., at 3491. 
168  Id. 
169  Bundesentschädigungsgesetz – BEG of 18 September 1953 (BGBl. I p. 1387). 
170  Published 4 July 1956, BGBl. II S. 864. 
171  12 September 1990, BGBl. II S. 1318; in force since 15 March 1991, BGBl. II S. 585. 
172  BGH, NJW 2003, 3488, at 3490.  
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and duties under international law, 2) the court in Distomo reaches the real 
issue: whether states are immune for violations of jus cogens, but limits its 
decision to the facts of the case, holding that states are currently immune for 
past violations of international law if the state would have been immune at the 
time of the violation of international law. Thus, the court in Distomo, unlike 
the court in Malenkovic, leaves room for evolution of the law either as to 
whether immunity would not apply to an Act of State in violation of jus cogens 
today. The court in Distomo also seems more open to the idea of the possibility 
of directly enforceable individual rights under international law than in 
Malenkovic, though holding that such rights do not in fact exist given the facts 
of the Distomo case. 
We can also compare Distomo to Sampson v. Germany 
173 at least on the 
facts and note that the parallel U.S. case reaches the same results for similar 
reasons: state immunity. It seems rather clear that immunity is, internationally, 
the greatest obstacle to remedies for individual claimants in cases of serious 
violations of international law. The second greatest obstacle, at least in Ger-
many, is the persistence of the notion that international law only grants 
remedies to states. However, as was abundantly demonstrated in American, 
British, and Francophone law this is simply no longer no longer a valid view of 
international law. On this point Germany, or at least the court in Malenkovic, 
finds itself taking the minority view. 
Synthesis:  Private Law Protection of Human Rights before the 
EU Member States 
As we have seen plaintiffs are not without remedies in the cases brought before 
domestic courts of the Member States of the European Union for extra-terri-
torial violations of human rights law, including the possibility of making 
claims for compensation as parties civiles in an action civile. In theory this 
would also be possible in German law through the Adhäsionsverfahren. 
Though it is clear that the principal remedy for human rights violations in 
Europe is criminal prosecution and the principal remedy for human rights 
violations in U.S. law is tort, both systems do not exclusively rely on tort law 
or criminal law to punish, deter, and compensate victims of human rights 
violations even where those victims are not nationals of the forum jurisdiction. 
Tort law and criminal law should play complementary roles in preventing and 
remedying violations of human rights. 
                                                 
173  Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F. Supp. 1108.  
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Part II:  Private Law Protection of Human Rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Introduction 
What are the possibilities and limits of tort law as a remedy for violations of 
private rights of individuals under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)? To ultimately answer that question we will first consider: some 
points of general interpretation and individual rights under the ECHR. 
I.  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
We can best approach understanding Drittwirkung and competing hierarchical 
categories using the functionalist method of looking at practical causes and 
effects empirically and inductively. With this method we can now attempt to 
analyse the scope of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. We proceed in both 
cases by analysing the relevant treaty’s terms and then looking at leading cases 
that attempt to interpret and apply the treaties. We conclude that opportunities 
do exist for the protection of human rights via tort law, even extraterritorially, 
within the ECHR. 
A.  The Terms of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1.  Article 1 ECHR 
Art. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 
Two notes are important here. First, the convention on its own terms expressly 
extends its protections to “everyone” “subject to the jurisdiction” of the con-
tracting state
174 without regard to nationality.
175 This protection goes beyond 
the ordinary duty of states imposed by international law to respect the rights of 
                                                 
174  Karl Josef Partsch, Die Rechte und Freiheiten der europäischen Menschenrechtskon-
vention, Berlin 1966: Duncker & Humblot (hereafter Partsch), p. 60. 
175  “[I]n becoming a Party to the Convention a state undertakes to secure Convention 
rights and freedoms ‘not only to its own nationals and those of other High Contracting 
Parties but also to nationals of States not parties to the Convention and to stateless 
persons’.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights 
Treaties in the Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 
European Journal of International Law 529, 548 (2003) (quoting Austria v. Italy, 4 YB 
ECHR (1961), 138-140) (hereafter Orakhelashvili).  
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foreign citizens.
176 The ECHR is not linked to citizenship for such would not 
serve the goals of the convention.
177 Furthermore, individuals may either be 
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting state (in personam 
jurisdiction) or be subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting state by reason 
of personal property (in rem jurisdiction).
178 Merely having property subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court can subject the individual to its jurisdiction. This 
implies that the convention protects the fundamental rights of individuals 
rather than the interests of contracting states, as case law shows.
179 For 
example, in Ireland v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights stated that: 
“Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises 
more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, 
over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective 
obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective 
enforcement’.”
180 Similar reasoning also applies to the genocide convention.
181 
Though individuals may bring claims against other states, non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) do not have standing to bring cases before the 
ECHR.
182 The Strasbourg Court has held that: 
“it is clear ... that it is not the applicant Union, as such, which is the victim of 
the alleged infringement of the right guaranteed by article 14 of the 
Convention. It is not the association itself, in fact which could be compelled to 
compulsory labour, but each of its members as individuals. It follows that, as 
regards the alleged violation of Article 4, the applicant Union cannot claim to 
be the victim of a violation of the Convention.”
183 
NGOs often play a key “watchdog” role in protection of human rights – but 
they cannot play this role under the terms of the ECHR as it is today. 
What of the “territoriality” of the conventions rights? The extension of the 
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178  Id., at 60-61. 
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180  Id., citing Ireland v. UK, 58 ILR (1980) 188, at 291. 
181  Advisory Opinion on Reservations, ICJ Reports (1951) at 23. 
182 Marek Antoni Nowicki, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) before the 
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protections of the convention to citizen and non-citizen alike is very favourable 
to human rights’ protection of non-citizens, since a general climate of respect 
for the law is necessary for the protection of human rights. However, the 
limitation of those rights to those places “subject to the jurisdiction” of a con-
tracting party is unfavourable to human rights protection globally. The 
convention’s protections do not travel with the citizen of a contracting party 
when they leave the jurisdiction of a contracting state. Historically, however, 
until the industrial revolution law was essentially personal: thus Roman law 
would apply to Romans outside of the territory of the Empire. In the medieval 
era Christians, Moslems and Jews had different rights in one country. We can 
also still see vestiges of law based on the person and not territory. These are 
most evident in religious law, which in some states (notably those influenced 
by Islamic religion) is the governing positive law of family relations including 
the law of successions. The idea that the law follows the person is also 
reflected in the law of nationality of those states which, like Germany, 
determine nationality by descent according to the rule of ius sanguine. 
Historically this differential personalized treatment explained, for example, 
why Jewish persons could become moneylenders though that was forbidden to 
Christians. Unfortunately the human rights protections of the convention are 
not extended like the laws of the Roman Empire to the person of the citizens of 
a contracting state. Under Article 1, once a person is no longer subject to the 
jurisdiction of the contracting parties they no longer enjoy the legal protection 
of the convention. 
On the other hand, the convention does protect the rights not only of 
citizens but also of all persons within the jurisdiction of a contracting party. 
Even transient persons enjoy the human rights protection of the convention. 
This is a very generous fact for that is not at all the case of the constitutional 
protections of the U.S. which are increasingly seen as not having application or 
having only reduced application to non-citizens. 
As we will see in the cases of Al-Adsani, Bankovic, and Loizidou, the prin-
cipal issue in any litigation for extra-territorial effect of the convention is simp-
ly whether the convention even applies at all. The non-applicability of the con-
vention to extra-territorial conduct – even where such conduct is a violation of 
customary international law! – is a serious limitation of the convention. We 
now will look at the specific protections of the convention to see whether they 
can be the basis for individual claims in tort.  
  184
2.  Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security 
Art. 5 states:  
“(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law. 
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention 
of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compen-
sation.” 
Art.  5  (5) is intended to assure the enforcement of the familiar rights of 
criminal procedure protected under Art. 5 (1) – 5 (4) before national courts. 
Art. 5 (5) thus serves a similar function with Art. 13 (infra).
184 The right to 
compensation for wrongful arrest is, however, subject to ordinary jurisdictional 
rules (a claimant must appear before the proper court) and must have 
exhausted his local remedies.
185 Art. 5 (5) essentially creates a private cause of 
action in tort to remedy abuse of human rights by the government. Thus, the 
ECHR in fact does guarantee its protections in part through tort. 
3.  Article 3 – Freedom from Torture 
Art. 3 states clearly and succinctly in its entirety: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
Art. 3 requires that remedies for torture must be given to ‘everyone’, not only 
victims whose torture involves the state accused of not providing the necessary 
remedy. On this basis one can argue for an extensive reading of Art. 3, particu-
larly since torture is a violation of jus cogens, universally condemned, and 
liable to universal jurisdiction. One scholar thus argues that “Article 1 extends 
to everyone who is under the jurisdiction of the state when claiming that their 
rights guaranteed by the Convention, such as freedom from torture, have been 
violated, and it is not necessarily limited to situations where a victim is 
actually tortured within the jurisdiction of that state.”
186 The extradition or 
                                                 
184  A. H. Robertson J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe, Manchester University 
Press: Manchester and New York (1993) p. 83. 
185  Wemhoff v. the Federal Republic of Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A, 
No. 7. 
186  Orakhelashvili, at 551.  
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forced repatriation
187 of a person from a state party to the ECHR to a state 
where that person will likely be tortured or subject to an inhuman punishment 
is a violation of Art.  3.
188 The responsibility of a state party can even be 
invoked for acts by terrorists who are not state sponsored or even for acts of 
non-contracting States.
189 
4.  Article 6 – Right to a Fair Trial 
Art. 6 essentially guaranties usual rights of the accused to a fair and speedy 
trial seen in all developed countries before a neutral judge. However, Art. 6 of 
the ECHR does not contain any express provision as to what form of court 
proceeding is required. Thus, for example one of the parties to a proceeding 
does not necessarily have the right to be a witness in his cause.
190 However, 
unlike Art.  13, Art.  6 creates immediately enforceable rights in all persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of a state party.
191 Thus, Art. 6 can be invoked before 
national courts where the convention has internal effect within the domestic 
legal order.
192 
5.  Article 13 – Right to an Effective Remedy 
Art. 13 of the ECHR states: 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” 
It can only be invoked in connection with some other right guaranteed under 
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the ECHR.
193 What is meant by “effective remedy”? The ECHR has held that 
“an effective remedy under Art. 13 must mean a remedy that is as effective as 
it can be, having regard to the restricted scope for recourse inherent in any sys-
tem for the protection of national security.”
194 
As was already mentioned, Art. 13 does not provide a cause of action in its 
own terms but rather only in combination with some other article of the con-
vention. However, once another right is invoked, if that right can be heard be-
fore a national court in a domestic proceeding, Art. 13 would allow a remedy 
against persons – even against persons acting in their official capacity!
195 One 
could argue, probably unsuccessfully, that Art. 13 implies a waiver of immu-
nity of state officials. A criminal complaint linked to a claim for compensation 
in tort raises the issue of whether Art. 13 and Art. 6 para 1 can be invoked as a 
defence which does seem to be the case.
196 
All these possible claims raise the question whether and when the ECHR 
has “direct effect”. The question for reasons already extensively discussed in 
the preceding chapter is actually ill put. The answer to this question will show 
why. Let us look at the legal facts: It is true that only a state party may be sued 
under the ECHR. Strictly speaking the ECHR has no direct third party 
effect.
197 However, as expressly noted by the Strasbourg court, the convention 
is relevant “even in the sphere of relations between individuals”.
198 This 
relevance arises through application of the ECHR within the domestic legal 
order of the contracting states by laws such as Britain’s Human Rights Act. 
Further, in monist states such as France where treaty law is part of the 
domestic legal order the ECHR does have direct effect.
199 So while it is 
possible to pose questions about “Drittwirkung” and/or “direct effect” these 
abstract analytical tools can really only yield confusing answers. However, by 
asking more specific concrete questions we can reach satisfactory answers 
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obviating the need for confused terminological hair-splitting. 
As we can see, on its own terms, there are a few legal arguments under the 
ECHR that could be made for victims of torts in violation of human rights, 
most significantly perhaps Art. 5 (5) of the ECHR. How do these rights work 
out in the practice? To answer that question we look at case law. 
B.  Cases Litigated under the Convention 
With a basic understanding of the texts which may be the basis for protection 
of human rights in tort we can now see how the ECHR applies those texts and 
whether this application ever results in extra-territorial effect of the ECHR. 
Sadly the results are disappointing. In just about all cases the ECHR is 
interpreted conservatively such and is not applied outside the territory of the 
contracting parties. 
1. Bankovic 
In Bankovic, survivors and relatives of civilian victims killed by a NATO air-
bombardment of the Belgrade Radio-Television station complained of viola-
tions of Article 2 (right to life), Article 10 (freedom of information) and Article 
13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. The claims were determined as inadmissible as the place bombarded 
was not within the Article 1 jurisdiction of the Convention.
200 
The court reasoned that, wherever decided, the act was performed outside 
the jurisdiction of the state-parties.
201 The court, bound by the Vienna Conven-
tion on treaties,
202 applied an “ordinary meaning”
203 test to the phrase “within 
their jurisdiction in context of the object and purpose of the convention and 
subsequent practice.
204 The court quickly concluded that as to the ordinary 
meaning of “jurisdiction” in Article 1 of the ECHR, state jurisdictional compe-
tence is primarily territorial and that exceptions thereto are defined and limited 
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by the territorial rights of other states.
205 The court found that state practice
206 
and the travaux préparatoires of the convention
207 supported this view. 
Though the court acknowledges that the ECHR is a “living instrument”
208 it 
notes that the travaux préparatoires clearly indicate the intent of the con-
tracting state parties.
209 
This decision has been sharply criticized. Orakhelashvili notes that the 
court in Bankovic was at the margin of its mandate and that a ruling would 
require the court to adjudicate and overrule legal principles and considerations 
external to the Convention.
210 Nonetheless he criticizes the decision because 
the court did not decide the case for those reasons but rather attempted to 
justify its decision within the terms of the convention itself,
211 but ignored the 
duty of the court “to resolve any doubts in the light of the object and purpose 
of the treaty”.
212 Orakhelashvili goes on to say that: “The general impression 
...from Bankovic and Al-Adsani is that the European Court feels free to pick 
and choose between different methods of interpretation as if there were no 
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order or hierarchy between these methods.”
213 
Orakhelashvili is correct. There is even a term for this type of decision 
making: it is called “legal realism”. To prove his charge, Orakhelashvili notes 
that: “...specific interpretive methods were misapplied... the Court has 
practically failed in the two cases to accord due importance to the nature of the 
European Convention as an instrument of public order establishing obligations 
of an objective nature, which go beyond the reciprocal commitments of indi-
vidual contracting states. Furthermore, the Court also neglected the question of 
how certain provisions of the Convention are mirrored in general international 
law. Finally, the Court’s line of reasoning in both cases lacked the requisite 
degree of coherence when dealing with the previous jurisprudence of the Con-
vention organs.”
214 
In sum, the court’s decision if unprincipled was also inept. A more coherent 
and defensible decision could have been reached either on the basis of state 
immunity or on the international law concerns expressed by Orakhelashvili. 
We can see the flaw in the courts’ reasoning this way: suppose that a band of 
robbers and murders decided in Italy to conspire to kill a Serbian, then went to 
Serbia and killed the person, and returned to Italy to enjoy their plunder. 
Would the victim and survivors then be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
ECHR for their criminal conspiracy? Certainly. Further, the NATO aircraft, as 
aspects of the state, are by their very nature an exercise of jurisdiction, namely 
jurisdiction to enforce. Thus the convention should apply. The reasoning of the 
court in Bankovic is flawed. 
2. Al-Adsani 
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Al-Adsani 
v. United Kingdom
215 is factually similar to Saudi Arabia v. Nelson
216. Al-
Adsani, a British pilot in the Kuwaiti air force, was tortured by the Kuwaiti 
government, apparently for distributing salacious tapes of an important 
sheikh.
217 The plaintiff was not only beaten and threatened but was severely 
burned, ultimately requiring medical treatment in Britain.
218 The plaintiff based 
his claims on Art. 3 (freedom from torture) and Art. 6 (the right of access to a 
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court) of the ECHR. Art.  3 was determined to be inapplicable outside the 
jurisdiction of the contracting states.
219 Art. 6 was also complied with by the 
contracting state because of the immunity of foreign states. Al-Adsani was a 
case of the immunity of a state (as opposed to an individual)
220 for officially 
sanctioned torture.
221 Again, state immunity shows itself to be a key problem 
in guaranteeing human rights. Citing Nelson
222 and Amerada Hess
223 (among 
others) the ECHR found Kuwait to be immune.
224 Like the case of Sampson v. 
F.R.G.,
225 Al-Adsani relies on the tenuous distinction that while states may not 
violate their jus cogens obligations, those obligations do not require states to 
create remedies for their breach by other states.
226 Thus a state can grant an-
other state immunity for violation of jus cogens. The only other reading of that 
case would be that torture is not in fact a norm erga omnes
227 or jus cogens
228 
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which, given the convention against torture and state practice, is not the case. 
Further, Al-Adsani cannot be read as carving out a “de minimis” defence to 
torture: The plaintiff was severely burned (unlike Nelson who suffered no 
permanent physical injury). This decision, like the decision in Belgium v. 
Congo, effectively denudes jus cogens and if applied to the war crimes of the 
last world war would have exonerated many of those convicted. 
However, Al-Adsani does contain one hidden gem for those who wish to 
defend human rights. Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait
229 clearly states that for 
every crime there is a corresponding intentional tort in international law as 
well as domestically. Thus Al-Adsani leaves open two possibilities for 
plaintiffs. One is to argue from customary law that the common law, as French 
law, directly incorporates customary international law as part of the common 
law/ droit commun; that for every common law crime there is a corresponding 
tort; and thus, plaintiffs can sue under the ordinary tort regime while enjoying 
the jurisdictional benefits of universal jurisdiction as to violations of jus 
cogens. This does not, however, remove the defences of the state to immunity. 
But, logically, state immunity cannot be asserted in violation of jus cogens, 
because jus cogens norms are by definition non-derogable. Further, even if 
immunity for violations of jus cogens were not a logical impossibility, the 
immunity of the state must be distinguished from the immunity of the state’s 
agent. By suing not the state but its agent the issue of the state’s immunity is 
obviated. Then only the personal immunity of the defendant will be at issue. 
While ranking ministers and heads of state, according to the ICJ, do enjoy 
personal immunity for official acts during their term of office, this does not 
mean that lower ranking state officials have personal immunity. Further, 
personal immunities are limited to official acts after expiration of the officials’ 
term of office. 
3.  Brumarescu and Loizidou: Extraterritoriality and Expropriation 
Not all cases that seek to apply the ECHR outside the territory of the EU fail. 
In two cases of expropriation of land outside the EU but within the jurisdiction 
of contracting states, jurisdiction was found. The cases of Loizidu v. Turkey
230 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp59dFall1996p63.htm. 
59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 (Autumn 1996). 
229  107 I.L.R. 536, 540 (Eng. C.A. 1996): “In international law, torture is a violation of a 
fundamental human right, it is a crime and a tort for which the victim should be 
compensated.” 
230  Loizidu v. Turkey, ECHR 28/7/1998.  
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and Brumarescu v. Romania,
231 although judged by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and thus possibly valid only in Europe, may be evidence of a right 
to compensation or restitution for nationalization's under international law.
232 
Though Romania is not a member of the EU it, like Turkey, is a signatory 
to the ECHR. Thus the application of the ECHR was not really problematic. 
However, as it acts as a companion case to the more controversial case of 
Loizidou v. Turkey we will look at it briefly. In Brumarescu, the Brumarescu’s 
house was nationalized by the Romanian government in 1950.
233 That 
nationalization was wrongful in the sense that by Romanian domestic law the 
Brumarescus should have been exempted from nationalization.
234 The house 
was later sold in 1974 by the state to a third party. The house then passed by 
inheritance to the Mirescus. The European Court recognized the right of the 
Brumarescus to compensation.
235 
Loizidou v. Turkey more clearly raised the issue of what is meant by 
jurisdiction in Article 1 of the ECHR. Loizidu owned land on Cyprus – which 
was, however, seized when the Turkish government invaded and occupied 
northern Cyprus.
236 Turkey then created a puppet government which, however, 
has been recognized de jure by no state other than Turkey. The court had no 
problem finding that northern Cyprus was subject to the jurisdiction of Turkey 
because of the Turkish military presence. This opens up the possibility of 
arguing that NATO occupied areas of Yugoslavia were subject to the 
jurisdiction of one or several of the state parties to the ECHR or its rarely 
invoked American counterpart. 
Like Brumarescu, Loizidu v. Turkey also recognized a right to compensa-
tion for the seizure of the plaintiff’s land.
237 Brumarescu could, however, be 
limited by the fact that the nationalization was not in the public interest but 
                                                 
231  Brumarescu v. Romania, ECHR, 28/10/1999. 
232 But  see:  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398. 
233  Brumarescu v. Romania, 28 October 1999, ECHR Application no. 28342/95 
(Judgment: Merits) para. 12, available at:    
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en&attachment=true. 
234  Id., at para. 15. 
235  Id., at para. 22.  
236  Loizidou v. Turkey  (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Publications ECHR, 
Series A no. 310, para. 11. 
237  Id., at para. 26-27 (ECHR 1998).  
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rather was in the interest of only private persons.
238 Similarly Loizidou could 
be limited by the fact that Turkey had no legal right to invade Cyprus, and 
thereby violated the Charter of the United Nations.
239 In fact, the emerging 
norm against nationalization is one more evidence of the limitation of state 
sovereignty. The historic definition of a state’s sovereignty was ultimate and 
absolute authority over all persons and objects within its territory. This ulti-
mate and absolute power is increasingly relativized in the contemporary inter-
national system. 
4.  Tugar v. Italy
240 
In Tugar v. Italy an Iraqi mine clearer operating in Iraq detonated a mine los-
ing one leg as a result. The mines were sold by Italy. At the time Italy had no 
export licensing requirements on mines. It later enacted one but only after the 
sale of the mine in question. Tugar’s complaint was based on Art.  2 and 
Art. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. His claim was deter-
mined to be inadmissible, however, due to Art. 1 which applies the convention 
to those acts “within the jurisdiction” of the contracting state parties. While the 
manufacture and even sale of the mines occurred in Italy, they were sent 
outside the territory of a state party to the convention and further ultimately 
deployed not by a contracting party but by Iraq. Essentially, Tugar’s claim was 
that Italy negligently failed to prevent sale of arms to an outlaw state or 
government. Of course, the ECHR can apply outside the territory of the Con-
tracting Parties: 
“A measure of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoy-
ment of a Convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not 
too remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant 
Convention guarantee.”
241 
A point the court conceded to Tugar. However, Tugar’s case was distinguished 
from the Soering decision
242, on the argument that the decision to extradite is 
                                                 
238  Brumarescu v. Romania (Application no. 28342/95), para. 13 (ECHR, 28 October 1999). 
239  Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50) (40/1993/435/514) para. 13 (ECHR, 28 July 1998). 
240  Tugar v. Italy, Application No. 22869/93 (ECHR 18 October 1995) available at : 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D
3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=2341&sessionId=710132&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true. 
241  Soering, ECHR, 7 July 1989, Publications ECHR, Series A no. 161, p. 33, para 85. 
242  Id.  
  194
an act of ”jurisdiction”
243 and that, in contrast, the injury to Tugar: 
“can not be seen as a direct consequence of the failure of the Italian authorities 
to legislate on arms transfers. There is no immediate relationship between the 
mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of weapons and the possible 
‘indiscriminate’ use thereof in a third country, the latter's action constituting 
the direct and decisive cause of the accident which the applicant suffered.”
 244 
This distinction is of course very similar to that made in the common law of 
torts between cause in fact and proximate cause: in Tugar’s case, while there 
would be causation in fact, there would not be proximate causation. 
The logic of the decision in Tugar does not seem flawed but the outcome is 
very dissatisfying. The struggle to suppress anti-personnel mines is very im-
portant since such mines kill long after the conflict that led to their deployment 
and the victims are often children. Further, Tugar was working for an NGO 
which offered mine clearing operations as a sub-contractor. The decision does 
not say whether there was a contract and if so with which state. Suppose Tugar 
had been employed as a directly or indirectly by an ECHR signatory. Suppose 
further, that an ECHR signatory was exercising actual control over the area 
that Tugar was working in. Those presuppositions would be good arguments 
for application of the ECHR to his case. 
Conclusion 
Our study has revealed that the laws of the Member States of the European 
Union are generally the most successful line of attack on extra-territorial 
human rights violations. Secondarily, the ECHR may be able to be used to 
remedy human rights violations. We have seen that the principle remedy in 
European law is criminal prosecution, but that tort law can and does play a 
supplementary and/or secondary role as a legal remedy to violations of human 
rights outside the territory of the Member States. Our study has also revealed 
that the national laws both of the EU Member States and the United State 
could, consistent with international law, go further than they do in protecting 
human rights outside of Europe. 
Protections at the supra-national are possible before the European Court of 
Human Rights. Such protections, however, are generally limited in their effect 
to Europe. Whether before courts of the Member States or before the European 
                                                 
243  Then why isn’t the decision in Bankovic to send bombing aircraft also an act of 
jurisdiction? 
244  Tugar v. Italy, Application No. 22869/93 (ECHR 18 October 1995).  
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Court of Human Rights, creative lawyering could extend human rights protec-
tion to cases within the terms of existing treaties. 
Throughout this study we have seen that the principle limitation on extra-
territorial defence of human rights is immunity and jurisdiction. Both these 
obstacles, while serious, are not insurmountable. It seems relatively clear that 
the United States has gone further in the protection of human rights through 
private law just as it is equally clear that Europe has much more vigorously 
used criminal law to prosecute such offences. However, these offences are so 
heinous that ideally Europe and the United States will learn from each other 
and extend the protection of human rights. Just as Europe would do well to 
consider an Alien Tort Statute, so would the United States do well to consider 
the action civile. These are just the two most obvious examples. This work has 
tried to highlight other areas where good faith application of the law as it is can 
be used to extend the protection of human rights to all persons in the world. 
Hopefully it will contribute to that task. 
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